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ABSTRACT
Ghost-Bodies: History, Performance, and Practice in
Contemporary Dance in France 1980-2000 explores a 
phenomenon in dance known as “muscle memory”, that ability 
which the dancing body develops acutely, which allows a 
dancer to remember choreography, and even to perform steps 
automatically. This ability is crucial to dance’s history and 
future, both of which are characterised by an oral tradition of 
transmission. The common belief that muscle memory, and the 
body image upon which it depends, are enduring constructions, 
is opposed by contemporary neuroscience. Recent research into 
phantom limbs suggests that the body image is, rather, a 
malleable construct, and challenges the perception of the body 
image’s stability that is widespread in dance today.
Science provides explanatory models which enter popular 
culture. These metaphors, which conceptualise the workings of 
the human organism, affect the way in which the dancing body 
perceives and acts. Yet these metaphors are also reshaped by 
the art-making of the human. The thesis offers a metaphorology 
of dance techniques now dominating practice in France. It 
proposes a new model for conceptualising how subjectivities 
are constructed and perpetuated: the ghost-body.
The ghost-body is a synthesis of information arising from 
techniques of conceptualising, perceiving, and acting. Two 
ghost bodies currently dominate contemporary dance in France. 
The first, the Ghost-Body-as-Clockwork, is traced in 
Enlightenment philosophy and science; in the arts, through 
works by Edgar Degas and the ballet Coppélia; and in the dance 
studio, through the mechanical metaphors used by classical 
ballet. The Ghost-Body-as-Marionette is traced in the Romantic 
movement, through the scientific movement of vitalism and the 
pseudo-scientific movement of mesmerism; in the arts, through 
gothic literature and the romantic ballet, as well as through their 
revival in the work of Pina Bausch and Pedro Almodovar; and 
in the dance studio, through metaphors of strings and passive 
movement.
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Explanatory Note
To promote readability, my general rule in this study on French dance, has 
been to provide English translations in the main text, and to give the original French 
in footnotes where relevant. Exceptions to this rule occur where I have judged the 
original French wording to be important, at which points the French is given in the 
main text, and an English translation provided in a footnote. Each chapter provides 
the full name of authors the first time they are mentioned; thereafter they are referred 
to by last name only. The codified vocabulary of ballet is italicised.
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PARTI
THE GHOST-BODY IN
THE MAKING
Chapter 1 
Introduction: The Ghost-Body in Dance Studies
The first time a movement is encountered, the dancer-in-the-making must 
consciously hold in mind and direct the different parts of the body, their different 
efforts, and their timings. But with practice, these efforts no longer need to be guided 
consciously: the dancer can rely instead for a movement’s accomplishment on what 
dancers call “muscle memory”. The “muscle memory” of which dancers speak is in 
fact a misnomer, in that it does not consist solely in traces laid down in the body. 
Certainly, when rehearsing repertoire after a season or two has passed without 
performing a piece, a dancer may say that a step feels “right”. When he or she does 
so, what is happening is that the dancer is measuring his or her current kinetic 
sensations, as he or she performs the step, and comparing them to remembered 
sensations. The intelligence which makes dancers commonly able to perform an 
isolated coordination, a sequence of steps, and in some cases even a lengthy segment 
of choreography, even when not attending to the actions they make—an inattention 
due to stress or other circumstances—does not reside solely in the muscles 
themselves, but is constituted by pattemings of synapses in the brain. These 
pattemings of synapses which enable movement to emerge spontaneously and 
unwilled in the body are laid down in the brain through practice. Through practice, 
the body becomes the repository of a savoir-faire, it becomes a “body of knowledge”.
The more usual meaning of the term “body of knowledge” is that of a 
discipline or conceptual field that is constituted by a branch of learning. The 
information such a body comprises does not reside in a real body, but, rather, takes 
shape in different ways in culture. The present study uses the term in this sense also, 
in order to refer to the history of dance seen in its techniques, repertory, and 
institutions. I distinguish between two different kinds of body of knowledge: the 
animate dancing body which is limited by space and time; and inanimate methods, 
discourses, and institutions of culture. Yet I wish to propose that these two kinds of 
body interact, and even that they are inextricably interwoven. It is in order to
conceptualise the movement back and forth between the two kind of bodies which it 
identifies, that the present study proposes the idea of a “ghost-body”.
My introduction consists of six sections. In Section 1, “The Ghost-Body: 
Paradigm of Paradigms”, I indicate how the concept of the Ghost-Body may help to 
explain the way in which intelligence moves, taking on new forms as it does so. In 
Section 2, “Dancing Knowledge, Thinking, and Thinking About Dancing”, I outline 
the point of view of the dancer’s intelligence, illuminating my examination with 
recent findings in linguistics and cognitive science, disciplines which now forcefully 
argue that the human’s experience of movement is at the basis of its cognitive 
abilities. In Section 3, “The Discourse of Dancing Knowledge”, I consider a tradition 
of writing by choreographers, which reflected on the body-mind opposition dominant 
in European culture, analysing the different attitudes they adopted in affirming their 
stance within the body side of this binary opposition. Section 4, “Ghost-Writers of 
Ghost-Bodies”, examines the different texts which are the principal influences on the 
present study, showing the strands of concern and methodological approaches which 
have provided the inspiration and point of departure for my own text. Section 5, 
“Parts and Wholes of Ghost-Bodies”, explains the structure of the thesis, and how it 
gives textual form to Ghost-Bodies' methodology. Section 6, “The Ghost-Body-as- 
Clockwork and The-Ghost-Body-as-Marionette”, outlines the contents of the chapters 
of Parts n and m.
1. The Ghost-Bodv: Paradigm of Paradigm
Culture, which I am considering, broadly, as inanimate in the sense that it no 
longer resides only in actual living bodies, contains a body of knowledge which is 
specific to dance, one which is distributed in a dance culture’s institutions, methods of 
practice, repertory, and in the word. This inanimate body of knowledge, which grows 
and changes, is formed through the activity of living bodies. Living dancing bodies 
expressed, into the world, the knowledge that their experience gave them, and in so 
doing moulded culture, a culture which now in turn acts as the mould which shapes 
the way in which bodies engage in the practice of dancing. Thus do past dancing 
bodies leave their mark on present and future ones; for the traces these bodies have
left on the world persist as real presences. They are “ghosts” which appear in, and act 
on, the present.
I am proposing the term “ghost-body” as a conceptual tool, one which has the 
particularity of being able to perform certain moves. The ghost-body can appear, 
disappear, and re-appear in the present. Here, it may shimmer and linger in any of the 
degrees along the spectrum of materiality, from transparent immateriality to actual 
embodied flesh. In its most immaterial instances, the ghost-body exists as a kind of 
projection whose transparent image, superimposed on the world, transforms that upon 
which it shines. Hence, the ghost-body is a paradigm, both of paradigm itself and of 
paradigm-shifter, making re-emergence possible, but also, simultaneously, ensuring 
that absolute repetition is impossible. For the ghost-body condenses and displaces 
memory, yet its process of condensation and displacement involves a measure of 
distortion which means that the old appears in the world as new; a distortion whose 
different degrees allow for a span of instantiations, from the seemingly identical to the 
apparently dissimilar.
I employ the paradigm of the ghost-body to suggest that choreography from 
different periods is motivated by similar impulses. But besides suggesting that the 
ghost-body is responsible for the forward movement of cultural memory from the past 
into the present and future, I also argue that it is what allows dancing knowledge to 
propagate through different living bodies. The ghost-body is at the foundation: of the 
empathetic connection between the performance and the audience; of the intuitive 
bond between choreographer and dancer; and of the transference between dance 
teacher and student-dancer. It is what allows the audience to be moved by what it 
sees at the theatre, what allows invention to oecur in the rehearsal room, and what 
allows learning to happen in the dance studio.
The concept of ghost-body offers a way of illustrating the passage of time as 
non-linear, and of describing time-present as a discontinuous texture: one comprising 
the juxtaposed surfacings of divers times-past, strands of different histories whose 
only connection may be that they happen to emerge at the same moment in the now. 
The concept implies that the smooth, cohesive, interwoven texture of time-present is a 
surface illusion which, being illusory, does not enable the present to lie over the past 
like a blanket that puts it uniformly to sleep. Rather the various pasts of culture lie
under the surface of the present in different degrees of wakefulness, some of them 
merely laying in wait, ready to arise into the present.
2. Dancing Knowledge. Thinking, and Thinking About Thinking
In 1991, after more than ten years as a dancer, a time I spent dancing a wide 
span of repertoire ranging from Petipa to William Forsythe, I decided to attend 
university. Once involved in the world of academe, I felt I was in a world that 
literally thought differently.
As a dancer, I was used to memorising complex sequences of movements, and 
had developed an ability to see over-all movement patterns at a glance. These 
perceptual and cognitive ways of functioning were the means I used to comprehend 
my professors during their lectures. Unversed in the idioms of criticism, I was not 
able to grasp the subtlety of their arguments or recognise their references, yet I was 
able to glimpse the direction and general trajectories of their critical moves. These 1 
visualised as concrete movements; discourse seemed to me to be “reaching towards”, 
or alternately, to be “pushing against” or “away” from a body of thought that was real. 
Writing seemed to be about rehearsing other writing, or seemed to be articulating its 
meaning in defter, neater ways. Building an argument appeared to consist in showing 
the relations of continuity or rupture, in designing a “natural” flow or a surprising 
turn, between each theoretical move. The composing of an essay appeared to me to 
consist in elaborating ideas until they were held suspended in a tensile structure 
created by their own theme and variations. In other words, my way of conceptualising 
was structured by my experience of dancing, of creating, and of interpreting 
choreography.
What I would like to stress here, is my amazement that my dancer’s way of 
thinking actually permitted me, most of the time, to see the gist of the argument being 
made. This seemed doubly wonderful in that my untypical career-path had placed me 
in the context of university-level study in English after a long absence from study, and 
after a break from speaking English (my career had taken place in German-speaking 
Switzerland and then in French-speaking Switzerland and Belgium). Involved in a 
life where my principal interlocutors were also dancers, I had all but lost the practice
of using language at all, even foreign languages, in order to communicate. The 
routine, ability, and desire involved in dancing foster a strong complicity with one’s 
fellow-dancers which enables one to exchange meanings in unspoken ways. 
Attending university thus constituted a sudden re-immersion into language, one 
whose intensity perhaps allowed me to realise the way in which language derives 
from bodily experience, as is now argued by a significant part of the discipline of 
cognitive science.
Later, reading Mark Johnson and George Lakoff’s Metaphors We Live By 
(1980), and their Philosophy in the Flesh (1999), I discovered that the phenomenon I 
had found strange and wonderful was in fact just the normal way the brain works. In 
these two books Lakoff who is a linguist, and Johnson, who is a cognitive scientist, 
collaborate to develop the argument that it is our embodied experience, and 
particularly our experience of movement, which provides the models for the different 
conceptual operations involved in thought. Johnson continues to develop this thesis 
in a further book, written without Lakoff, The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of 
Meaning, Imagination, and Reason (1987), in which he writes:
The centrality of human embodiment directly influences what and 
how things can be meaningful for us, the ways in which these 
meanings can be developed and articulated, the ways we are able to 
comprehend and reason about our experience, and the actions we 
take. Our reality is shaped by the patterns of our bodily movement, 
the contours of our spatial orientation, and the forms of our 
interactions with objects, (xix)
If Lakoff and Johnson situate movement as at the foundation of language, which it 
provides with metaphor-models, cognitive scientist and researcher in artificial 
intelligence Andy Clark argues that movement should be recognised as inseparable 
from perception, and indeed from consciousness itself. In Being There: Putting 
Brain, Body and World Together Again (1997), Clark calls for a new mode of 
cognitive science, one which would abandon the premises of its earlier instantiations:
It requires us to abandon the idea (common since Descartes) of the 
mental realm distinct from the realm of the body; to abandon the idea 
of neat dividing lines between perception, cognition and action; to 
abandon the idea of an executive center where the brain carries out 
high-level reasoning; and most of all, to abandon research methods 
that artificially divorce thought from embodied action-taking, (xii- 
xiii)
Clark sees the brain in a reactive mode of urgency, stressing the necessary speed of 
mental operations, required to protect the body. “Minds make motions, and they must 
make them fast—before the predator catches you, or before your prey gets away from 
you” (1). For Clark, the brain saves the body by the speed of its moves; for another 
prominent cognitive scientist, Alain Berthoz, author of The Brain’s Sense of 
Movement (2000), the brain saves the body’s skin most effectively, not by reacting 
quickly in the moment, but by developing an ability to project time forward, in effect 
saving the time in which it can operate more slowly. This strategy is one in which the 
brain predicts and anticipates, giving its body the time to prepare its moves in the 
world. Berthoz writes:
The brain is not a reactive machine; it is a proactive machine that 
investigates the world. To become a ski champion, it is not enough 
for the skier to continuously process sensory cues and correct his 
trajectory; he must go over the run in his mind, anticipate its stages 
and the state of his sensory receptors, foresee possible solutions to 
every error, take chances and make decisions before he makes a 
move. (1)
3. The Discourse of Dancing Intelligence
An important part of dance scholarship is constituted by the essays of dancers 
and choreographers, whose intimate relation with the body has necessarily located 
them in the less prestigious term of European culture’s pervasive body-mind 
opposition. Choreographers have reacted in different ways to this binary division, 
according to which the reasoning, abstract, and eternal mind is elevated, while the 
instinctual, carnal, and transitory body is debased. One of these ways of reacting may 
be seen in Martha Graham’s often-repeated dietum, “the body cannot lie”, which 
attempts to reverse the values of the body-mind duality and claim that a stance in the 
body is actually the superior position, through suggesting that the eternal truth aimed 
at by abstract reason is inherent in the body. Another famous reaction to the body- 
mind polarity is offered by Yvonne Rainer, the title of whose three-part choreographic 
work, ‘The Mind is a Muscle”, tries to do away with the body-mind entirely, through 
its posing of the mind as a subcategory of the body to which it belongs.
The different reactions of Graham and Rainer to culture’s body-mind duality 
represent a dominant stance in the dance world, one which I suggest can be explained 
through a particular sense of the expression: minding the body. Science, too, 
conceptualises body-mind relations in terms of “minding the body”, but in an 
alternative sense of the same expression. For although more recent cognitive science 
credits the body with creating intelligence, in that intelligence emerges because the 
body requires looking after, science on the whole still images mind as the leader of 
the two halves of self, in that the mind watches over the body, looks out for it, 
protects it like a guardian angel. By contrast, the discourse of dance images the body 
as what leads the mind: it manifests the belief that the sensations which the body 
experiences should be minded, in the sense of their being heeded.
Recently, however, the discourse of dance has become more refined in the 
way that it has started to argue for the alternative sense implied by the ambiguous 
expression: “minding the body”. While Graham was able to state her belief only in 
mysterious terms, and Rainer needed to adopt a belligerent tone in attempting to 
abolish dualism completely, later dance writers have been able to give more nuanced 
accounts of their experience of dancing and of the relation between this experience 
and knowledge and cognition. A landmark text within this recent discourse is Susan 
Foster’s essay “Dancing Bodies”, which first appeared in Incorporations (1992), a 
high-profile Zone publication, where it was published alongside contributions from 
such established theorists as Felix Guattari, Gilles Deleuze, and Georges 
Canguilhem.^ In “Dancing Bodies” Foster articulates the links between body and 
mind in a tone which is at once invested in the practice of dance and theoretically 
fluent, one that relies neither on the mysterious voice of embodiment à la Graham, 
nor adopts an intellectually belligerent tone à la Rainer. Foster obtains her 
authority—in the sense that she is taken seriously outside the virtual ghetto of the 
discipline of dance studies—because her background in history and philosophy gives 
her the references which allow those in other discourses to find points of recognition; 
secure in the knowledge that she will be heeded, Foster is able to discard Rainer’s 
strident tone. In “Dancing Bodies”, Foster argues that the imagination as well as the 
muscles are involved in the construction of the dancing body. Refusing to be situated
’ Foster’s “Dancing Body” only later appeared in Jane C. Desmond’s Dance Studies anthology 
Meaning in Motion (1997).
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on one side of the body-mind dichotomy, Foster shows how the body “takes on” 
learning through practice, and how, in doing so, the body is divided into multiple 
intelligences.
Another recent essay in which the dancer’s embodied experience is given 
authority by a stance simultaneously within dancing and academic knowledge is 
“Spacemaking: Experiences of a Virtual Body” (1998). In it, philosopher,
choreographer, and dancer Susan Kozel gives an account of her experience of 
participating in Paul Sermon’s installation, “Telematic Dreaming”, which employed 
video projectors and monitors to superimpose two separate spaces, creating a virtual 
space in which interaction could take place between a performer and members of the 
public. Kozel inhabited one of these spaces, while her image was projected into the 
other space, in which spectators could join with her in a dance improvisation. The 
cameras in the public’s room transmitted an image of this dance back to Kozel, 
allowing her to coordinate her interaction.
In her account of her experience of performing in Sermon’s piece, Kozel 
articulates the way in which feeling, in the sense both of bodily sensation and of 
psychological affect, moved fluidly between the two spaces. The effort of controlling 
the shifts of her image created pain in her fleshly body, which served as a connection 
between it and her virtual image (83). But pain was located not only in her fleshly 
body, but also, Kozel claims, in her virtual one. One visitor to the installation took 
out a knife, and Kozel “felt a predictable shiver”. Though “the most he could do was 
slash the duvet”, acknowledges Kozel, “ I still felt uncomfortable” (83). In another 
improvisation, Kozel writes:
Someone elbowed me hard in the stomach and I doubled over, 
wondering why, since I didn’t actually feel it. But I felt something, I 
was shaken for a while. (83)
Here, Kozel claims that feeling was located in her virtual body; yet a further 
improvisation made feeling retreat back into her actual flesh. This time, Kozel writes:
Two men in leather jackets jumped my image on the bed. One 
attacked my head and the other my pelvic area. After three or four 
body-twisting blows they fled . . . What did I feel? Very little . . .  I 
believe that the extreme violence of the attack caused me to separate 
my physical self from my virtual self. (84)
In this essay, Kozel shows how she takes seriously the information which the body 
gives her about her physical and emotional state: the responsible approach which 
marks any self-respecting dancer. At the same time, she seems to delight in 
subverting notions that are common in literary and philosophical circles, namely, that 
virtual reality offers an opportunity “to leave ‘the meat’ (in other words the body) 
behind in order to voyage in the non-space of the mind”, an attitude that Kozel 
criticised in a former essay, “The Virtual World: New Frontiers For Dance and 
Philosophy” as the vicious last gasp of Cartesianism (1995; 219). In this earlier essay 
she cites Myron Krueger’s remarks about “technologically naïve people”, who:
Regarded their electronic image as an extension on themselves.
What happened to their image also happened to them; they felt what 
touched their image. (220),
Kozel is sensible of the “humbling of having to admit to being naïve”, which, she 
writes, “seems like an indication of being backward, out of touch or fearful of 
change” (220). But she assumes and affirms this potentiallly humiliating position, 
writing:
I agree to Myron Krueger’s terms and adopt a position of 
technological naivete . . . not out of a romantic sense of the power of 
child-like wonder [but] because I see this as a valid 
phenomenological experience of effective “immersive” technology.
(220)
Kozel does not retreat into mysticism like Graham, nor does she react defiantly like 
Rainer, for her knowledge of a tradition of philosophy allows her to stand her ground 
in a more graceful way. Using the procedures of reasoned argumentation, Kozel 
shows that the phenomena which her so-called “naivete” allowed her to pinpoint 
should not be overlooked, for they are an integral part of fundamental processes of 
perception.
4. Ghost-Writers of Ghost-Bodies: History. Performance and Practice in 
Contemporary French Dance 1980-2000
Ghost-Bodies emerges primarily out of my practice as dance-student, 
professional dancer, dance teacher, and audience member. I trained as a Ford
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Foundation Scholar at The School of American Ballet, and later danced a substantial 
part of the Balanchine repertoire as a member of the Zürich Ballet under the 
directorship of Patricia Neary; in Chapter 5, I draw upon this experience in an 
analysis of the Balanchine technique. Directly upon leaving the School, I spent a year 
as a member of The Pennsylvania Ballet, where, to my dismay, as a lowly first-year 
member of the corps de ballet and a girl who looked the part, I was cast in a static and 
stationary part (albeit the title role), as the doll in Benjamin Harkarvy’s production of 
Coppélia, which experience informs my critique of that ballet in Chapter 4. But it is 
the experience of performing Christopher Bruce’s Ghost Dances (1981), which may 
constitute the strongest influence on the present work, for it may be during the 
memorable rehearsal period in which Bruce mounted his piece upon the company that 
I was first haunted by the idea of haunting. Ghost Dances depicts the influence of 
political and social turmoil in Chile (at the time under Pinochet) on the lives of that 
country’s people. It is structured as a succession of short scenes of life, which are in 
each case abruptly truncated by a ghost—the ghost of Chile’s political history— 
whose emergence disrupts the lives and stories of the people onstage. In the last 
section of Ghost Dances, a group of dancers diagonally traverses the stage in a 
huddled formation, their faces immobile, impassive, in contrast to their feet which 
move to mark out a complex rhythm, as if sleepwalking, dreaming, or as if they were 
marionettes moved by strings. This quality is one I later recognised as an audience 
member when Pina Bausch’s Café Müller was given at the Théâtre de la Ville in 
Paris, which piece I analyse in Chapter 7. Chapters 5 and 8 are based primarily on my 
experience as a dance teacher, and emerge out of ten years of teaching experience at 
the Ecole Peter Goss in Paris; but they are also oriented by the French dance teacher- 
training diplomas that I have taken during that time. The training programme for the 
first of these diplomas, entitled “l’analyse fonctionnelle du corps dans le mouvement 
dansé”, involved a two year period of study under the direction of dance kinesiologist 
Hubert Godard; the second training programme, for a discipline entitled “Pour la 
Culture Chorégraphique”, involved a similar period of study under the direction of 
dance historian Laurence Louppe. The methodology of Ghost-Bodies can be located 
as between, or even as spanning the viewpoints of, these two programmes.
If my various physical practices have provided the basis for Ghost-Bodies, this 
basis has also been illuminated by academic writing about the dancer’s experience of
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practice. The reading of Foster and Kozel sharpened my desire to write about dance, 
for what these two writers demonstrated was that the knowledge emerging from the 
discipline of dance could make a contribution to a larger body of knowledge; and in 
turn that a wider culture than that constituted merely by its own discipline was ready 
to “mind” the words of dancers. The subject and concerns of my study are directly 
inspired by Foster’s “Dancing Bodies”, an essay which demonstrates how bodies are 
made through the metaphors used in practice.
I have already mentioned the influence of Lakoff and Johnson on the present 
study, and of their reflection on the way in which embodiment is structured through 
metaphor. An inspiring case study in relation to this point of view, is The Player’s 
Passion: Studies in the Science of Acting (1993) by theatre historian Joseph Roach. 
Roach’s text is a study of the way in which acting techniques evolved through time in 
Western Europe. Roach finds that each successive acting technique developped 
practices which assumed the human body produced and expressed passions in 
accordance with the models of human physiology made available by that era’s 
science. In The Player’s Passion, Roach offers a geneaology of the metaphors that the 
body of the actor assumed in his or her professional activity, by examining the science 
that provided these metaphors, which metaphors, as Roach has it, constituted the actor 
as a body of ideas (11).
In Ghost-Bodies: History, Performance and Practice in Contemporary Dance 
in France 1980-2000, I adopt Roach’s approach of considering the history of the 
performer’s body as a body of scientific ideas. I extrapolate from his methodology 
too, tracing how dance techniques are influenced by different historical conceptions of 
the body and the metaphors which body them forth. It is in this context I have chosen 
to draw upon the literatures of the history of science and the popular end of the field 
of contemporary cognitive neuroscience as important sources. I argue that a 
consideration of dance through the intellectual history of science can be even more 
fruitful for the discipline of dance studies than it has been for theatre studies. Roach 
argues that the actor is influenced by biology, for biology has attempted to explain 
how it is that emotion is produced in the body; I suggest that the dancer is even more 
fundamentally influenced by science, in that science has provided models for 
understanding how motion is produced in the body. What has been at stake for the 
actor is his or her expressivity, a relatively subjective matter; what has been at stake
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for the dancer is his or her virtuosity, the ability to perform recognisable physical 
feats, a relatively objective matter.
More broadly, it is not only performers whose lives are influenced by how the 
body is perceived to work. Rather, people in general live in their bodies in ways that 
are influenced by how science understands the body: but that understanding is so 
pervasive and diffused that in order to recognise the influence of science on culture, a 
comparison of the sciences of two cultures is often required. In The Expressiveness of 
the Body and the Divergence o f Greek and Chinese Medicine (1999), Shigehisa 
Kuriyama offers just such a comparison, juxtaposing the sciences of medicine 
belonging to the West and the East, providing evidence which demonstrates that the 
two medical traditions not only possess different ways of conceptualising the body, 
but different techniques of sensation, and different ways of using the senses to gather 
information from the body of the patient (16). For Kuriyama, ways of 
conceptualising are part of a total system that includes ways of perceiving, and ways 
of experiencing the body, which each serve and are served by each other (13).
Ghost-Bodies approaches the dancing body through a methodology which can 
be seen to combine those of Foster, Roach, and Kuriyama. My central concept of 
ghost-bodies can be understood as expanding on the particular kind of body that 
Foster theorises as produced through practice in “Dancing Bodies”. For Foster, as the 
student dancer practises, two bodies are produced: one of these, she terms the 
“perceived and tangible body”; the other, she terms the “ideal body”. And, for Foster, 
there is a discrepancy between them. Foster theorises that the perceived and tangible 
body derives primarily from sensory information, which is most importantly 
kinaesthetic, but which is also visual, aural, and haptic (and also, Foster suggests, 
olfactory) (482). Whereas the ideal body, for Foster, is made up of “fantasized visual 
or kinaesthetic images of a body, images of other dancer’s bodies and cinematic or 
video images of dancing bodies”, to which information about the perceived and 
tangible body may be added (482-483).
Foster understands these two bodies, the ideal body, and the perceived and 
tangible body, as both part of the dancing self, for she writes that they emerge 
together out of practice. As Foster writes that the two bodies “are constructed in 
tandem; each influences the development of the other”, the reader understands that 
her ideal body is a projection of the perceived body (483). Rather as a shadow is
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always projected further than its body, but always from where that body stands, the 
aesthetically ideal body that it is possible to imagine is a function of the body’s 
present state of embodied intelligence. Foster’s ideal body can be understood to 
consist in the dancer’s imaginative processes, which will naturally, and necessarily 
always be ahead of the perceived and tangible body. Yet even while Foster knows the 
discrepancy between her two bodies is an inevitable state of affairs, she feels under an 
imperative to make the two bodies merge, and “fail[ing] to regulate a mirage-like 
substance”, produces a sense of loss and frustration (482).
Under the strength of this negative affect, Foster’s pen begins writing as 
though the ideal body were an entity being imposed upon her by an outside force, as 
though the rule of language were writing itself on her unknowing body. In shades of 
Franz Kafka’s short story “In the Penal Colony” (1914), in which the body of the 
prisoner, unaware of the fault of which he is accused, will know his crime only when 
his sentence has been painfully etched on his body, Foster writes of the encounter of 
the dancer and the technique he or she practises, as a moment of painful confrontation 
that is not illuminated by knowledge until its skill has been incorporated. The 
metaphors of practice at first seem “inapplicable” or “incomprehensible”, and make 
sense only through time, effort, pain, and repetition (482). What now emerges 
through Foster seems pure Foucault, not only when she cites him, writing that the 
body is “instructed, trained, forced to emit signs” (482), but also when she writes in 
her own voice:
Each discipline refers to [the body] using select metaphors and other
tropes that make it over. . .  that show it how to behave. (482)
Yet when Foster avows that dancing knowledge is not so much learnt as 
inscribed on the body through practice, her avowal emerges out of her experience of a 
particular state of affairs in the methods of dance practice, in which, dominantly and 
traditionally, intellectual knowledge does not precede or accompany bodily 
knowledge, but only ever graces it afterwards. Dance pedagogy overwhelmingly has 
not considered it necessary, feasible, and in some cases even desirable, to support and 
illuminate the production of a movement by simultaneously imparting a knowledge of 
the biological rules which are directly implicated in its production. I suggest that the 
pain which Foster associates with the process of becoming a dancer, derives from not 
one, but from two discrepancies. The first discrepancy is that which Foster identifies
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as arising in practice between perceived and ideal bodies. The second discrepancy is 
one that opens up because dance’s dominant pedagogy separates the dancer’s mind 
from his or her body during most of the stages of learning.
Ghost-Bodies engages with these discrepancies and how they are produced. 
In the case of the discrepancy which exists between the present-body-as-capability 
and the future-body-as-opportunity, I affirm its necessity, while trying to transform 
the negative affect that Foster sees as attending it. In Chapter 2, I examine the 
mechanisms through which the human remembers and imagines, and propose that the 
discrepancy which Foster identifies forms a space which is not only inevitable, but 
also one that constitutes a positive space of possibility. It is in this space of creative 
becoming, I argue, that the dancer may invent his or her dancing self. My concept of 
ghost-body illustrates the many levels in which the bodies of memory and imagination 
lead the body, inspiring the body-as-a-whole along new paths, contributing to its 
potential creativity. By contrast, I argue that the second discrepancy, which opens up 
between the mind and body in the practice of dance, is an unnecessary and mostly an 
undesirable one. Ghost-Bodies thus proposes an argument that pedagogy in dance 
should reform itself so that a state of grace can characterise all the stages of engaging 
in the practice of dance, rather than existing as the rare and brief state of knowing that 
visits the body only after the learning of a skill has been interiorised. To this end, I 
argue that dance pedagogy should invent strategies through which it can engage the 
mind’s activity in directing, accompanying, and illuminating the body’s practice.
It is in the first section of her essay that Foster conceptualises ideal and 
perceived bodies; its second section consists in a typically structuralist analysis of five 
dance techniques that are widespread and influential in America—ballet, Duncan 
technique, Graham technique, Cunningham technique, and Contact Dance 
Technique—in which she shows that each technique has values that are peculiar to it. 
Yet while the specificities of these techniques can be plainly demonstrated, what I 
find more intriguing, and what I address in Ghost-Bodies, is the similarities which 
may also be observed across them. Common ideals and metaphors seem to permeate 
several different techniques, but also seem to separate into two main categories. One 
of these categories combines ideals of articulation, segmentation, isolation, geometry, 
and movement that stops sharply or is percussive, ideals which are common to the 
French and American schools of ballet, the Cunningham technique, jazz, and hip-
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hop—and my list is not exhaustive, but merely mentions dance styles which are 
common today in France. These different techniques are also visited by a number of 
mechanist metaphors which serve their ideals, metaphors which image the body or its 
parts as tools: as scissor blades, levers, compasses, hinges, cork screws; and 
especially, I argue, as clocks.
A second category shares ideals of continuity in time and space, strategies of 
fluid succession or propagation in the body, degrees of intensity from accumulation 
and ebbing, and the body’s expressiveness. Again, these ideals characterise diverse 
techniques and aesthetics, and once more I am only citing those which are important 
in today’s France: the Limon technique, the Russian school of ballet, Pina Bausch, 
and release technique. The metaphors that appear in the practice of this second group 
of dance styles are vitalist ones which transport the body to a “natural” world in 
which it is subject to elemental forces. Here, the body is not imaged as a tool but as 
organic matter which exhibits phenomena of growth, and which is moved by wind, by 
water; and especially, I contend, by strings.
5. Parts and Wholes of Ghost-Bodies
Part I contains two chapters which each contextualise the concept of the ghost- 
body. If in the present chapter I locate the ghost body within the discourse of dance 
studies. Chapter 2 provides the background science which illuminates the process of 
learning, remembering, and imagining dancing through which the concept of the 
ghost-body is built. Parts II and m  each contain three chapters, which pertain to the 
three different spheres of influence, of history, performance, and practice, which I 
argue are what make up a ghost-body. For though, in “Dancing Bodies”, Foster 
conceptualises the ideal body as exclusively containing the information of dance 
techniques, in The Player’s Passion, Roach has demonstrated how the ideals which 
shape the methods of an artistic practice are influenced by the biological sciences; 
while in The Expressiveness o f the Body, Kuriyama has suggested that techniques of 
action are inextricably bound up in their techniques of conceptualisation and 
perception.
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The three-part structure of Ghost-Bodies Parts II and IQ implies different 
levels of influence working on the dancer, like atmospheric spheres which surround 
the dancing subject from different distances. Moving from the most removed of these 
spheres to the most intimate, the first chapter of each part discusses a particular strand 
of the history of science, and its ways of organising the activity of conceptualisation. 
The second chapter of each part investigates the patterns of perception of a ghost- 
body, which are manifested in different areas of artistic production and performance: 
theatre, film, literature, and art, as well as dance. Finally, the third chapter of each 
part examines the dance practice through which the ghost-body becomes flesh.
6. The Ghost-Bodv-as-Clockwork and the Ghost-Bodv-as-Marionette
Parts n  and IQ identify two ghost-bodies: the ghost-body-as-clockwork and 
the ghost-body-as-marionette. Each of these two ghost-bodies comprises a total 
programme for thinking, perceiving and acting, which programmes are in a dialectical 
relation with one another; for the two ghost-bodies are fundamentally distinguished 
by their different relationships to knowledge. These different relationships may be 
elucidated with reference to a divergence of attitude which has powerfully marked 
European culture and continues to create tension within it. One of these attitudes is 
that which holds that science can successfully describe the world, discovering and 
mastering the rules of nature; the other attitude holds that some of the world’s forces 
cannot be described, discovered, and mastered, as if there were something beyond the 
natural in nature.
The ghost-body-as-clockwork, forming Part Q of Ghost-Bodies, embodies the 
first of these attitudes. I argue that the ghost-body-as-clockwork, which implies a 
confidence in the power of human agency and knowledge, may be seen as the 
dominant attitude of European culture, one which found its most exemplary flowering 
in the culture of the Enlightenment. The Enlightenment’s philosophical tradition, 
epitomised by La Mettrie’s L ’homme-machine (1748), found models for human 
subjectivity in mechanist science’s proved ability to measure and predict the world. 
Mechanist science was in turn upheld by the ingenious inventions of famous 
clockmakers and engineers, who were able to produce the machines and mechanical
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instruments which made measurement possible. In Chapter 3, I argue that the 
machines that inventors made subsequently became the model for human subjectivity, 
and I do so through a discussion of the mechanical, human-shaped automata that 
toured the courts of Europe in the eighteenth century. In Chapter 4 ,1 argue, through a 
close analysis of the ballet Coppélia (1870), that in the late nineteenth century this 
same project on human subjectivity, to make man a machine, was simultaneously 
implemented and exorcised by substituting woman for man in this equation. In 
Chapter 5 ,1 move to the classroom in the late twentieth century, to analyse the way in 
which the mechanical metaphors that permeated European culture in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries may be seen as instantiated in the technique of ballet which 
was developing and codified during this period. Through a discussion of the 
pedagogy and institutions present in France today, I suggest that mechanical, 
clockwork metaphors—the heritage of ballet which influences other techniques of 
Western dance developed after it—continue to shape the dancing body’s mode of 
subjectivity.
The ghost-body-as-marionette, forming Part III of Ghost-Bodies, embodies the 
second of my two central attitudes. In reaction against Enlightenment philosophy and 
mechanist science, there arose movements in European culture which were called, 
variously. Romanticism, the Gothic, and Melodrama, in the arts; Animism, in 
philosophy; and vitalism, in science. In Chapter 6 ,1 examine the vitalist medicine of 
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, at whose centre was the elucidation of the 
exact workings of the nerves, and at whose periphery (and finally entirely excised) 
was the charismatic figure of Anton Mesmer. Mesmer’s treatments, which involved 
music and the movements of the practitioner, led to the discovery of the intermediary 
state of consciousness of somnambulism. The miraculous, unwilled movements of 
the somnambulist, seemed to give evidence that the passive body was in the power of 
a higher authority, which moved it like a marionette master; and this image was given 
form in Heinrich von Kleist’s essay, “On the Marionette Theater” (“Über das 
Marionnettentheater”, 1810). In Chapter 7 ,1 examine how the image of the passively 
moving body recurred in Gothic and Romantic literature, and in the Romantic ballet. 
Yet the vitalist questions of reflexes, homeostasis, inner desires and outer compulsion 
are ones which have recently been given new forms in art, which I demonstrate 
through a consideration of Pina Bausch’s Café Müller (1978) and Pedro Almodovar’s
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Talk to Her ( Hable Con Ella, 2002). In Chapter 8 ,1 engage with the questions that 
have been recently emerging in France around the teaching of dance. I analyse how 
vitalist ways of looking at the dancer are increasing in strength and becoming 
widespread in public institutions, and suggest that the popular expansion of vitalist 
pedagogy has been built upon the years of practice of certain individual forerunners.
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Chapter 2 
The Matter of Ghost-Bodies
In a recent review, dance critic Alastair Macaulay evoked a phenomenon 
which constitutes a distinctive aspect of the dancer’s experience, one commonly 
known as “muscle memory”. Macaulay observed that, ironically, in a field which is 
distinguished precisely by its ephemerality, the dancer’s muscle memory can be so 
intense and lingering that, ‘Play the right music, and aged ballerinas will twitch back 
into action like marionettes, remembering the choreography of yesteryear’ (18). 
Macaulay’s wording brings out the ambiguity of this phenomenon, one which is 
positive in the sense that it may constitute a kind of “automatic pilot” for the dancer, 
whose body will remember the choreography which the mind forgets. Yet the 
phenomenon has a negative aspect too, in the sense that the repetition which muscle 
memory makes possible also makes repetition hard to avoid, even when this is 
undesirable (as Macaulay may be suggesting, with his image that depicts elderly 
ladies disporting themselves like young ones). Muscle memory is ambiguous 
because, while enabling the continuance of the history of the art form of dance 
through its repertoire, it inevitably and simultaneously restricts the ways in which new 
choreographic invention can be imagined. For what emerges as the dancer moves in 
the steps of past choreographic writing is a whole phantom world, one that is 
manifested through the way in which the attitude of the dancing body creates the 
space around it according to its image.
Codified dance techniques involve the repetition of exercises which, in 
continually using certain muscular chains, strengthen particular synapses in the brain. 
In 1949, Donald Ftebb discovered how this occurs at a micro level in the brain. He 
suggested that:
Activity would be followed by changes in all the cells that had taken 
part in the fleeting pattern. The cells would strengthen their 
connections with each other, growing extra synapses or increasing
their stocks of neurotransmitters so that it became easier for them to 
fire together for the future. In this way, every pattern could leave 
behind a memory trace. A faint ghost of what had just happened 
would become etched into the brain’s circuitry where it would affect 
the course of all future processing competitions. So a nerve network 
could learn. (McCrone, 43)
The “faint ghost” that Hebb mentions here, is the particular pattern of synapses which 
fire together to enable muscles to coordinate in a certain way to produce a movement, 
a movement whose repetition will make the trace gradually turn from faintness to 
legibility. Here, a circle of effects is entered by which a neural pattern that is 
produced, gradually exists as though to produce itself—even, seemingly, to ensure 
that no other pattern be created. For, as Hebb points out above, the production of a 
pattern affects the course of all future activity of the brain. This can be appreciated if 
we imagine the dancer in practice. When the dancer executes a particular movement, 
a certain pattern of brain activity creates a neural trace which is strengthened with 
repetition; but at the same time this has a parallel effect on and in the body. In the 
performing of a movement, the different muscles of the dancer’s body that are used to 
engage in it “learn” to coordinate together: each of these muscles has its fibres 
strengthened or lengthened as the case may be, and the ligaments, tendons, and 
muscle envelopes, which connect these muscles into muscular chains, receive traction 
that pulls them into an alignment that makes that movement easier. The “ghost” 
exists in the body of the dancer as well as in the dancer’s brain; and this ghost may 
now “take over” that body, even though this take-over may not be as pronounced as in 
the example cited by Macaulay. The take-over may take the form of a kind of 
laziness, for the dancer will now find it more comfortable and economical to use 
existing patterns than to create new ones. Yet here, the coordination that becomes 
easier also shuts down the creative possibilities of untried and unknown patterns that 
now recede from imminence with every repetition. Through choosing the activity of a 
specific practice, the dancing body begins to have its choices made for it; in order to 
keep choice in the picture, the dance artist needs to ensure that a multiplicity of 
muscle patterns is at his or her disposal.
Above, I have suggested that neuro-muscular patterns may, in a way, 
choreograph the dancing body. But this only becomes true after years and years of 
practice and towards the end of a dancer’s career; at the beginning of that career, it is
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the dancing body that must create neuro-muscular patterns; and these are not easily 
acquired, as Justin Howse and Shirley Hancock stress in Dance Technique and Injury 
Prevention (1992). Here, the authors discuss muscle memory with reference to the 
engram, which they define as a complex pre-programmed neuro-muscular pattern. 
The engram directs the work of various muscle “agonists”, the muscles producing 
efforts to create an action, but it also coordinates the efforts of muscle groups which 
aid in these efforts, efforts termed “synergistic”, and it ensures that the actions of 
muscles which can sap these efforts, the “antagonists”, are inhibited. Howse and 
Hancock insist that an engram can be produced only through the exact execution of a 
particular movement, whose exactitude means that the movement must initially be 
performed slowly, and with great concentration. But most important, they stress, is 
that an engram is produced only through numerous repetitions of that movement. 
They write: “the number of repetitions required to produce a really well-developed 
engram numbers in hundreds of thousands or millions and not just hundreds or 
thousands” (20). The engram is the biological means by which the body economises 
effort in a future time by expending considerable efforts in the present. It is through 
the repeated deployment of painstaking attention while making a movement, that the 
body is afterwards able to perform the same movement without attending to it at all.
What the findings of Howse and Hancock reveal are the reasons for the way in 
which the conservatory system of codified dance techniques, whose principal teaching 
method is repetition, has always been the indispensable unseen partner which 
produces a certain dancing body. For the muscle memory that the dancing body 
requires to perform choreography is only constituted in it by an extended period of 
training, one in which body and mind are shaped according to certain patterns. In a 
circular manner, the aesthetic value of a particular style of dance—whose continued 
manifestation in performance is made possible by the patterns inscribed in the dancing 
body—becomes that which upholds the very system of dance training by which it is in 
turn supported. This closed circle determines that however efficient codified 
techniques may be at re-producing themselves, and thereby at enabling the heritage of 
dance to exist in the present through its repertoire, this is precisely the extent to which 
they also fail to be creative institutions, fail to produce dance artists who are capable 
of imagining new ways of moving and of staging choreography. The present study, 
Ghost-Bodies, argues that this failure is one that is pre-programmed, not only through
22
the training of the body in patterns of movements, but also through the inscription in 
that body of patterns of thought that necessarily occur in the self-same moment of 
practice.
If repetition is the principal tool of traditional pedagogy, the pedagogies 
arising out of newer aesthetics, such as release technique and contact improvisation, 
or those inspired by the somatic technique of Mosche Feldenkrais, precisely resist 
using repetition as a principal tool of learning. But if they avoid addressing the body 
at a muscular level, this does not mean that the dancing body which practises these 
techniques is not being inscribed by memory. In the case of release technique, 
particularly, which includes methods which aim to give the body a certain control 
over its reflex systems, the dancing body grows sensitive to what may be considered a 
deeper level of memory in the body. This layer of body memory is not muscle 
memory, but rather is constituted by the natural plasticity of the body’s connective 
tissue, or fascia. Here, the word “plasticity” does not imply an ability to bend, but 
rather a property of preserving a certain shape, a property which stems from the 
higher quantity of collegene in the fascia (a category which includes ligaments, 
tendons, and the envelops of muscles). Since release techniques involve strategies 
which aim to minimise the efforts of muscle agonists, and to suppress the action of 
antagonists as entirely as possible, what limits a movement, and creates a kind of 
repetition or memory in the body, is the resistance of the fascia to stretch.
Ghosts of the Bodv Image
Muscle memory, which allows for the recollection of choreographic writing, is 
a well celebrated form in which the dancer’s memory is manifested; the memory that 
is constituted by the plasticity of the fascial system is another such memory system in 
the body. Researchers on memory also classify other workings of the body as body 
memory. In The Making o f Memory (1992), neurologist Steven Rose entertains the 
idea that scar tissue may constitute a kind of memory system, since it is tougher than 
unscarred skin (320). In “Memory Structures, Processes and Processes”, Henry 
Roedinger, Randy Buckner and Kathleen McDermott propose that the female 
reproductive system should be understood as involving body memory, for “the first
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act of labour creates processes that transfer efficiently to facilitate the speed of 
response execution when the same situation arises again” (40-41). They also consider 
the immune system as a memory system, implying that AIDS may be understood as a 
failure of a particular system of body memory, which normally “can remember, 
sometimes for a lifetime, the identity of a pathogene” (40). Yet I wish to suggest that 
all of these kinds of body memory work in relation to the fundamental memory of an 
organism, which is the memory of itself, which is most commonly known as the 
“body image”.
The “body image” is a term coined by two neurologists, Russell Brain and 
Henry Head in the early twentieth century for the vivid sense of our body. For 
example, when we close our eyes and gesticulate, we feel the positions of our limbs in 
space, and of the trajectories of their movements, sensations which are afforded to us 
through proprioception. Proprio ception or self feeling, is a term coined by Charles 
Sherrington, who in 1875 discovered that the body possesses a kind of sixth sense, 
one that is turned inwards upon itself to capture the modulations of its inner workings, 
rather than being focused outwards to seize information from the world. Hence, 
“body image” is a misleading term, in that it suggests information of a visual order. 
While what is rather the case is that the body image is a construct that is synthesized 
from all the senses, one which is not exclusively or even primarily informed by 
vision. The body “image” contains information from many sources: from the body’s 
balance organs; from sensations of stretch, pressure, heat, tension in the muscles; 
from the sensation of angle in the joints; from motor command centres in the brain, as 
well as from sight. The body “image” is a misnomer in another way, in that it may 
suggest a fixed or still photographic image. When actually this synthetic construct 
ressembles a moving picture: one that continually changes its shape, one that is 
constantly being updated through the incorporation of new information. Yet this 
supremely malleable, complex, fragile synthesis, which in Phantoms in the Brain 
(1999), V.S. Ramachandran calls an “entirely transitory internal construct”, is what 
constructs our sense of self. It is in the interests of our dwelling comfort, in the 
interests of perceiving our identities as stable and permanent, in the interests of self­
recognition and self-continuity, that what I call “necessary fictions” are constructed. 
Subjectivity builds illusions which depict selfhood as stable and permanent through
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surpressing awareness of these lower levels of self where identity is in a state of 
volatile flux (62).
In The Strange, Familiar and Forgotten: An Anatomy o f Consciousness 
(1992), Israel Rosenfield stresses that the body image founds our sense of self and 
enables our relation with the world, by providing the self with a point of reference. 
He cites Madame I, a patient who had lost her body awareness, and the subject of one 
of the earliest studies on body image (conducted in 1905 by French neurologists G. 
Deny and P. Camus), whose symptoms included a constant touching of her own body. 
Madame I complained:
I have to touch myself constantly to know how I am. I have the 
feeling that my whole body is changed, even at times that it no 
longer exists. I touch an object, but it is not I who am touching it. I 
no longer feel as I used to. I cannot find myself. I cannot imagine 
myself. (39)
Deprived of internal sensation of the body’s state of being, Madame I attempted 
desperately to produce this sense through external touching. Yet Madame I s 
testimony does not only show the way in which the sensation of the body provides the 
foundation of identity; it also implies other important aspects of subjectivity which are 
built out of and connected to the body image, and which therefore cannot function in 
its absence. The body image is the indispensable point of reference that 
simultaneously makes sense of perception and imparts a sense of self, as is evinced by 
Madame I’s “I touch an object, but it is not I who am touching it”. It is the ongoing 
sense of identity that enables self recognition, self-continuity, and constructs an 
emotional base-line, one whose failure is witnessed as Madame I claims, “I no-longer 
feel as I used to”. In Volatile Bodies (1994), Elizabeth Grosz observes that the body 
image is an image in the present which allows for “an anticipatory plan for the 
detailed movements that the body must undertake in order to act” (69). The body 
image provides the reference in respect of which a future body can be entertained; it 
founds the projective processes of the imagination, in direct contrast to Madame I s: 
“I cannot imagine myself’.
The body image is manifested in posture—indeed. Head defined the very 
notion as “the postural model of ourselves” or the “postural schema” (Grosz, 65), a 
“spatiotemporally structured and structuring model which mediates between the 
subject’s position and its behaviour” (66). In Volatile Bodies, Grosz distinguishes
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between Head’s physiological theorisation of the body image in Studies in Neurology 
(1920), and Paul Schilder’s later work on the phenomenon. Image and Appearance of 
the Human Body (1935), which she judges to have been more influenced by 
psychology. Grosz remarks that, for Schilder, the postural model of the subject’s own 
body is “demonstrably linked to the model that the subject has of other bodies and, in 
turn, that other bodies have of the subject’s body” (68).
The body image, which constructs how the subject is poised to act, and is a 
kind of self-memory that determines the way in which the body can engage in 
movement and invent itself in future, is a phantom in the sense that it is an invisible 
presence. Though it is involved in constructing consciousness, it itself remains 
unconscious. Here I am not using the word “unconscious” in the way that it has been 
employed in psychoanalytical theory, but rather in the way that the unconscious was 
postulated by British psychologists in the middle of the nineteenth century, notably 
Hamilton, Laycock, and Carpenter—a distinction that Jonathan Miller remarks with 
great clarity in his essay “Going Unconscious” (1998). Here, Miller writes:
In psychoanalytic theory, the Unconscious exercises an almost 
exclusively withholding function, actively denying its mental 
contents their access to awareness . . .  In contrast to this distinctively 
custodial interpretation, the Unconscious . . . figures as an altogether 
productive institution, actively generating the processes which are 
integral to memory, perception and behavior. Its contents are 
inaccessible not, as in psychoanalytic theory, because they are held 
in strenuously preventative detention but, more interestingly, because 
effective implementation of cognition and conduct does not actually 
require comprehensive awareness. (28-29)
The body image is part of those processes that are not visible, for Miller, because it is 
expedient to assign a large proportion of the activity which creates consciousness to 
automatic control (29). Yet there is an extent to which the body image may 
nevertheless be accessible to introspection, insight, and report. In How Our Lives 
Become Stories: Making Selves (1999), Paul John Eakin compares the different 
attitudes of Oliver Sacks to the body image: one which characterises his A Leg to 
Stand On (1984); the other which may be appreciated in the “Afterward” (1993) 
published in the second edition of the same memoir. In Sacks’s original text, written 
ten years after a solitary hike in Norway in 1974, during which he traumatically and 
dangerously injured his leg, the author writes that the body image was inaccessible, 
“self-concealing”. Yet in his “Afterward” written nine years later. Sacks comes to see
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that consciousness is “able to observe a particular form of breakdown in itself’ 
(Eakin, 30). The normally invisible body image may be glimpsed in its negative 
form; it may be intuited when it fails to work, as in the case of Madame I; or, as I 
shall suggest below, when it creates patterns of body usage which are conspicuous in 
their particularity.
Far advanced into the course of an intensive two-year teacher-training 
programme in dance kinesiology, I experienced an uncanny perceptual phenomenon. 
The course, which had been mostly academic in the first year, was largely practical in 
the second, involving its students in situations in which, for the refining and training 
of our observation of moving bodies, some students on the course would take turns in 
acting as “guinea pigs” for their fellows. The course curriculum particularly aimed to 
make its students aware of models of dynamic investment and muscular development, 
and stressed that these constituted patterns which both underpinned and determined 
the ways in which the dancing body was available to engage in movement. These 
patterns, acquired over time, could be seen in the present moment in the body’s 
posture.
This was the context in which I observed my colleague, dance teacher 
Emmanuelle Lyon, noticing her particular tilt of the head, chin upraised: unusual, I 
thought, in a tall person. I also observed a particular gait which puzzled me, in that its 
stride was overlong for her already long legs; and a general posture that was markedly 
anterior of the body’s gravitational axis. These two factors combined to characterise 
her walk as a falling forward onto her outstretehed leg, as opposed to a propulsion of 
her body-weight forward from the strength of the back leg. With this combination of 
clues in mind, but not focusing on them, I began to experience a curious sensation. I 
began to see that her way of moving would make sense if there were another person 
beside her, to whom this movement pattern was a way of relating, and I almost began 
to see this absent person’s shadowy outline. The strange perception culminated in a 
moving image in which I saw Emmanuelle holding the hand of a grown-up whose gait 
she was only just managing to match. She later recounted to me her strong childhood 
memory of having often had to run to keep up with the father whom she adored.
A similar vision surfaced as I viewed another member of our group, this time 
Carlos, a Brazilian dancer (who has since died from AIDS). At this later point in the 
training, our programme consisted in studying the muscular chains in the lower
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extremities. What was stressed was the way in which particular distributions of 
weight on the zones of the feet foster certain ways of developing the muscular chains 
in the legs. Yet in the case of Carlos, I noticed that the story told by his feet 
contradicted what his legs were saying: the muscular chains in use were not in 
continuity. The muscular organisation dominant in his feet stopped high on his ankle; 
here began a different organisation dominant in his legs. I began to see this place on 
his body as a line where his feet were divided from the rest of him. When the lack of 
continuity in his muscular organisation was remarked on, he recounted that as a young 
boy in Brazil he had been diagnosed as having falling arches, and had been prescribed 
a kind of orthopaedic shoe which he had worn for years. These were large and hated 
heavy boots that laced up over the ankle.
The above examples suggest that the characteristic of body memory may be its 
apparent permanence: one so ostensibly eternal that Lord Nelson, who suffered from a 
phantom limb, cited the enduring nature of his phantom to argue for the existence of 
the immortal soul (Ramachandran 22). Yet, in Phantoms in the Brain, neurologist 
V.S. Ramachandran, writing about his research into the phenomenon of phantom 
limbs, describes the experiments he designed and conducted, which demonstrate that 
the body image may be altered almost instantly if the sufferer experiences the correct 
combination of sensory information. In order to present how the body image is 
constructed in the human body, and thereby how it may be reconstructed, the 
following section sets out certain of the relevant discussions current in cognitive 
science, neuroscience and neuro-psychology.
Action. Perception, and Cognition
In Being There: Putting Brain, Body and World Together Again (1997), 
researcher in artificial intelligence Andy Clark argues that the models through which 
mind is traditionally studied are seriously flawed. These models conceive of Mind as 
a tripartite series of functions. The first of these is perception, which is seen as the 
reception of information during which the self is unselective. The second part of the 
series of functions is cognition, in which the operations of sorting, classifying, and 
transforming the information occur. The third and last part of the series consists in
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intentional action (171). In this model of Mind, incoming data are not conceived of 
as intrinsically geared to taking action in the world. In his critique of the tripartite 
model of mind, Clark nevertheless concedes:
No one thought, of course, that perception, motion and action did not 
matter at all. All agreed that sooner or later such issues would have 
to be factored in. But it was widely believed that the additional 
problems such topics posed could be safely separated from the 
primary understanding of mind and cognition, and that the solutions 
to these more “practical” problems could just be “glued onto” the 
computational engines of disembodied reason. (68)
Against the traditional model, which “glues” the questions of action and 
perception “onto” a primary understanding of mind and cognition, more recent 
research in cognitive science recognises that the three need to be addressed at the 
same time, for they constitute and develop through their interactions. Newer 
conceptual models of cognition view perception not as the passive, innocent, neutral, 
and all-inclusive, acceptance of information from the world, but rather as the active 
searching out of desired information. Here, perception already has designs on what it 
perceives: it is these very designs, that filter and edit information, that give form to 
what appears. Perception designs a world, by filtering out information it does not 
require, and by slicing up the world, creating categories. New cognitive science also 
perceives the designs of perception as always already motivated, in the strong sense 
that an organism’s ability to move is a crucial factor in what it sees and senses. 
Perception searches out elements of the world that it can manipulate, and overlooks 
what it has no power or interest in moving. In The Body in Question (1978), Jonathan 
Miller writes that an organism’s range of perception develops in relation to its range 
of mobility:
When one’s repertoire of movement is as limited as [the bell-shaped 
jelly-fish or the shallow cylinder of the sea anemone] there is no 
particular advantage in having an extended field of perception, either.
Without the ability to perform nimble movement, it is impossible to 
take advantage of events which are recognised from afar: there is no 
point in appreciating a remote threat if you can’t flee from it; there is 
no such thing as a distant opportunity if you can’t leap forward and 
seize it. (194-195)
The recognition that cognitive processes are not only mental, but also somatic, leads 
to a further diffusion or distribution of cognition, to the extent that in The Body in
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Mind (1999), Mark Rowlands stresses that a part of the human’s cognitive sense is not 
“located exclusively inside the skin of cognizing organisms” (23). He proposes, that 
to solve any problem in the world, the organism needs to adopt a strategy. That 
strategy will require the investment of a certain quantity of the organism’s energetic 
resources, a quantity Rowlands refers to as the strategy’s “evolutionary cost” or its 
“cognitive burden” (24). Using the example of a jigsaw puzzle, Rowlands asks his 
readers to contemplate the extraordinary difficulty of completing one, if one were not 
allowed physically to manipulate the pieces, but could only form internal 
representations of the pieces and manipulate these in one’s head. He writes:
The cognitive burden of comparing suitably manipulated external 
symbols is a good deal less that the burden of performing the 
manipulation internally and comparing the results of this internal 
manipulation. (166)
For Rowlands, an essential part of the processes of cognition resides in the ability of 
the organism to manipulate external symbols, and another crucial part is contained in 
these symbols themselves:
Mind is not, exclusively, inside the head. Minds are not purely 
internal things; they are in part worldly in character. That is, minds 
are hybrid entities, made up in part of what is going on inside the 
skin of creatures who have them, but also made up in part of what is 
going on in the environment of those creatures. (29)
Clark, a researcher in artificial intelligence, also stresses the “worldliness” of 
cognitive processes, a theoretical perspective which is underlined in the title of his 
book, which pays tribute to a Heiddeggerian “being-in-the-world” or “Dasein”. 
Recent writing in the philosophy of mind has also taken on the challenge that new 
cognitive science implicitly poses to traditional philosophy, critiquing as 
fundamentally misleading the models of subjectivity this philosophy has proposed. In 
Descartes’ Error (1994), Antonio Damasio manifests the resolutely anti-Cartesian 
stance that his title suggests, insisting repeatedly that the body is “a content that is part 
and parcel of the workings of the normal mind” (226). In Philosophy in the Flesh: 
The Embodied Mind and Its Challenge to Western Thought, Lakoff and Johnson take 
issue with several philosophies. They aver:
There exists no Cartesian dualistic person, with a mind separate from 
and independent of the body . . .  no Kantian radically autonomous 
person, with absolute freedom and a transcendent reason that
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correctly dictates what is and isn’t moral . . .  no poststructuralist 
self—no completely decentered subject for whom all meaning is 
arbitrary, totally relative, and purely historically contingent, 
unconstrained by body and brain” (5-6).
Lakoff and Johnson point out that “the mind is not merely embodied, but embodied in 
such a way that our conceptual systems draw largely upon the commonalities of our 
bodies and of the environments we live in”. These writers insist that even when 
cognition looks its most abstract, logical and prepositional, it is actually relying on 
metaphors of force, action, and motion, developed in real-time activity and based on 
bodily experience. Johnson writes:
The centrality of human embodiment directly influences what and 
how things can be meaningful for us, the ways in which these 
meanings can be developed and articulated, the ways we are able to 
comprehend and reason about our experience, and the actions we 
take. Our reality is shaped by patterns of our bodily movement, the 
contours of our spatial and temporal orientation, and the forms of our 
interaction with objects.(155)
Like Rowlands with his “evolutionary cost” or “cognitive burden”, Clark too argues 
that there exists an effort-saving principle which selects which strategy is adopted to 
solve a problem, which Clark terms a “principle of parsimony”. For Clark, the 
limited cognitive ability of the human has led to a development of processes by which 
the human continually uses the world in ways which are “clearly computational and 
informational: to transform inputs, to simplify search, to aid recognition, to prompt 
associative recall” (68). To solve a problem of mathematics, for example, Clark 
observes that the external medium of paper is used to store the results of simpler 
problems until a solution is found; he suggests that some of us use brightly coloured 
coffee cups and alphabetise our libraries in an effort to facilitate the retrieval of 
information in a future time. The methods the human uses to exploit the structures of 
the outside world and to facilitate the processes of cognition, Clark terms 
“scaffolding” and “off-loading”(61). Clark’s “principle of parsimony” proposes that 
there is an imperative to know and work only as much as is needed to get the job 
done, an imperative which fosters the emergence of strategies which create the 
relations between subject and world as a functional coupling.
Clark uses two main metaphors to describe this functional coupling that 
characterises relations between subjectivity and world. One of these is implied in
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Clark’s “007 principle” (47), in which Clark playfully refers to an icon in present 
popular culture, the intelligence agent James Bond, originally imagined by the 
novelist Ian Fleming. Bond embodies the “functional coupling” which Clark suggests 
involves the subject with his world, because an essential part of 007’s intelligence 
resides in the props and artefacts that Q manufactures for him, artefacts which with 
each successive film grow tinier, more portable, more technologically arcane, and 
more destructive.
Yet, while Bond’s gadgets certainly argue that part of his intelligence is 
distributed out in the world, I contend that, in a crucial way, the Bond character also 
embodies a neo-Kantian fantasy of subjectivity, which on the contrary, consists 
precisely in the subject’s independence from the world. This fantasy is importantly 
temporal: in time-present the subject enters and uses the world, integrating its 
information, so that in time-future it will be able to make its exit from the world and 
live independently from it. For what we are given to admire most in the character of 
Bond may be the swift and sure way in which the flow of his thoughts and actions, 
which depends on crucial interactions with external resources, also exploits those 
interactions. Bond always gets away from danger, and also, away from any emotional 
entanglement which might threaten to make Bond “bonded” in his turn. Clark figures 
the functional coupling of subject and world, through a second metaphor, and one 
which I believe is a less ambiguous model for conceptualising the enmeshedness of 
subjectivity. Clark writes: “the relationship between user and artefact is about as 
close and intimate as that between a spider and web” (218). The image of the spider 
insists on the ongoing way in which the subject is involved in the creation of his 
world, and also stresses that the level of this relation is not decorative or auxiliary, but 
rather the fundamental one of survival.
The concept of a coupling between self and world also occurs in The Tree of 
Knowledge: The Biological Roots o f Human Understanding (1987). Here, cognitive 
scientists H. Maturana and Francisco Varela write that the biological roots of knowing 
cannot be understood by examining the nervous system alone, but rather require that 
learning be considered as the “expression of structural coupling, which always 
maintains compatibility between the operation of the organism and its environment” 
(172). Yet the authors identify, over and over, a common tendency in popular 
conceptualisations of cognition: that by which the process of learning is described
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through some form of a metaphor of “getting information” from the environment 
represented “within” (25-26, 129-131, 133, 172). Developing a parallel argument in 
“Genes, Environment, and Organisms” (1995), historian of science Richard Lewontin 
suggests that our society is marked by an ideological commitment to “the hegemony 
of the internal over the external” (122). Despite the fact that the ongoing change in 
most organisms is a consequence of a unique interaction between their internal state 
and the external milieu, science has, according to Lewontin, traditionally approached 
the study of biology as though the “outside” world were not a creative force on the 
“inside” organism. This view is one it has embodied in its writing by posing the 
questions about the life history of the organism in terms of metaphors of development. 
Lewontin writes:
Literally, “development” is an unfolding or unrolling, a metaphor 
that is more transparent in its Spanish equivalent, desarollo, and in 
the German Entwicklung, an unwinding. In this view, the history of 
an organism is the unfolding and the revelation of an already 
immanent structure, just as when we develop a photograph, we 
reveal the image that is already latent in the exposed film. The 
process is literally internal to the organism, the role of the external 
world being only a provision of a hospitable condition in which the 
internal process can run its normal course. (121)
Lewontin critiques the metaphor of development, which “gives an impoverished 
picture of the actual determination of the life history of organisms. Development is 
not simply the realisation of an internal program . . .  the outside matters” (123). But 
he also understands that science is grounded in its society, a society that is influenced 
by and integrated into the structure of all our other social institutions. In Biology as 
Ideology: the Doctrine ofDNA (1991), Lewontin writes:
The view that we are totally at the mercy of internal forces present 
within ourselves from birth is part of a deep ideological commitment 
that goes under the name of reductionism . . .  by [which] we mean 
the belief that the world is broken up into tiny bits and pieces, each 
of which has its own properties and which combine together to make 
larger things. The individual makes society, for example, and society 
is nothing but the manifestation of the properties of individual human 
beings . . . The individualistic view of the biological world is simply 
a reflection of the ideologies of the bourgeois revolutions of the 
eighteenth century that placed the individual at the center of 
everything. (107)
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A view which sees the individual as enmeshed in the world is thus fundamentally 
threatening to society as we know it.
This is illustrated in a particularly illuminating manner for the present context 
by the 1976 novel by Manuel Puig, Kiss o f the Spider Woman, for what this novel 
reveals is the ambivalence with which our present subjectivities react to models of 
subjectivity which displace the agency of the subject. The functional coupling that 
Clark casts as arising between artefact and user, is in fact not one in which the subject 
retains his agency, who is able, like agent Bond, to move smoothly in, but also and 
importantly, out, of relations with the world at will. Rather this enmeshedness is like 
that of the spider, in which clear definitions between body and world no longer exist, 
in which imbrication is a permanent state of affairs in which the subject may feel 
trapped, and in which it may no longer be clear that the artefact of the web exists for 
the spider who is its “user”. Here, movement, the subject’s agency, transforms in an 
insidious way into stasis, the subject’s very disintegration or entropy. Puig writes:
She’s...poor creature she can’t move, there in the deepest part of the
jungle she’s trapped in a spider’s web. (280)
The speaker of the above words is Molina, Puig’s protagonist, who is in jail for 
“sexual deviancy”, in a repressive country that strongly resembles Argentina of the 
1960s and 1970s. Molina, who in Spanish speaks of himself in the feminine gender, 
passes the time in his cell by retelling the stories of the American films he has seen 
and loved, to his cell-mate Valentin, a political revolutionary. Yet, as Molina tells the 
tales, a reader who has seen the films Molina describes (examples of film noir from 
the 1940s) realises that Molina’s acts of remembering are also acts of imagination. 
Moreover, the reader sees that Molina’s repainted film-starlets seem also to be 
portraits of a self both idealised and despised, because in every case these females 
come to stand for what is strange, animal, and repudiated by society. In the last 
movie Molina recounts, the heroine, dressed in a long, silver, gossamer-silk gown, is 
transformed into a spider-woman—as Molina says: “the spider web is growing out of 
her own body, the threads are coming out of her waist and her hips, they’re part of her 
body” (280)—when all along the novel has been depicting Molina’s own activity of 
story-telling in terms of weaving, embroidering and spinning.
Molina is also spider-like in that he is engaged in devious and menacing 
plotting in the very spinning of his tales. For his act of sharing information about
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himself is also the way by which he hopes to encourage his cell-mate Valentin to 
reciprocate, and to confess the true-story of his alleged political crimes as he becomes 
involved in the web of Molina’s life stories. The information Molina hopes to extract 
from Valentin in this way is to be what earns him his release from prison and what 
brings him back into secure and fast relations with the world in the bosom of his 
family. Yet Puig suggests that Molina’s willed, self-serving act of plotting is actually 
the cover or alibi for an unwilled, self-destructive one. Story-telling, “languaging”, is 
beyond Molina’s control, it is the outpouring of a cloying liquid that the self exudes:
You can’t get along without becoming attached to something... it’s 
as if the mind had to secrete affection without stopping — the same 
way your stomach secretes juices for digestion — like a leaky 
faucet. And those drops continue dripping on anything, they can’t be 
turned off... because they’re spilling over the top of their container.
(41-42)
In Kiss o f the Spider Woman, the spider and its web appear as a horrific mode of 
deviant subjectivity, for the self may all too easily become imprisoned in the web of 
its own making—and indeed, it is Molina who falls into his own trap: who falls in 
love with Valentin, is convinced by him to work for the revolutionary cause, and dies 
at the novel’s end. As in the quotation above, Puig shows the self-world coupling in 
an even less glamorous guise, by changing Molina’s irrepressible communicability 
into an oxymoronic incontinent container.
Dance Practice as Autobiographv: Biologv as Biographv
In the first chapter of Paul John Eakin’s book on autobiography. How Our 
Lives Become Stories: Making Selves, the author examines recent writers on body 
image, notably Ulrich Neisser, Elisabeth Grosz and Oliver Sacks. Eakin’s thesis is 
that the reflexive activity of contemplating and narrating the self, as though the self 
were a coherent entity, is a performative act, in the sense that it can create the centring 
of self it projects through positing an “I”. For Eakin, the act of imagining the self that 
is writing the autobiography instantiates its authority by posing as remembrance. As 
an aid towards the articulation of his theory, Eakin adopts the multi-layered vision of 
subjectivity which Ulrich Neisser sets out in his essay, “Five Kinds of Self-
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Knowledge”. Neisser’s categories distinguish among different kinds of “self-
specifying information” which constitute gradations of knowing from the fundamental 
to the abstract. These are: an ecological self, the self as perceived with respect to the 
physical environment (“I” am the person here in this place, engaged in this particular 
activity); an interpersonal self the self as engaged in interaction with another person; 
the extended self the self existing outside the present moment, of memory and 
anticipation; the private self the self of conscious experiences which are not available 
to anyone else; the conceptual self the diverse forms of self-information that posit the 
self as a category (22-23). For Eakin, the last three of Neisser’s levels are 
characterised by their reflexivity, and thus can enter into the autobiographical project, 
while the first two of Neisser’s levels, the “ecological self’ and the “interpersonal 
self’, for Eakin, are “characterized by direct perception unmediated by reflexive 
consciousness of any kind” (23). Leaving aside for the moment the question of the 
extent to which perception can be direct, I should like to address Eakin’s assertion 
that the conscious making of the self takes place only on the last three levels of 
Neisser’s categories of self-hood.
The hypothesis of this research is that the dancing body constructs its 
specificity out of a reflexive relation to what Neisser calls the “ecological” self. In 
contrast to what sports psychologists have suggested, that “part of the training is not 
to think too much about any point in the cycle” (as though movement itself is not 
analysed, but rather is evaluated as successful in terms of a goal other than 
movement), dancers emphatically do analyse and hone the trajectories of their 
movements, experiment with different dynamics and assess their relative virtues.^ 
The sensory information that these experiences afford is also not allowed to dissipate, 
but is gathered into the dancer’s conscious perception. Thus, the dancer’s experience 
pushes back the boundaries of human embodiedness, not only in its performance of 
technical feats, but also in its reflexive awareness of sensory information usually kept 
below the threshold of consciousness. In Miller’s The Body In Question, the author 
describes this normal threshold:
* The full quotation is explicit about the relationship of unanalysed movement to memory. “Normally 
a moment of still passes in a blur of activity. Part of the training is not to think too much about any 
particular point in the cycle o f action, but to let the movement flow -  to get in and out smoothly so 
that you can react fast to whatever happens next. In consequence [one’s] memory [of movement] 
seems fragmented or partial” John McCrone, Going Inside: A Tour Round A Single Moment o f  
Consciousness, 276.
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The inside of the body is...literally studded with instruments capable 
of registering changes in pressure, temperature and chemical 
composition. But none of these meters has any dials: they are not 
meant to be read by human consciousness. (39)
The dancer’s activity belies Miller’s statement for, more and more, dance practices 
are developing techniques whose aim is to render readable the inner “metres” of the 
body.
One such technique is Body-Mind Centering developed by Bonnie Bainbridge 
Cohen. In Sensing, Feeling and Action: The Experiential Anatomy of Body-Mind 
Centering (1993), Bainbridge Cohen insists upon the large extent of action that there 
is in the activity of perceiving (114-118). Her model starts with a traditional 
understanding of the stages of perception, to which she adds two more. In their order, 
the traditional stages are: “sensory input”; “perceptual interpretation”; “motor- 
planning”; “motor response”; “sensory feedback”; “perceptual interpretation”. For 
Bainbridge Cohen, “sensory input” is already a hybrid entity, one which comprises 
the dancer’s proprioceptive sensations of that moment and the teacher’s commands. 
“Perceptual interpretation” is defined as the synthesis that the dancer creates from 
these different kinds of information. “Motor planning” is the stage where the dancer’s 
body prepares to respond to the command; and the “motor response” is the movement 
performed. For Bainbridge Cohen, the “sensory feedback” stage involves largely 
unconscious processes by which the body corrects and adjusts its movements so that 
the actual performance coincides with the movement that was planned. In The Body 
in Question, Miller shows the ongoing and moment-to-moment care that these 
adjustments require of the body at a level lower than it knows. He writes.
Feeling thirst, for instance, you might turn your head until your 
glance comes to rest on a glass of water. The brain may improvise a 
clear strategic plan of what to do with the glass of water, but the 
tactical problem of lifting it from the table to your lips can be solved 
only by moment-to-moment estimations of how the lift is going. If 
the grip is too strong and is not automatically limited by the 
experience of pressure felt by the fingertips and the joints of the 
hand, the glass may splinter. If the grip is too weak, because the 
slippery surface had not been anticipated, the glass will fall to the 
floor. And that is only the start of the problem. The eyes may give 
some idea of an object’s weight, but vision is notoriously deceptive.
The fact that the glass is raised to the lips without being smashed into 
the face is a tribute to the subtle weighing abilities of the outstretched 
limb. And the fact that the glass remains at the mouth while losing
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weight as it is emptied shows how punctually the news is updated:
without this information the glass would levitate as it was drained.
(205-206)
Returning to Bainbridge Cohen’s model, “perceptual interpretation” is a stage in 
which the body integrates its new experiences into its store of older ones, and in 
which it notices, and also re-marks through noticing, what Antonio Damasio has 
expressed in the title of his 1999 book, as The Feeling o f What Happens. The 
reflexive re-marking of experience that the dancer engages in is a way by which he or 
she shapes the self at Neisser’s “ecological level”.
Yet Bainbridge Cohen also conceives of the stages of perception as a cycle, 
and this is what leads her to see that action begins and ends with the particular state of 
being in the subject. This state constitutes one of the stages that Bainbridge Cohen 
adds to the traditional model of perception, one she understands as a context of “pre­
conceived expectations”. The dancer enters the room with a reason to practise 
dancing: hopes, ambitions, abilities and shortcomings, ideas about what movement is 
and feels like and a body tonus that expects to find what it knows. It is with this 
surface tension, this base tone, this carefully graded sense of possibilities, this cloud 
of memories and desires, that the dancer enters the movement, thereby adding new 
information to that state of being which, through the integration of this new 
information, may be changed. The “pre-conceived expectations” of a dancer are 
informed, not only by the dancer’s practice but by the dancer’s whole life. It is 
nourished by all that is heard, seen, studied, or imagined, and contains the collection 
of histories and cultural references of which the dancer has knowledge. This 
collection of lived or imagined histories establishes the web—and the metaphor is, as 
Puig has reminded us, not an innocent one—of associations for the dancer’s 
imagination in the field of dance.
The second stage Bainbridge Cohen proposes is involved in perception, and 
consists in further reflexive, albeit unconscious, activity that she first termed “pre­
motor focusing”, but which she has, since 1992, referred to as “active focusing”, as a 
way of stressing that this stage is actually a motor act even though it is a pre-sensory 
one (117). This stage follows directly after the first stage of the subject’s 
“preconceived expectations”, and comprises unconscious motor actions which tune 
the dancing body in anticipation of the movement it will perform. Yet the body which
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requires awareness of these unconscious motor acts may develop such an awareness, 
as is shown in Pride and a Daily Marathon (1991), in which neurologist Jonathan 
Cole tells the story of his patient Ian Waterman. At the age of nineteen. Waterman 
had contracted a disease which afflicted the sensory nerves, especially the nerve fibres 
subserving touch and proprioception, but which did not affect the motor nerves. The 
disease left Waterman with a rare neurological condition in which, unable to feel his 
body from neck to foot, he still was able to move. Yet in order to move, all of the 
adjustments that Miller mentions as happening unconsciously when we lift a glass of 
water and drink it, had to become conscious, voluntary orders Waterman gave his 
body. Cole writes:
If Ian wants to move an object he is holding from his side to the front 
of him, he first has to think that he must lean back a little to prevent 
the extra weight in front of him from pulling him over. (124)
Waterman was able to re-leam his motor skills in the absence of proprioception, 
because on the one hand he had already laid down his motor programmes, being 
nineteen when taken ill, and on the other hand because there was a price to pay for 
failure:
Ian discovered . . .  the hard way. If he moved one leg forward but 
did not move his center of gravity forward, or counterbalance one 
movement with another, he would fall. (58)
Ian needed to learn how to modulate his body-weight and its distribution in space in 
order to function as a human being, and though this involved a massive and constant 
effort—the daily marathon of the title—he was able to do so. Cole writes that in 
explanation of this. Waterman “simply says, again and again, that he knew what he 
had to do for a given movement and that it helped” (123). Cole writes that there was 
something peculiar and ungraceful about the deliberate, calculating way in which 
Waterman moved, which might make it seem strange to compare his experience to a 
dancer’s intuitive and seemingly instinctive agility. Waterman’s determination had 
allowed him to develop the motor skills necessary to hold down a normal job, where 
the personnel officer heard of his case and consulted him about the how the office 
environment could be improved. Cole writes that this officer:
was astonished when [Waterman] described his entire floor, recalling 
every loose joint of the flooring, all the bubbles in the fitted carpets, 
the slippery ramps, the trailing wires, the heavy doors, and a
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dangerous step. He knew the contours of his floor like a map, since 
in order to get around he had to negotiate all these potential hazards 
which, to most other people, were invisible. (115)
In contrast to the personnel officer, I was not in the least surprised at the detailed 
intimacy of Waterman’s knowledge of his office space, for I developed just such a 
detailed map of the stage space in every theatre where I performed. I consciously 
knew the exact situation of the more slippery tapes where the linoleum panels of the 
stage carpet were joined, and knew also precisely under which linoleum panels were 
located the irregularities in the floor it covered—the slight ridges where there were 
trap doors in the stage. This linoleum could also sometimes be taped down 
irregularly, creating bubbles which were to be avoided, but bubbles could also arise 
because of the temperature of the stage, when performing outside on tour in the 
summer in hot climates. The wings too held potential traps, of which the dancer 
needed to be aware. There were lights set on the floor which could connect painfully 
with a shin, whose electrical wires, taped to the floor, were sometimes inconveniently 
run across the path of the wings. The memory of these hazards convinces me that it is 
need which determines whether knowledge is gathered or left to dissipate; and 
because of this need, which in the dancer’s case is an investment in movement, I 
believe that he or she develops an ability analogous to that of Waterman, learns ways 
to intervene consciously at the level of the body’s unconscious motor acts. In Chapter 
8 ,1 shall discuss this ability through consideration of the work of French kinesiologist 
Hubert Godard, who refers to this phenomenon as “pre-movement” (“le pré­
mouvement”), by which it becomes possible to modulate the dancer’s body: 
enlivening, quickening, and shaping the body and its potentialities in important ways.
Necessarv Fictions
In How Our Lives Become Stories: Making Selves, Eakin’s theory of 
autobiography is careful to underline the way in which the conscious and unconscious 
levels of self, which are appreciated in Bainbridge Cohen’s state of “preconceived 
expectations”, are always already present. If Eakin suggests that only the last three of 
Neisser’s levels engage in the self-making which is autobiography, he nevertheless
40
quotes at length from an autobiographical text which, I wish to suggest, provides 
evidence that the contrary may be true: that the both the ecological and the 
interpersonal selves are always at work in shaping the self; and that it is only the 
dancer’s practice of listening to the body that makes him or her into an expert 
interpreter of these selves—selves that are speaking in unrecognised ways in other 
less highly trained bodies.
In A Leg To Stand On, the neurologist and science writer Oliver Sacks 
recounts the story of his own narrow escape from death, his hospitalisation, and his 
cure. On holiday in Norway, Sacks, a keen mountain climber, went out alone before 
dawn on a long walk, and after four hours of striding up the mountain, at eleven 
o’clock encountered an enraged bull which nearly gored him. In running away from 
the bull. Sacks slipped, fell, and suffered drastic damage to his left leg: the quadriceps 
muscle was completely tom away from the knee, an injury which rendered the leg 
totally powerless, and the act of walking impossible. Sacks was then faced with the 
thought that he would very probably die of exposure to the cold on the mountain, for 
he was unable to walk down the mountain to help and warmth; a probability that 
could only intensify as night began to fall, when there would be less and less chance 
of his being spotted by a potential rescuer, should anyone chance to venture up the 
mountain.
But Sacks constitutes a formidable opponent to the mishap life has sent him: a 
host of allies rallies to his aid, as his narrative makes clear. For between the moment 
when Sacks is injured and the moment when he is discovered by two reindeer hunters, 
there occurs a string of internal monologue (which Sacks recreates in his novel), a 
monologue in which a sequence of identities—doctor, mathematician, philosopher, 
religious person, music lover, poetry reader, and son—all collude in the effort to 
preserve Sacks’ life.
The first incarnation that takes over in him is Sacks the man of science, who 
uses reason to de-dramatise the deathly situation in which he is located. Sacks, the 
author at the time of writing his book, tells us that his first thought was that this could 
not be happening to him. This displacement of identity is a life-serving, necessary 
fiction, I am suggesting, an illusion which is colluded in as Sacks, back on the 
mountain and in time of peril, assumes one of his identities, that of a doctor, whom he
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instructs to inspect “the leg” as though it were one belonging to another. Sacks 
writes:
OK, Doctor,’ I said to myself, ‘would you kindly examine the leg?’
Very professionally, and impersonally, and not at all tenderly, as if I 
were a surgeon examining ‘a case’, I took the leg and examined 
it.. .murmur[ing] my findings aloud. ..as if for a class of students. (6)
Still in his role as doctor, on the ground with his useless leg splayed in front of him. 
Sacks makes a splint out of the umbrella he has fortunately been carrying (as a 
seemingly indispensable part of the dress of an Englishman), to which prop he binds 
the afflicted leg as firmly as possible with strips of his anorak. He now devises a slow 
and painful form of locomotion in which, sitting on his buttocks, he uses his two arms 
in propulsion and his one good leg for steering, enabling him to half-slide, half-row 
himself down the mountain. Once in motion, however. Sacks is overtaken by another 
of his bodies of knowledge, and becomes a mathematician. Now his mind is 
obsessively involved in extracting statistical correlations which are meant, on one 
level, to calculate the rate at which he can return to the valley, but on another level are 
what keep him occupied so that his mind does not fix on the imminent menace of 
death. From the speed at which he has walked and the time he has spent walking. 
Sacks carefully estimates how far he must have come up the mountain, and then 
compares this distance to the distance he speculates he can cover by his newly 
invented form of locomotion; a figure which he arrives at by involved calculations of 
the rate at which he is now covering ground, and his idea of how much time is still 
left to him before it will be dark (and thus too dangerous to move since he will be 
unable to avoid the irregularities of surface in the mountain slope). These calculations 
convince him, that if he just keeps going steadily, and is careful not to tip over, he will 
be able to return far enough down the mountain to be found before nightfall.
Yet he who is perceiving the world and his rate of locomotion, from which 
data Sacks the mathematician is calculating, is the very Sacks whose life is held in the 
balance of these calculations. At around six in the evening, after seven hours of hard 
slide-rowing. Sacks sees that he has only one hour of sunlight left, and simultaneously 
recognises the spot he has made his way to, remembering the hour it was when he 
passed the spot on his way up. He now realises that his present form of locomotion is 
six times as slow as walking, when his estimation, of its being just possible for him to
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reach safety, had been based on the calculation that it was half as fast as walking. He 
writes:
How could I have imagined that one was half as fast as the other, and 
that the ascent from the relatively warm and populous low-lying 
farmland, which had taken four hours or so, could be retraced in just 
twice that time, bringing me within range of the highest farmhouse 
by dusk . . .  I had been secretly sustained by this vision throughout 
the interminable hours of my descent. (16)
The fiction that Sacks invents despite, or beneath, his scientific self, the vision of 
being able to reach safety by nightfall, forms the over-arching narrative spun by some 
fundamental self within Sacks, a self which enables him to hold onto hope. But this 
narrative runs concurrent with several other smaller narratives regulating his mood. 
Sacks the philosopher is joined by his memories of Nietzsche, Leibniz and Kant; 
Sacks the historian of science is accompanied by Harvey; in Sacks the religious 
person, there emerge lines from Ecclesiastes; while Sacks the lover of literature and 
poetry is overtaken by Tolstoy, Auden, and Goethe, one after another, in turn; while 
in the meantime Sacks the music lover discovers rhythm and melody in his slide- 
rowing, and is “musicked along” in his efforts, a discovery which Sacks insists was an 
involuntary one, writing, “I did not contrive this. It happened to me” (13). And so 
Sacks remarks that while his method of locomotion at first demanded all his attention, 
he soon masters it and his mind is free to roam. At a later point in his descent of the 
mountain, more personal memories from his childhood emerge in him, all of them 
happy and rich, memories which sweeten the present time of his arduous descent with 
their past happiness.
Static or “Volatile” Bodies
The stream of different stories that arises in Sacks as he slides and rows his 
way down a mountain, may be understood as the strategies by which all of the levels 
of his self arise to ensure his organism’s homeostasis. In The Body in Question, 
Jonathan Miller writes about homeostasis in the following terms:
The ambition, the versatility and intelligence with which the creature 
pursues food and avoids predators are merely homeostatic aids to the 
maintenance of status quo. All action is directed towards a state of 
affairs where there is no need for further action. For living things, all
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restlessness is directed towards the state of tranquillity. Breathing, 
healing, sweating and flushing; eating, drinking and urinating, all are 
undertaken in the service of an almost unattainable stability. (174)
Here, Miller shows the inseparable and circular relationship between action and stasis. 
Stability permits mobility, while that permitted mobility is constructing a further 
stability. By contrast, in her investigation of the body image, Elizabeth Grosz 
theorises for the “volatile body” of her title. Grosz quotes Deleuze and Guattari as 
she valorises:
A discontinuous, non totalizable series of processes, organs, flows, 
energies, corporeal substances and incorporeal event, speeds and 
durations. (165)
Grosz takes a stand for inter-corporality, denying “that there is the ‘real’ material 
body on one hand and its various cultural and historical representations on the other”, 
claiming, “that these representations and cultural inscriptions quite literally constitute 
bodies and help to produce them as such” (x).
Ironically, it is Grosz’s very effort to be careful with language that makes her 
contribution problematic for dance studies. Grosz writes that in an effort to avoid 
dualism, she makes it a point not to use “many of the common metaphors that have 
been used to describe the interactions of mind and body, metaphors of embodiment, 
of containment, machine metaphors, two sided coins, hydraulic models” (xii); but in 
their place she proposes two metaphors that are unfortunately unhelpful for the 
practice of dance. One of these is Grosz’s adoption of Deleuze’s “the body without 
organs”. This formulation strikes precisely the wrong note, for dancers, because 
organ proprioception has been identified as one that the profession needs to develop. 
In “Dancing Bodies”, Susan Foster remarks that the practice of dance develops acute 
awareness of the skeletal, nervous and muscular systems; it develops minimal 
awareness of the lungs, stomach sense organs circulatory system, whereas “other 
organs and the endocrine system [are] not at all” developed (483). The conspicuous 
absence of sensitivity that Foster notes is also observed by Bonnie Bainbridge Cohen, 
an important part of whose technique, Body-Mind Centering, attempts precisely to 
address and redress this specific lack in dancers’ bodily knowledge.
The second metaphor which Grosz adopts, that of Lacan’s moebius strip, is 
also an infelicitous one for dancers, because in showing how easily the outside and 
inside slip fluidly into one another, this paradigm suggests that the inside and outside
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of subjects are the site of a similar effortless, seemingly seamless, and reversible 
movement. Therefore, while I believe that on the level of theory, Grosz’s suggestion 
that living and inanimate bodies inscribe one another is insightful and pertinent for 
dance, at the level of metaphor, I wish to argue that a practice-based theory of dance 
requires a model which places more stress on the efforts and timings that characterise 
the interactions between the self and world; and also a model which places more 
emphasis on the fact that those interactions leave marks which are not easily erased, 
but rather which often linger on the body.
While Grosz’s metaphors in Volatile Bodies seem to wish to abolish the 
categories of inside and outside the body, and to suggest that the body is characterised 
by rapid changes. Miller in The Body in Question writes as though categories of 
outside and inside were fixed, and as though the body were characterised by slow 
changes. Rather than taking these perspectives as diametrically opposed, I suggest 
that it is possible to see that both are valid views, through a perception that these 
views are the inevitable result of a choice to focus on a particular level of the 
organism. This can in turn be appreciated through a consideration of the methodology 
of Maturana and Varela in The Tree of Knowledge. Here, the authors find that what is 
characteristic of all living things is “autopoietic organisation”, by which term they 
mean that at every level of the organism processes are at work which not only sustain 
life but which also produce it. They first explain what they mean by autopoeitic 
organisation, using the example of a cell, and then show the ways in which the same 
autopoeitic organisation may be seen on more and more macro-levels within an 
organism and then in society at large. The cell, they write, attracts the elements which 
will be part of it, orders the movements of these elements, organizes their sequences, 
and the exchanges among them. Through these actions, the cell brings itself into 
being. And one important action without which the cell cannot survive is the 
production of its own membrane, for without the membrane the other activities that go 
on within its protection cannot occur. The membrane is a barrier which determines 
that exchanges take place at a different speed within the cell, than what occurs 
between the cell its outsides. From the point of view of the cell, activity is going on 
that is rushed, traumatic and volatile; from the more macro-level of the organism, 
outside the cell, what is going on in the cell movement may appear so slow, slight, 
and automatic that it seems like stasis.
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Inside the Grammar of the Dancing Body
What is important for the present context is a knowledge of which level in the 
organism should be addressed, in realtion to what is being sought. This awareness of 
level is the indispensable knowledge without which no intervention in the body’s 
processes can be successful. Here, an example from dance practice may illuminate 
the way in which it is necessary to know the steps of the small dance going on inside 
the body in order to bring about change within the body. One of the central principles 
in ballet is that of extension, and when I was a young dancer in training I realised that 
in order to lift the leg high to the front, in développé en avant, the muscles at the 
backs of the thighs, the ham-strings, needed first to be lengthened. I consequently set 
about zealously trying to stretch these muscles, along with my colleagues. This we 
would attempt to do while seated on the floor with our legs stretched out in front of 
us, by grasping our feet with our hands, and bending our elbows in an effort to tract 
our torso further down towards the outstretched legs. However, a slow steady and 
gentle pull did not result in reducing this distance quickly enough for the liking of 
some students, and these individuals would resort to a forceful tugging which they 
were obliged to release seconds later when the pain was felt in the muscle. The 
pulling and releasing together generated a bouncing movement, which allowed the 
young dancers the satisfaction of seeing, at least momentarily, the goal attained. But 
these gains were short-lived, for the next day these same muscles felt the abuse of this 
treatment. Stiffer, the students were even further away from the wished-for high 
développé.
Having since studied biomechanics, I now know the extent to which our 
efforts were misdirected, and that we were proceeding in the very way we should 
have had we wanted to shorten these muscles. In order to increase these muscles’ 
extendibility, we should have paid careful attention to the grammar of the body and 
respected its laws. This would have involved realising that the reason the hamstring 
muscles did not lengthen was that they form part of a vigilant homeostatic system 
which protects those same muscles from the damage that can occur from too rapid a 
stretch. It would have involved a knowledge that though it is not possible to be free
46
of the internal checks of the body’s homeostasis, it is possible to get inside the rhythm 
of these checks, to defuse them, and turn them to working towards one’s own designs.
It is this inner grammar which neurologist V.S. Ramachandran has devoted 
himself to studying, and whose rules he is beginning to learn, and learning to master. 
His findings suggest that what has been held as given, that the body learns and 
changes slowly, is not necessarily true. In Phantoms in the Brain, Ramachandran 
recounts his successes in treating patients who are suffering from body image 
disorders. Through his invention of a virtual-reality box in which a mirror transposes 
the image of one side of the body to the other, Ramachandran is able to exploit the 
fact that body images are a synthesis of information which arises from three different 
senses: the vestibular-proprioceptive, the neuro-motor, and the visual. His patients 
are plagued by the feeling of a limb which does not exist: his invention, which 
constructed an illusion of a normal limb in the place of the phantom, gives them new 
visual information to be integrated into that synthesis. The new perceptions 
Ramachandran’s patients experience while using the box reorganise their body- 
images, curing them almost instantly of their phantom limbs. Ramachandran has also 
developed exercises which involve producing a combination of tactile sensations in 
the absence of sight. Here, he has one person sit blindfolded on a chair, and then sits 
a second person sitting on a second chair in front of the first person who thus does not 
know that a second person is involved. He takes one finger of the first person in one 
hand and, stretching it far in front of him, reaches and strokes the nose of the second 
person in a complex series of taps. At the same time he moves a finger of his own 
second hand in the same pattern on the nose of the first person. The first person feels 
the pattern of taps on his nose; he also feels that his hand is stretched out far in front 
of him tapping in the same pattern: the person begins to feel as though his own nose 
were suddenly very long, projected far in front of him. For Ramachandran, the way in 
which the body, interpreting these stimuli, can be convinced it suddenly has a long 
nose, proves that the body image is not static, but rather very malleable. He writes 
that this experiment:
illustrates the single most important principle underlying all 
perception—that the mechanics of perception are mainly involved in 
extracting statistical correlations from the world to create a model 
that is temporarily useful. (59)
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Ramachandran’s research is useful for dance studies because it show the way in 
which it is the very constructed nature of the body image, its status as a moment-by- 
moment-synthesis, and its embeddedness in the world, that make it possible to act on 
and change it. Yet at the same time Ramachandran’s findings make clear that the 
subject cannot usually exploit the knowledge of the body images’ constructedness by 
him- or herself, and point to the necessity of a third party. For his experiments can 
only work in the absence of the subject’s knowledge or sight, because they create an 
illusion which the subject is so placed as to be able to form a new synthesis of 
perception, one which is more enabling than the previous one. If Ramachandran’s 
cures for phantom limb work by constructing such a context. Sack’s full recovery 
from his leg injury is brought about by a similar construction: a ruse that makes him 
want to use his leg normally. After hospitalisation and a stay in a rehabilitation 
centre. Sacks visits a specialist because he feels his leg is not wholly functional, a 
doctor who remarks that Sacks has gained fifteen degrees of flexion in his knee, 
enough to walk normally. In the specialist’s opinion Sacks is still walking stiffly 
because he has “‘forgotten’ [his] knee, and can’t imagine what using it is like” (148). 
He asks Sacks what physical activity he enjoys, and when Sacks says swimming, 
sends him to a pool. There, the life guard, who has been put up to it by the doctor, 
challenges Sacks to a race and pushes him in the water. Sacks is in the water before 
he has time to think, “and then the impertinence and the provocation, had their effect” 
(149). Sacks keeps up a fast crawl for four Olympic lengths, stops when the lifeguard 
cries “enough”, and once out of the pool finds he walks completely normally. The 
next day, when Sacks revisits the specialist, the doctor confesses he devised the whole 
scenario, remarking, “What one needs is spontaneity, to be tricked into action” (149).
In dance practice, these illusions, ruses, and tricks that may change the body 
image may take place in the pedagogical situation, in the way that specific 
constructions of bodies of knowledge—or ghost-bodies—are brought to bear on living 
bodies. These constructions, which are enacted in devised scenarios or pedagogical 
situations, may address the dancing body at many different levels. It is the very basis 
of the dance class that it devises ways to provide the body with new experiences, that 
it invents ways of extending the body’s abilities and its ways of being in space and 
time, ones that may be integrated into the dancing body’s synthetic body image. But 
newer dance techniques that are inspired by somatic practices allow the dancing body
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to create new syntheses of perception even before movement is experienced, for they 
enable it to become aware of Bainbridge Cohen’s “unconscious preparatory 
movements”. These techniques permit the dancing body, in a manner similar to how 
Ian Waterman pre-thinks his action, to influence these unconscious preparatory 
movements. Pedagogical or devised situations may work on the subject at a stage still 
earlier in perception, and change the subject’s mind, movement, and perception. This, 
I suggest, was the case when Sacks was forced to accept his leg as an integral part of 
himself; but I also believe it was the case when I saw the ghosts of my colleagues’ 
body images: a pedagogical situation supplied an opportunity, a knowledge base, and 
an incentive, for my sighting. Other constructions which can act on the same stage of 
perception, changing the desires and expectations with which the dancer enters the 
classroom or goes on stage, are the bodies of knowledge which inform his or her 
imagination. It is from a desire to nourish the bodies of knowledge that are alive 
within the dancer, that the subsequent chapters of Ghost-Bodies have been written.
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THE GHOST-BODY-AS-CLOCKWORK
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Chapter 3
The Ghost-Body-as-Clockwork as Philosophical Ideal
and Publicity Stunt
The ghost-body-as clockwork is manifested when certain kinds of movement 
quality are present. These may be as varied as the slippery smoothness of Fred 
Astaire in a tap routine, the lanky disjointedness of the dancers in William Forsythe’s 
company, the formal tilts and geometric spatial orientations of Cunningham 
technique, the refined isolations that are one characteristic of jazz dancing, or the 
robotic moves that are found in breakdance and hip-hop. What these diverse 
movement qualities share is the way in which they engage the parts of the body 
relative to one another. Each movement style allows a particular body part a freedom 
of motion, by constructing its independence from the parts of the body around it. 
According to the ghost-body-as-clockwork, the body’s parts are separate and discrete 
entities, whose individual and local workings are to be perfected.
Though the ghost-body-as-clockwork influences the different kinds of dance 
mentioned above, it is one which crystallized in the technique of ballet. Even more 
specifically, the ghost-body-as-clockwork can be seen in its most condensed and 
exemplary form in the figure of the dancing automaton, the eponymous heroine of the 
1870 ballet, Coppélia. The technique of classical ballet is one which is founded upon 
the smooth and easy independent movements of the body’s articulations. Ballet 
teachers enjoin their students to ‘oil their joints’; speak of ‘polishing’ a movement; 
describe as a ‘lever’ the forceful first leg lift in a grand jeté’, and explain rond de 
jambe par terre in terms of a compass, one of whose hands is the stable unmoving 
reference for the circular movement of the other. These metaphors reveal that the 
body is imagined as if it were a metal instrument, a mechanical tool, one whose 
moveable parts engage with one another in precise and controlled ways. Each 
movement is imagined and trained in the dancer as being a local one which should not
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disturb the poise of any other part, nor the equilibrium of the body as a whole. This 
constitutes a way of looking at the body which is essentially bio-mechanical, one 
which understands the body through the observable workings of man-made machines. 
Yet, as Steven Vogel points out in Cat's Paws and Catapults: Mechanical Worlds of 
Nature and People (1998):
Natural and human technologies differ extensively and pervasively.
We build dry and stiff structures; nature mainly makes hers wet and 
flexible. We build of metals; nature never does. Our hinges mainly 
slide; hers mostly bend. We do wonders with wheels and rotary 
motion; nature makes fully competent boats, aircraft and terrestrial 
vehicles that lack them entirely. Our engines expand or spin; hers 
contract or slide. We fabricate large things directly; nature’s large 
things are cunning proliferations of tiny components. (16)
The understanding of the body as a machine is one which is embedded in the 
history of Western medicine, and intimately linked to the development of technology. 
Western medicine evolved its particular view of the body in relation to the metaphors 
that became available for its conceptualisation of the body. In The Body in Question, 
Jonathan Miller traces the way in which Western medicine’s theoretical models were 
beholden to actual tools and machines, whose discovery and use were at the source of 
medicine’s successive theories. Miller suggests:
It is impossible to imagine how anyone could have made sense of the 
heart before we knew what a pump was. Before the invention of 
automatic gun-turrets, there was no model to explain the finesse of 
voluntary muscle action, (xiv)
Miller writes that William Harvey’s De Motus Cordis et Sanguinis in Animalibus (On 
the Motion of the Heart and Blood in Animals) (1628) explained the circulatory 
system in terms of a mechanical pump with a series of pipes and valves. In “A 
Mechanical Microcosm: Bodily Passions, Good Manners and Cartesian Mechanism” 
(1998), Peter Dear stresses the way in which René Descartes’s view of the body, as it 
appears in his posthumously published Traité de l ’homme (ca. 1633) is beholden to 
mechanical metaphors. Not only do our lungs work like bellows and does our blood 
flow as within a hydraulic system, but our memory, sleep, passions, hunger, pain, 
dizziness and sneezes can all be accounted for mechanically. For Descartes, functions 
in the human body-machine follow:
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Simply from the disposition of organs as wholly and naturally as the 
movements of a clock or other automaton follow from the disposition 
of its counterweights and wheels. (Dear, 59)
In The Mechanical Turk: The True Story o f the Chess-Playing Machine That Fooled 
the World (2002), Tom Standage supplies the following definition of “automaton”:
(from autos, the self, and pao, to seize): a self-moving machine, or 
one in which the principle of motion is contained within the 
mechanism itself. According to this description, clocks, watches and 
all machines of a similar kind are automata, but the word is generally 
applied to contrivances which simulate for a time the motions of 
animal life, (xi)
Echoing this definition, in Living Dolls: A Magical History o f the Quest For 
Mechanical Life (2002), Gaby Woods suggests that one of the stakes in Descartes’s 
conceptualisation of the body as an automaton, was a desire to see it removed from 
outside jurisdiction. Clockwork was precisely governed by internal necessity; it was 
untouched by external forces, and did not require outside government. This made 
Descartes’s writing potentially subversive of the monarchy, which governed by divine 
right, and of religious belief which conceptualised the deity as the prime mover; for it 
provided the analogy by which the social body could be imagined as self-governing.
Yet the condition of self-rule was that rule be internalised. As Michel 
Foucault and others have argued, the move to create a social body of free agents, who 
could, according to the political revolutions of the century, determine their own 
destiny, albeit collectively, was simultaneously a move to greater regulation of the 
individual’s body. This implies that a greater freedom of movement on the level of the 
social body was intrinsically linked to a more thorough discipline of the body in daily 
life. In the same way, I shall argue, the very concept of the individual’s agency is 
utterly dependent on an Other’s subservient body. The ballerina’s body became a 
favoured Other in the nineteenth century, the sight of which neutralised a host of 
concerns and anxieties bearing upon the questions of freedom and determinacy. The 
ballerina was the dancing automaton through which spectators knew themselves as 
agents.
Two examples of recent publicity campaigns for high quality watches 
illustrate well the ghost-body-as-clockwork and the concerns it involves, ones which 
still touch the dancing body in the present day. The first (Plate 1) is an advertisement 
for Rolex in which French ballerina Sylvie Guillem is shown in a full-body shot, and
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in which the contrast between face and body is striking. For while Guillem’s gaze 
confronts her viewers straight-on, her four limbs shoot out from her body at alarming 
angles. Executing a développé à la seconde, Guillem’s legs have become like the 
hands of a clock, straight arrows seemingly unconnected the one to the other; in such 
a way that any dancer viewing the advertisement must be aware that the image 
condenses layer upon layer of irony. The first of these ironies dictates that if 
Guillem’s body incarnates the principles of clockwork, then this is because it was 
trained with this image in mind, proof of which is given as Guillem describes her 
position. It is “six o’clock, exactly” she declares in the advertisement, meaning that 
Guillem imagines her lifted leg as the minute-hand which indicates the twelve 
position on a clock-face, while her standing leg on demi-pointe corresponds to the 
hour hand which points to six. The photo’s grain shows the muscles of Guillem’s 
bare legs in high definition, revealing their streamlined, fine yet intricate lineaments. 
Her body is a precision instrument, as sophisticated as the product it endorses.
The connection between articularity, muscularity, and agency in Western 
culture is explored in Shigehisa Kuriyama’s The Expressiveness o f the Body and the 
Divergence of Greek and Chinese Medicine. Kuriyama’s research discloses that the 
clustering of these concepts is peculiar to Western culture, and traces the history of 
their coming together by considering early Greek pictoral and literary representation. 
Kuriyama discovers that while the word “muscle” was late to emerge in medical 
treatises, what one might now call a “muscular” body was present in early Greek 
painting and sculpture. The word contemporaneous writers used to describe the 
quality of those bodies was arthros, literally, jointedness. However, studying these 
texts, Kuriyama finds that “arthros” is not entirely synonymous with “articulation” in 
the modem anatomical sense. Rather, it designated the “divisions and distinctions 
which gave the body distinct form” (135).
Kuriyama writes that for the early Greeks, what hinged upon the distinctness 
of the body was identity itself. In the pseudo-Aristotelian text Physiognomies, the 
force of a person’s character could be judged to the extent which his body looked 
defined -  and I use the masculine pronoun advisedly. For if brave and forceful 
characters were “well-jointed and sinewy” the opposite body-quality, anarthros, 
characterised the bodies of a host of identities, which for one reason or another were 
judged inferior. “Anarthros” designated the soft bodies of women or those of slaves.
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the unformed malleable bodies of children and embryos, the feebleness of the old and 
the ill, the strange difference of the foreigner (135-142).
What constituted the bodily definition upon which identity and agency both 
depended, was the individuation of the subject, which came about through its 
differentiation from other bodies. Differentiation was, in turn, seen to be dependent 
upon agon or struggle. Kuriyama quotes from The Histories, in which Herodotus 
describes the Sythians’ physiognomy. Herodotus writes:
The seasons being uniform and altering but little, wherefore the men
are also alike one another in physique...For neither bodily nor
mental endurance is possible where the changes are not violent. (141)
Struggle was seen by the ancient Greek world to be formative of the individual and 
his singular abilities, a vision that continues to influence Western medicine and art. 
Struggle or competition, “agon” in Greek, was thought to characterise the body itself 
since its musculature was categorised as pairs of opposites called “agonists” and 
“antagonists”. While the body’s musculature may indeed work through the 
production of tension and countertension in these opposing muscle pairings, this is not 
the only bodily coordination possible. Yet because of the way Western anatomy 
names the body, the concept of struggle remains an important conceptual category. 
This in turn frames the Western vision of the body and influences how it can be used. 
In the Rolex photograph, it is the “arthrosity” of Guillem which is being celebrated 
and at the same time seen as founding her as a self-moving agent.
The second advertisement (Plate 2), for Omega, was part of a campaign whose 
slogan was “James Bond’s Choice”, in the run up to the release of the new Bond 
movie. Die Another Day, in 2003. In this advertisement it is actor-celebrity Pierce 
Brosnan who endorses the product, though not in his own right, but rather in the 
persona of the famous secret agent he plays. Bond is a mere number, a servant in her 
Majesty’s secret service; yet the bond(sman) becomes agent by mastering others, 
particularly through his ability to use the latest intelligent technology. The 
technological instruments Bond uses are miniature versions of Bond himself, in that 
they too are kinds of intelligent agents (though inanimate ones) in disguise, just as 
Bond’s singularity is all but hidden by the interchangeable tuxedo of Western evening 
dress. For typically they are objects which seem the standard issue for the normal 
business man: cigarette lighter, pen, briefcase, but under which innocuous guise they
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conceal their true power, intelligence, and function. The advertisement is playing 
with this aspect of Bond’s discretion, which it intimates also characterises Omega’s 
design.
What the two advertisements share is how they juxtapose animate and 
inanimate bodies, and suggest a hierarchy between them. They work by promising 
that the human will attain agency (and status) through the use of the watch. Yet the 
object relations of the two putative users of the watches are substantially different. 
The Bond character is a famous user (and spoiler) of objects and new technologies 
which become his prostheses: that by which he extends his power in the world; while 
the sole prosthesis associated with the ballerina remains the point shoe. Bond’s 
strategy with technology is to miniaturise it and make it portable: his toys are 
microscopic condensations of knowledge which enable him to act in all places. By 
contrast, the technologies which touch the ballerina are typically bigger than she: the 
mises en scène in theatres, there before her, and the conservatory system which 
produced her, both of which are thus beyond her control. By stark contrast with what 
happens to Bond, these technologies are all around her body, framing how she can 
dance, making her own skills the reverse of interchangeable. Rather, her skills are 
ones that are particularly embedded in a very specific context.
The divergence between the two potential watch-users’ object relations 
derives from the fact that their energies are oriented in opposite directions. Bond’s 
agency is constituted by his outward thrust: the subjection of other inanimate and 
animate bodies (fast cars and women respectively); while the ballerina’s agency is 
constituted by the turning inward of her powers, which makes her own body the 
mastered object. This divergence between these two subjects’ agency is linked to a 
further concern, which, using terms offered by historian of science Simon Schaffer, I 
can now identify as the question of “the place where intelligence is to be found inside 
a space to which access is forbidden” (“Babbage” 78-79). The two photographs 
dramatise the spatial mode of intelligence’s place, and its relation to gender. 
Brosnan’s photograph is a head-shot, implying that Bond’s intelligence is localised in 
his brain; Guillem’s image is of her entire silhouette, suggesting that her intelligence 
is located in her body.
Within the rhetoric of the two photographs, the watch, the inanimate body of 
intelligence, is placed clearly at the service of the animate body. Outside the rhetoric
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of the advertisement, however, the clear superiority of body over machine is not so 
obvious, especially in the case of the dancing body. The state-of-the-art perfection 
which is the ballerina’s body requires a daily maintenance and has a famously short 
life-span. The ballerina’s perishability determines that she must be replaceable, but 
the imminent absence of her person is foreseen and rendered unimportant by the 
academy which produced her, which every year produces a crop of young dancers to 
take her place. Her singular body-of-knowledge will be recuperated by a larger body- 
of-knowledge; its creations and discoveries will form part of the repertoire which will 
shape the bodies of future dancers. The fragile temporality, the imperilled longevity, 
of the dancer’s body ensures that it can exemplify the alienating side of the Janus­
faced discourse of agency and reification, in that the docility and ductility of the 
dancing body are posed as the pre-condition of the existence of the repertoire.
The radically different life-spans of the ballet Coppélia, and the choreographer 
and dancer who created it, illustrate the antagonistic relation between animate and 
inanimate bodies of knowledge. Both St. Léon and Giuseppina Bozzacchi were dead 
before the end of the year 1871 (Guest 248, 251); Coppélia, which enjoyed 
“immediate and unequivocal success” at its 1870 première (Guest 244), remained so 
popular with audiences that it existed in the Opéra repertoire for an “unprecedented 
711 performances over ninety years” in its original version (Bergner and Plett, 160). 
After seven years of a new version choreographed by Michel Descombey, the Opéra 
called upon Pierre Lacotte to revive the original in 1973. Dance writer Femau Hall 
writes that though “an Italo-Russian version of Coppélia survives—we have no way 
of knowing how much (if any) of the original French choreography of 1870 remains” 
(391). Yet on the occasion of his revival of the ballet, Lacotte claimed authenticity 
for his version, based on the rigour and discipline of the academy of the Paris Opéra 
and the dancers it trained. In “A Controversial Ballet: Reflections on Coppélia”, 
dance historian Giannandrea Poesio recounts Lacotte’s claims to authenticity. He 
writes:
Fortunately for [Lacotte], much of the second version of Coppélia— 
the one performed in 1871 after the disastrous Franco-Prussian 
war—had survived by oral tradition. The dancer Léontine 
Beaugrand, who had taken the role created in 1870 by the Italian 
Giuseppina Bozzacchi, taught it to Rosita Mauri, who, in turn, passed 
it on to Carlotta Zambelli, one of the great interpreters of Swanhilda.
(893)
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Lest even this short list of names, only three generations of dancers, suggests that 
variation might have crept in, Poesio adds:
Zambelli, first as a dancer and then as a teacher, was particularly 
keen on preserving the ballet as it had been taught to her, avoiding 
any possible alteration. The 1871 choreography arrived hence 
directly to Lacotte, who was a pupil of Zambelli. (893)
The exactitude and respect of those who danced Coppélia is here shown as the reason 
why the repertoire lived on. The dancer’s animate body models itself upon an 
inanimate body of knowledge, the steps of the repertoire, in order to perform the role 
of Swanhilda. Subjecting itself to this body of steps, the animate dancing body makes 
the inanimate body of knowledge come alive again, a state of affairs which is shown 
as the very condition of a heritage in the art form of dance. This constitutes one more 
irony of which the dancer, contemplating Guillem’s image, both arrested in time and 
seemingly outside it, may be aware.
Metaphor as Total Programme: Wavs of Thinking, Feeling and Acting
The metaphor of clockwork is not only explanatory, but is also performative, 
bringing into being the body as it is imagined, through practices that are peculiar to it. 
For the body metaphor does not only organise the body’s movement, but also involves 
modes of perceiving and conceptualising which together form a three-fold programme 
which directs how the body lives. This programme for action, perception and 
conceptualisation is active even beyond the body it inhabits, for it structures the ways 
in which that body will interact with other bodies and how it will offer itself to be 
seen by them.
The programme for the clockwork body continues to exist in the present day, 
but it emerged at a particular moment in Western history, a moment when technology, 
that pragmatic instantiation of the inanimate body of knowledge that the Human 
produced, was displacing and redefining the place of man, and more particularly the 
place of woman. Provoked by the political revolution of the eighteenth century, and 
the industrial revolutions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, these 
displacements and redefinitions gave rise to anxieties about the place of intelligence
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(Schaffer, Enlightened). The ballerina’s body, a machine-like instrument created 
through repetition and disciplined by the Opera’s strict hierarchies, seemed to palliate 
these anxieties, making her a favoured Other in mid- and late-nineteenth century 
Paris. The Opéra displayed the dancing-body-as-clockwork to its audience 
(conceived as male) much as a Rolex watch is now displayed to the public of our day: 
as an object available for possession, if only by a privileged few. But what was 
necessary, in order that her possession be enjoyed with impunity, was that the dancer 
be clearly marked as Other, and several discourses and practices together contributed 
to do so.
The performer/audience relations which characterised the nineteenth-century 
ballet had changed from those which had characterised the Ancien Régime, as has 
been documented by dance historians. In his classic work. Histoire de la danse en 
occident: de la préhistoire à la fin de Vécole classique (1978), Paul Bourcier writes 
that pre-Revolutionary dance existed for “une société, de cour, bien entendu...[la 
danse] n’a plus pour fonction que de se donner à elle-même une représentation d’elle- 
même”; for, under Louis XIV, himself an accomplished and enthusiastic dancer, the 
ballet was performed by and for the aristocracy (119-121). Historians have typically 
noted that the themes of the ballet under monarchical rule were Greek gods and 
goddesses; for, in representing Classical themes, sometimes embodied by the king 
himself, such as Bourcier remarks when Louis XTV danced the role of Apollo, it could 
be suggested that France herself was enjoying its Golden Age under its present 
monarch (119). The paradigm which structured audience/performer relations under 
the monarchy was that of a mirror: the aristocratic court saw itself, its hierarchies, and 
its etiquette reflected onstage.
But by 1840 things had changed. Revolution had swept one audience away 
and set quite a different one in its place. This new audience emphatically did not 
want to see itself onstage, as is made very clear in critic Jules Janin’s tirade against 
the male dancer. Janin’s tirade was first brought to the forefront of the awareness of 
dance writers by Ivor Guest in 1966, in The Romantic Ballet in Paris, but from this 
that time continued to haunt dance writers, and call for their critique. Janin’s passage 
appears in Lynn Garafola’s 1985 essay, “The Travesty Dancer in Nineteenth Century 
Ballet”, which considers the social factors at work constructing the dancer as a sexual 
commodity in nineteenth-century society; it recurs in Ramsay Burt’s 1995 book. The
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Male Dancer: Bodies, Spectacles, Sexualities, as the paradigm against which Susan 
Foster’s argument tended; it appears again in her 1996 essay, “The Ballerina’s Phallic 
Pointe”. Despite all the critical attention this passage has attracted, 1 believe the 
metaphors which Janin uses to build his argument have not been appreciated, and 
propose to consider it carefully again. Below is Guest’s translation of Janin’s famous 
complaints:
[The male dancer] responds to nothing, he represents nothing, he is 
nothing. Speak to us of a pretty dancing girl who displays the grace 
of her features and the elegance of her figure, who reveals so 
fleetingly all the treasures of her beauty. Thank God, 1 understand 
that perfectly, 1 know what this lovely creature wishes us, and 1 
would willingly follow wherever she wishes in the sweet land of 
love. But a man, a frightful man, as ugly as you and 1, a wretched 
fellow who leaps about without knowing why, a creature specially 
made to carry a musket and a sword and to wear a uniform. That this 
fellow should dance as woman does—impossible! That this 
be whiskered individual who is a pillar of the community, an elector, 
a municipal councillor, a man whose business it is to make and 
unmake laws should come to us in a tunic of sky-blue satin, his head 
covered with a hat with a waving plume amorously caressing his 
cheek, a frightful danseuse of the male sex, come to pirouette in the 
best place while the pretty ballet girls stand respectfully at a 
distance—this was surely impossible and intolerable, and we have 
done well to remove such great artists from our pleasures. Today 
thanks to this revolution which we have effected, woman is queen of 
ballet. (Romantic 21)
If Janin’s review argues that the male dancer cannot take part in the act of 
representation (“He responds to nothing, he represents nothing, he is nothing”), this is 
because it implies that in being a man, the male dancer contained the ability to blur 
distinctions between two orders. As Foster’s reading of the passage has it: “Janin 
succinctly observed the alignment of masculine identity with a public domain and of 
feminine identity with a private domain” (Ballerina’s 8). What Foster terms an 
opposition between public and private are Janin’s “land of love” (inhabited by 
dancing girls) and his land of law (in which men are meant “to carry a musket and a 
sword and to wear a uniform”). For Janin, the differences between political 
representation and artistic representation could be kept clear by means of the 
distinction of gender; they would be confused if “a man, a frightful man, as ugly as 
you and I” were to show himself onstage. Janin writes as if it were the very 
similarity between what went on in life and what went on on stage that foreclosed the
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pleasure in looking in post-Revolutionary society, a pleasure which Janin connects, 
importantly I believe, to knowledge and its absence. The review contrasts a desire to 
see the female dancer, of whose aesthetic Janin writes, “Thank God I understand that 
perfectly”, with a distaste for the male dancer’s activity, who is contemptible because 
he “leaps about without knowing why”(my emphasis).
Ramsay Burt’s analysis of this passage from Janin attributes the unpopularity 
of the male dancer either to his “association with the degenerate of the old 
aristocracy” (in the case of the danseur noble), or to “his resembling the rude prowess 
of the working classes” (in the case of the caractère dancer) (25). Either way, these 
associations prevented male dancers from representing middle-class values, an 
analysis that shows how Burt assumes that in 1840 the paradigm for the relation 
between the public and the performance had remained a mirror. In contrast to this, 1 
argue that what attended the changed demographics of ballet’s public was a change in 
the paradigm of the relations between them. The new bourgeois audience did not 
place itself in front of a mirror, but rather before a window, one through which they, 
as knowing subjects, could escape into an imaginary world, and vicariously enjoy the 
substantial otherness of that world, with an impunity assured because those inhabiting 
it were clearly demarcated as other.
The male dancer was banished from the stage during the first half of the 
nineteenth century, because implied in the changing roles he played onstage, were the 
roles which men played in the real world: soldier, municipal councillor. And these 
were also identities in part pressed onto men by outside authority rather than by 
internal necessity. Yet if men were all but banished from the stage in danced roles by 
the end of the Second Empire, (where their roles were taken over by female dancers 
en travesti, as was the case in Coppélia in which the ballerina Eugenia Fiocre created 
the role of Frantz); Ivor Guest notes that mimed roles (such as the part of Dr. 
Coppélius in Coppélia) continued to be played by men {Second Empire 3).  ^ This fact 
contradicts Burt’s statement that it was “the spectacle and not the activity of dancing 
which underlay the prejudice against the male dancer” (13). Indeed, spectacle and 
performing the body through activity became so entwined in the eighteenth century.
* Guest assures us that “The practice of casting a woman in a major travesty part became an almost 
general at the end of the Second Empire: in four of six new ballets produced between 1864 and 1873—  
La Maschera, Le Roi d ’Yvetot, Coppélia, and Gretna Green— the beautiful Eugenie Fiocre played 
important travesty roles that enabled her perfect figure to be displayed to wonderful effect” (3).
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that by the nineteenth century they constituted a single position. Being the object of 
the gaze and/or engaging in manual or physical labour entailed being the Other of 
nineteenth-century bourgeois male subjectivity, a subjectivity that was itself based 
upon the primacy of seeing and knowing.
Dancers’ Identities: Imaging and Writing the Dancing-Bodv-as-Clockwork
While Janin’s aesthetic discourse used the distinction of gender in order to 
define two separate worlds, the distinction itself was a fluid and unstable one that was 
under construction in the nineteenth century, one which was being articulated by 
many different discourses, some of which were themselves imaged through the 
dancing body. The interdependant relationship between several of these discourses 
and the art that was produced in the nineteenth century, art which both embodied 
these ideas and imaged them, can be seen the work of the impressionist artist Edgar 
Degas. Degas was connected to the ballet theatre for over four decades, beginning in 
the 1860s. His engagement with the ballet was encyclopaedic, practically life-long, 
and intimate: his work includes studies of the orchestra pit, the dance classrooms, and 
the backstage areas such as dressing rooms, corridors, and wings, as well as 
representations of the stage and its audience. The interweaving of Degas’s personal 
life with that of the Opéra and its employees is a matter of record: his familiarity with 
the dancers was such that, in 1868, two years before Coppélia’s première, he was 
close enough to the sensational Eugenie Fiocre to depict her in her new role as the star 
of La Source, in a depiction which in Degas and the Dance, dance scholar and teacher 
Jil DeVonyar and art historian Richard Kendall point out was a surprisingly 
unconventional manner (15). DeVonyar and Kendall write that Degas was so 
sympathetic to the Opéra dancers and intimate with them, that it was perceived by his 
contemporaries as amounting to an identification with them, and resulted in his being 
“repeatedly caricatured as one himself’ (15). Yet art historians have also noted 
Degas’s inscription within society as an upper-class male, and his interest in the 
evolutionary theory being articulated at the time (Charles Darwin’s Origin of the 
Species was published in 1857, but the idea of evolution’s possibility had saturated 
the scientific community years before) which yielded an ideology that was used to 
legitimate class and gender distinctions. These two interests interwove in Degas’s
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work, to create powerful and ambivalent depictions of the female dancer, one 
particular image of which I should like now to consider in detail.
In 1881, Degas’s principal entry at the exhibition of 1881 was a statuette of a 
dancer, which subsequently became the object of lively argument. Entitled Little 
Dancer of Fourteen Years {La petite danseuse de quatorze ans), the statuette was 
smaller than life-sized, and she was displayed in a glass case, a mode of presentation 
which in “Anatomie et physiognomie: La petite danseuse de quatorze ans de Degas” , 
art historian Anthea Callen asserts was as uncommon for contemporary sculpture as it 
was commonplace for zoological or other scientific exhibits (367). In tension with 
these devices, which called attention to its status as an artefact, was the dancer’s 
aspect, which was disturbingly hyper-real. The tinted wax from which it was made 
showed a high relief and texture; it was adorned with a wig of real hair; it sported 
actual clothing: a white bodice and gauze skirt, pink ballet slippers, pear-coloured hair 
ribbon and a matching one around the neck. While the dancer’s dress, as the uniform 
worn by all her ilk, bespoke an anonymity, the dancer’s features stressed a distinct 
personality. For Degas, it was said, the working of the dancer’s nose was crucial. 
This feature was turned up, both in an impertinent expression, and in a slant that was 
considered ape-like to contemporaneous audiences. The Sculpture of Edgar Degas, 
by Charles Millard, gathers the contemporary critical reception to the work, and that 
of the critic Paul Mantz is particularly pertinent here. Mantz wrote:
The piece is finished and let us acknowledge right away that the 
result is nearly terrifying...Formidable because she is thoughtless, 
with bestial effrontery she moves her face forward, or rather her little 
muzzle—and this word is perfectly correct because this poor girl is 
the beginning of a rat...[Degas] has gathered from the espaliers of 
the theatre a precociously depraved flower. (Millard I2I-I22)
For Callen, the outrage of Mantz has to be understood in relation to the 
scientific ideas to which Degas’s sculpture gave image. Callen considers Degas’s 
work in the framework of the discourses of its contemporaneous society, suggesting a 
“reflexive relation between scientific discourse and art during this period” (362). In 
contextualisation of her analysis of the statuette, Callen writes that in the nineteenth 
century the disciplines of both art and science were pressed into service to produce 
“visual signs of difference” (366). These signs were urgently required by a bourgeois 
male society which needed to “assure for itself a separate and higher state of
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evolution, at the same time biological and cultural, which would concur in 
legitimising its position of patiiarchical dominance” (366). The pseudo-scientific 
theories of physiognomy, recognised as validly scientific in the nineteenth century, 
provided the basis of this thought, which was consolidated by Gall’s phrenology (now 
also considered spurious). These theories posed a relation between degeneracy and 
criminality which legitimised the ghetto-isation of the lower classes, for this relation 
hypothesised criminality as a heritable trait which purportedly proved the inferiority 
of the lower classes, as well as that of the non-white races and women. 
Contemporaneous anthropologists and anatomists identified several features as 
degenerate. These included a skull shape characterised by an acute facial angle, as 
well as heavy bones and fleshy features. Hence, the salient cheekbones and marked 
jaw-lines of the under-nourished lower classes became signs of their evolutionary 
inferiority. In women, degeneracy was thought to announce itself in two ways 
peculiar to the sex: the first of these was a robust physicality (in contrast to the 
delicate health of refined upper-class females), the second was precocity. Both these 
traits were the sign of an aggressive sexuality absent in socially respectable women.
In his very choice of subject. Degas committed himself to depicting a certain 
number of traits associated with degeneracy: his model, an advanced student at the 
Opéra, Belgian Marie van Goethem, was necessarily physically strong; while the 
dancer’s thinness would to a certain extent determine a relative prominence of facial 
feature. But Callen shows that Degas is not recording what he sees; rather, she argues, 
he is exaggerating specific elements of his model’s person, and it is not by chance that 
those which are selected correspond closely to the evolutionary theory that was then 
current. Callen’s research analyses Degas’s successive studies for his statuette, and 
by comparing the initial ones with the finished work, it reveals the pattern by which 
the animate body of the dancer was re-formed in the work of art. Each successive 
sketch substituted, for van Goethem’s features, those that were more closely 
associated with evolutionarily lower animals, thus giving a concrete image to ideas in 
the air at the time. Yet through the very markedness of these characteristics. Degas 
exposed these ideas to view and made them fragile, for his image made its audience 
uncomfortable, a discomfort that may be felt in the following passage. Mantz wrote:
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Proof that your fourteen year-old is not real is that there is nothing 
real about her. Her thinness is hard; this is the thinness of old age, 
not of childhood. (Millard 122)
The accusation of insufficient verisimilitude is curious, given that the critic’s 
objections condense around the little dancer’s thinness, a recognised dancer-trait. 
Joris-Karl Huysmans had commented on the thinness of dancers in “L’Exposition des 
Indépendants en 1880”:
Original anaemic specimens, these girls in deplorable health from 
sleeping in garrets; worn down by premature devotion to such work; 
there again, nervous dried-up girls whose muscles show through their 
jerseys...And, how many among them are charming, charming 
because of a special beauty compounded of plebeian coarseness and 
grace! (Herbert 129)
Degas’s great friend, Ludovic Halévy, had also written a similar description of the 
dancer’s physique:
I met an urchin fourteen years old. She is as dark as a mole and as 
thin as a rail, but those who attend to this business and know the 
ropes, tell me that she will be charming at eighteen. And, already, 
some wretches are bringing her pendants and earrings at twenty-five 
francs apiece. (Herbert 115)
The vehemence of the criticism launched against Degas’s statuette suggests that, on 
the contrary, it was the very hyper-realness of Degas’s depiction which disturbed, for 
it meant that the dancer could not longer be contemplated exclusively as an aesthetic 
object, but was suddenly apprehended as a person.
Millard records that Degas had taken particular care with his statuette’s nose 
and had been painstaking about the glass case in which she was to be put on view 
(21). These aspects simultaneously stressed her social reality as a sexual object and 
hinted, by her impertinent, stuck-up nose, that she was indecently, precociously aware 
of this: she seemed to be coolly appraising her audience in the act of looking at her. 
By these means Degas heightened the audience’s awareness of the social markings 
which kept the dancer in a particular social sphere, that of the demi-monde; and, by 
contrast, of his own relative freedom of movement, ensured by his status as a 
bourgeois male who could move with impunity between his own world and hers. At 
the same time, the perception of the dancer as a naturally more highly-sexed female 
served to legitimise her sexual exploitation by the bourgeoisie: for she could be seen.
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if not as inviting their advances, at least as being receptive to the desires which could 
not acceptably be projected onto women within the bourgeois man’s own class.
The Place of Intelligence
Another issue which underpinned the distinction between genders in the 
nineteenth century was a concern was their relative intelligences. In the essay 
“Enlightened Automata”, historian of science Simon Schaffer examines the way in 
which intellectual activity and ability were distributed, and perceived to be 
distributed, among the different strata of the social body. Schaffer suggests that this 
distribution was one which had been re-ordered by the industrial revolution, for the 
machines in use in industry constituted an inanimate intelligence which to some 
extent obviated the need for a thinking workforce. These nineteenth-century changes 
in the workplace were the concrétisation of theories that had been articulated earlier 
by Enlightenment philosophers, theories whose harbingers had been the clockwork 
automata which had toured the courts of Europe in the 1750s. Schaffer quotes from 
Denis Diderot’s 1751 Encylcopédie, where the terms in which Diderot admires the 
workings of an automated silk-loom (a precursor of Jaquard’s design) show how the 
advent of machines displaced the Human, and made human processes of intellection 
and imagination superfluous.
A machine that makes hundreds of stitches at once...and all without
the worker who made the machine understanding anything, knowing
anything, or even dreaming of it. (Enlightened 129)
Schaffer underlines that for Diderot, “active gestures were a fundamental source of 
knowledge, a knowledge that could only be freed, reformed and rendered efficient by 
the gaze of the enlightened” (Enlightened 127). This meant that the mechanisation of 
the workplace necessitated a redistribution of knowledge, away from the worker and 
towards the management, for as Schaffer has it, it was thought that: “genteel ‘men of 
theory’ could be deluded by their cunning workforce and by utopian optimism” 
(Enlightened 145). Schaffer quotes John Theosophilus Desaguliers who in 1734 
wrote: “There is a Combination among most Workmen to make a Mystery of their 
Arts and they look upon him as a False Brother who lets gentlemen into their Manner 
of Working and the Knowledge of the Price of all Materials” (Enlightened 145). For
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Schaffer, this shift necessitated in turn a shift in the way the relationships between 
action, seeing and intelligence were portrayed. Prior to the Enlightenment, Schaffer 
argues, the practical activities of each social class were held to involve knowledge 
which was indivisible from practice, and were that class’s exclusive concern. The 
knowledge of the skilled artisan was of a different order form that of the philosopher 
and could not interest him. But this understanding, consensual prior to the 
Enlightenment, shifted as the Enlightenment took hold. Schaffer notes that it is an 
understanding which Diderot is struggling against in his Encyclopédie, as he writes an 
apology for his inclusion in it of even very trivial subjects:
A good mind can sometimes, with the same success, both raise itself 
to the highest contemplations of philosophy and descend to the 
minutest details of mechanics. (Enlightened 132)
Diderot’s metaphors exemplify how he is imagining the world’s body of knowledge 
as a vertical tiered structure, and conceptualising the philosopher’s ability as a 
mobility, in his freedom of movement between these tiers. Importantly, the 
philosopher’s omniscience was linked to his distanced perspective as an observer, 
rather than to his intimate knowledge as a participant. In an early draft of The Wealth 
of Nations, Adam Smith recognised that the invention of the many machines by which 
labour was facilitated and abridged was indebted to the division of labour by which 
distinct, and separate knowledge accrued through hands-on experience. Yet 
according to Smith, the key technological inventions of these machines could not be 
credited or confined to workers. Schaffer remarks that these were attributed not to 
the man of action, but to the man who possesses an overview of the processes of 
work, the philosopher, who for Adam Smith is:
No work man of any kind, but a man of speculation, one of those 
people whose trade it is not to do any thing, but to observe every 
thing, and who are, on that account, capable of combining together 
the powers of the most opposite and distant objects. (Enlightened 
130)
Schaffer shows the way in which this portrayal moved the worlds of action and 
knowledge further apart. The philosopher was to become a man of thought and was 
henceforth to be characterised by the scope of his interest; his Other was the manual 
worker, whose mental landscape was associated with the simple, restricted and
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repetitive gestures he performed. Schaffer quotes from Smith’s Edinburgh colleague, 
Adam Ferguson, who wrote, in 1767:
Many mechanical arts require no capacity. They succeed best under 
a total suppression of sentiment and reason, and ignorance is the 
mother of industry as well as of superstition. Reflection and fancy 
are subject to err, but a habit of moving the hand or the foot is 
independent of either. (Enlightened 129)
The body’s capability to act seemingly without requiring forethought became the 
model which allowed a categorisation of activities, and a hierarchy whose base was 
unthinking repetitive action, and whose acme was creative intellectual work. Yet 
Schaffer is careful to point to this portrait of the body precisely as portrayal, one 
which aimed to show the body as stupid for the very reason that it was recognised, by 
those who did the portraying, to contain important intelligence; a portrayal, then, 
which constituted a means of keeping this recognition from others.
In “A Calculus of Suffering: Ada Lovelace and the Bodily Constraints on 
Woman’s Knowledge in Early Victorian England”, historian of science Alison Winter 
argues that a method of evaluating a thing by the extent to which it was associated 
with bodily activity was so pervasive in the nineteenth century, it became the measure 
by which even different kinds of intellectual interests and their disciplines were 
arranged in a hierarchical relation. Winter describes the intellectual climate of the 
nineteenth century as one in which gender replaced gentility as the most important 
distinction determining intellectual identities. She considers the relationship between 
Lovelace’s high-profile identity as a female intellectual, the daughter of intellectuals 
(Lord and Lady Byron), and how Lovelace herself portrayed that identity. Winter 
argues that Lovelace found a way to cast her troublingly “masculine” intellectual 
powers in a feminine mode, by styling herself “High Priestess of Mathematics” and 
by adopting a maternal role in relation to Charles Babbage’s Analytical Engine (the 
precursor of today’s computer) (202). But Winter suggests that these portrayals in 
writing were not enough, and that Lovelace was also engaged in portraying herself as 
feminine through her notoriously sickly body.
Lovelace’s considerable intellectual talent was recognised early on in her life 
by one of the era’s prominent intellectual figures, Augustus De Morgan, who told 
Lovelace’s mother. Lady Byron, in the 1840s that Lovelace’s abilities “would have 
made her among the best of an incoming class of mathematicians at Cambridge”, yet
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Winter reminds her readers that De Morgan was speaking hypothetically, for of 
course at the time the admission of women was decades in the future (220). Despite 
this ability, Lovelace was advised against pursuing her passion for mathematics, a 
discipline unsuitable for her as a woman because of its analytical nature. Winter 
writes that for the nurturing of her feminine identity, her tutor instead prescribed a 
greater attention to:
Natural History and Physiology [for they] will be the studies best 
adapted to cherish what is a present most needing development, as 
bringing her into relation with other sentient beings, and keeping 
constantly in view the goodness as well as the power & wisdom of 
the Creator. (222)
Winter shows that the binary opposition between the manual and the 
intellectual could operate even within the abstract discipline of mathematics. A 
concept of certain intellectual pursuits as mechanical rather than creative gained 
credence at this time, and was useful for reconciling the proven intellectual capacity 
of women with the common knowledge that women were the intellectual inferiors of 
men. Winter explains:
Earlier conventions according to which intellectual power could be 
demonstrated by virtuoso performance of calculation gave way to the 
notion that calculation could be rendered “mechanical” and that it 
was therefore properly associated with manual labour. This devalued 
prodigious calculating feats: such skill became regarded as 
essentially uncreative, and thus accessible to women. (207)
Hierarchies of Intelligence
The construction of intelligence which came into prominence in the 
Enlightenment era, by which bodily action and bodily acts of perception were split 
apart, has been analysed at length by Michel Foucault in Discipline and Punish 
(1977). The paradigm that Foucault uses to examine how action and perception are 
separated in modem society is the architectural structure known as the Panopticon, a 
correctional facility designed by Jeremy Bentham at the end of the eighteenth century, 
but one which Foucault claimed “must be understood as a generalizable model of 
functioning; a way of defining power relations in terms of the everyday lives of men”, 
in that it assured certain inequalities of vision (205). The Panopticon was an annular
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building with a central tower with small windows from which guards unseen could 
see into every cell; whereas in each cell every inmate was perfectly visible and unable 
to see anyone else. For Foucault, “the Panopticon was a machine for dissociating the 
see/being seen dyad” (201-202). Foucault discusses the Panopticon to show the way 
in which this artefact engendered absolutes: the presence or absence of 
vision/intelligence/power (voir/savoir/pouvoir). Yet while Foucault takes the 
Panopticon as his model to show how inequalities in vision may be rendered 
mechanical, institutionalised, and how these may be reified into the extreme positions 
of prisoner and correction officer, he also explains how the Panopticon works by 
referring to another type of architecture. Foucault writes:
By the effect of backlighting, one can observe from the tower, 
standing out precisely against the light, the small captive shadows in 
the cells of the periphery. They are like so many small cages, so 
many small theaters, in which the actor is alone, perfectly visible and 
constantly visible . . .  He is seen, but he does not see; he is the object 
of information, never a subject in communication. (200)
As Foucault saw, the proscenium theatre has a function of dividing the activities of 
seeing and being seen. While Foucault argued that the Panopticon polarised the 
human into subject and object, I wish to return to the theater to analyse in detail the 
ways in which it creates nuanced and ambiguous hierarchies of sight and intelligence. 
To do so I shall again discuss the work of Degas, this time two works in pastel: 
Dancer with a Bouquet, Seen From a Loge (1877-1879) and At the Ballet, Woman 
With a Fan (1883-1885).
These two pastels show the theatre as creating a series of points of view that 
grow more privileged as they progress towards the theatre’s periphery and move away 
from the object of vision, the focal point of the stage. In Dancer With a Bouquet, 
Seen From a Loge (Plate 4), Degas imagines a point of view for the beholder of the 
pastel, which permits the perception of several levels of reality at the same time. This 
multiple perspective is a gendered one, for Degas situates the beholder in the place of 
the male theatre-goer, in the second row of seats behind a woman he has accompanied 
to the theatre: as art historian Robert Herbert writes in Impressionism: Art, Leisure 
and Paris Society (1988), “we assume the position of a man, standing or seated 
behind our companion (not next to her, the place of another woman)” (103). The 
woman with whom the beholder shares the loge is placed at the extreme right of the
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canvas and only partially seen, yet her profile and shoulders, all that the beholder sees 
of her, are framing the canvas and show her intent on watching a bowing solo dancer 
onstage, who is herself flanked by a female corps de ballet. From the shared 
viewpoint of the beholder/male ballet-goer, the space of the stage, the fictional world 
in which the ballerina appears and is contained, is divided in an ambiguous way from 
the loge, the real world which governs the appearance of his female companion. For 
the horizontal line, by which Degas structures this divide, does double service as the 
wooden edge of the stage, and the velvet-covered railing of the loge's, railing.
While this division justifies a difference in scale between the pastel’s two 
main female subjects, it demarcates similarities which seem both to draw the two 
women’s worlds together and to insist on their distance from one another. They seem 
drawn together by what Herbert calls Degas's “visual puns”(102-103). In this pastel. 
Degas’s perspective superimposes the profile of the society lady over the image of the 
dancer. Thus situated, the former’s nose appears just over the latter’s flowers, so that 
she seems to be sniffing them—this, when we know that the condition of operation of 
the olfactory sense is proximity. Meanwhile, Degas’s use of colour, which repeats the 
same blue of the dancer’s bouquet in the society woman’s sapphire earrings, 
underscores the social distance between the two women. Flowers and jewellery 
constitute the two archetypical tributes paid by men to women, and so in choosing to 
depict the women with these different tributes. Degas re-marks the differing ways in 
which they were beheld by bourgeois males. The ephemeral and fast-fading flowers 
are for the dancer, whose status as a member of the lower classes means her charms 
are ephemeral and perishable goods; the sapphires befit the lady in the loge, because 
she belongs to a class whose order must endure, just as the stones will never lose their 
colour. Degas’s juxtaposition of similarities images a series of levels of existence 
whose relative power is shown by two mutually exclusive factors: the extent to which 
one is on display, and the extent to which the other is positioned to see that display.
The pictoral metaphor which embodies the theme of degrees of visibility in 
both pastels is announced in the title of the second. At the Ballet, Woman With a Fan 
(Plate 4). In both works the woman spectators carry lace fans that they can use to 
screen their faces, preventing them from being seen by the curious in other loges. 
Onstage, the fan recurs in inverted miniature form, in the prop her social inferior 
carries, the bouquet she has just been offered. A further inverted fan-shape is
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constituted by the ballerina’s tutu, the tulle of whose skirts is characterised by an 
openness of weave that partly conceals and partly reveals the dancer’s legs from view. 
More tulle skirts, these further upstage and out of the limelight, enmesh to form a 
fainter and less distinct fan-shape. These skirts belong to the frieze of the corps de 
ballet, flattened against the scenery, to whom they are likened by the decoration that 
they collectively form. The shared and diffused nature of this fan-shape suggests here 
the less individuated identities of the corps de ballet members. Behind them, a final 
screen, that of the scenery, repeats the colours of the girls’ tutus as it provides the 
contrast against which their pale pink legs appear clearly. Degas repeats the fan shape 
in his canvas with numerous variations, as if conjugating a verb, whose different 
forms indicate the different persons they address. In doing so. Degas structures an 
equation by which the more a figure is visible the less it is able to see and know; and 
its contrary, the less a figure is seen, the more it knows of others. The corps de ballet- 
as-scenery is totally visible yet unable to see, because Degas depicts them in various 
ways that seem to preclude this ability. In Dancer with a Bouquet, Seen from A Loge, 
the corps de ballet are shown in the sweep of action, with their backs turned, with 
indefinite features and eyes so smeared and indistinct that it seems impossible they 
could be used to see with. In At the Ballet, Woman with a Fan, Degas avoids the 
problem entirely by depicting the corps de ballet without heads -  a trope in his work 
to which my argument will return. Positioned in the middle of the framing devices 
constituted by the corps de ballet frieze, the stage scenery, and held there in focused 
view (in At the Ballet, Woman with a Fan, by the society woman’s binoculars; in 
Dancer with a Bouquet, Seen from a Loge, by the spectator’s fan), stands the bowing 
soloist. She can do nothing to change the framing devices around her, nor can she use 
her fan-shape, the tulle of her tutu, to screen herself from others’ view. Yet in the 
same work Degas the painter identifies so closely with the dancer that he also sees the 
dancer as artiste-peintre. For in choosing to depict her during her révérance, when 
formal choreography has stopped, he highlights a moment at which the dancer has a 
certain control over her appearance. Degas suggests that at this moment the ballerina 
is no longer solely an instrument in the service of the choreographer’s design, but also 
an artist in her own right, a portraitist who composes her body’s parts into a shape that 
she designs to be seen by the watching audience.
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The Topologisation of the Body
A further discourse which was simultaneously at work in framing the dancer 
as a fitting object for the bourgeois male’s prurient interest is what I shall term the 
“topologisation” of the body: a discourse which acted to focus scopic interest on the 
dancer’s legs, thereby diverting it away from her face. Again, I want to consider this 
focusing of the public’s vision, through a discussion of one of Degas’s images. For 
Herbert, the Orchestra of the Opéra (1868-9) (Plate 5), completed just one year 
before Coppélia’s première, is the portrait of the artist’s friend Désiré Dihau, 
exemplifies Degas’s modernising project in portraiture, namely to present its subject 
in an active setting (94). Yet the painting shows the way in which subjectivity in the 
nineteenth century was articulated in relation to a necessary other of reification. For 
if Degas depicts his friend’s “agency”, by showing him playing in the Orchestra pit 
during a performance at the ballet, he does so by staging a striking contrast with those 
shown as lacking subjectivity: the dancers onstage.
The Orchestra at the Opera is divided horizontally into two separate worlds. 
The first world is that of the darkened orchestra pit, which Degas has peopled, not 
only with his bassoonist friend, but also, fancifully, with other friends who were not 
musicians: these were recognisable personalities of a certain set and day, a sort of 
tableau à clef The second world is the brightly illuminated one of the ballet; but as in 
the pastel I have already discussed. At the Ballet, Woman with a Fan, Degas crops the 
painting so that the work shows them only from the neck down, so that the dancers 
remain unrecognisable to the beholder of the painting, even though these dancers 
were perhaps equally well-known to the members of the Jockey Club, who had the 
right of visiting them back-stage. These dancers would have enjoyed notoriety well 
beyond the elite circle of the Jockey Club, for, as Susan Foster points out in 
Choreography and Narrative, “in the 1830s and 1840s two related kinds of literature 
about dance . . . began to enjoy unprecedented popularity and to circulate in far 
greater quantity than ever before” (222). The bodies of the seated men, clad in 
evening dress, disappear into the blackness of the orchestra pit, leaving their faces the 
more visible by contrast. Onstage these values are reversed. The bodies of the 
headless dancers, in their pink, blue, and tulle skirts, merge with one another and
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blend seamlessly into the scenery, leaving their legs and feet the more sharply visible 
against the dark wood of the stage floor. Degas juxtaposes two imagined worlds: one 
in which men are personalities and bodiless heads, the other in which women are 
nonentities and faceless bodies.
The identification of dancers with their legs, which is given image in The 
Orchestra at the Opéra, was consonant with the prevailing discourse on dance and 
dancers at the time. In a review of Coppélia, by J. Barbey D’Aurevilly, a critic 
covering the ballet during the Second Empire in France, one may glimpse how writing 
as well as painting trained the audience to a certain focus. Beginning his review with 
the concession that Coppélia’s débutant ballerina was no beauty, D’Aurevilly quickly 
goes on to suggest that this criterion is not the one by which the merits of a dancer 
should be measured. D’Aurevilly writes:
And firstly, let me say right off to have done with it, that she isn’t 
what’s called pretty. But what need would she have to be pretty?
Taglioni was not pretty, nor was Essler. Miss Bozzacchi remains in 
the highest tradition of dancers in not being pretty. She will trouble 
us less as a woman; we will judge her the better as a dancer. ^
D’Aurevilly argues that it is Bozzacchi’s lack of conventional female beauty that will 
allow her spectators not to be distracted away from her dancerly qualities, which he 
localises in her body. More precisely, within that body, its upper half, the torso, neck 
and arms, reveal a dancer’s individuality (Bozzacchi’s arms testify to her extreme 
youth, “her sweet, supple unfinished arms”);^  whereas the lower half of the body, the 
legs and feet, are what identify a dancer, they are the site of her inscription within that 
identity. D’Aurevilly found Bozzacchi’s legs to contrast with her half-formed upper- 
body:
Only the legs are fully formed in this little girl: for the rest, in this 
indecisive adolescent . . . Only they are the entirely sculpted 
instrument and sign of vocation, the indispensable beauty of the
 ^ “Et d’abord disons-le bien vite pour que ce soit fini, elle n’est pas ce que l’on appelle jolie. Mais 
qu’a-t-elle besoin d’être jo lie .. .Taglioni n’était pas jolie, Essler non plus. Mlle Bozzachi [sic] reste 
dans la tradition des plus grandes danseuses en ne l’étant pas. Elle troublera moins comme femme. On 
le jugera mieux comme danseuse.” D ’Aurevilly. Feuilleton du Journal le Parlement, 29, July 1870.
 ^“ses bras mignon, souples, inachevés”.”
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dancer! Here art and the exercise of an art have an advance on 
nature!"^
Once D’Aurevilly has identified the dancers’ legs as that which he has the duty to 
inspect, then he can let his gaze and analysis focus upon them with impunity, in a time 
when female legs in everyday life would have been kept well hidden, a state of affairs 
that Judith Chazin-Bennahum discusses in “Women of Faint Heart and Steel Toes”. 
For he continues to dilate upon them for the next paragraph of his review, in language 
which enmeshes the ethical, aesthetic and erotic registers:
Miss Bozzacchi’s legs have that purity which, for legs, like virtue, is 
a strength. Nevertheless near the ankles they have an imperceptible 
arch which will be seen by those who know how to see, and upon 
which voluptuous imaginings will be fixed.^
For D’Aurevilly, it is the very ability to discern, being one of “ceux qui savent voir”, 
that by a circular logic both authorises and legitimises the act of seeing, even if it also 
conveniently entails a voluptuous act of imagining.
The dancer in D’Aurevilly’s review was synendochically replaced by her 
legs, which were at the same time the favoured sign both of her profession and of her 
sexual availability. But these legs also proved, through the polar relation supposed to 
exist between action and thought, the dancer’s lack of intelligence. As Janin’s review 
put it, in the world of responsible adults the body’s actions produce and uphold the 
world’s systems because they are ones which have been the result of forethought and 
reason. In the irresponsible world of the dance, this sequence, in which action follows 
thought, is turned on its head, and men -  or excuses for men -  act before or even in 
the absolute absence of thought: “they leap about without knowing why”.
Seules les jambes sont formées dans cette petite fille: pour le reste, dans cette adolescente 
indécise.. .Seules, elles sont entièrement sculptées.. .l’instrument, le signe de vocation, la beauté 
indispensable de la danseuse! Ici l’art et l’exercice de l’art ont avancé la nature.”
 ^“Les jambes de Mlle Bozzacchi ont cette pureté qui, pour les jambes, comme la virtu, est la force . . .  
elles ont cependant, vers la cheville, une imperceptible arcure que verront bien ceux qui savent voir, et 
à laquelle se prendront les imaginations voluptueuses.”
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Chapter 4 
The Ghost-Body-as-Clockwork in the Repertoire
I have discussed the discourses that were active in the mid and late nineteenth 
century France because together they constitute the intellectual and social canvas 
against which the figure of the ballet Coppélia can better be understood. These 
discourses attempted to construct ever more separate realms for thought and action, 
for seeing and doing. Scientific discourses linked the action of seeing with 
intelligence, reason, power and creativity, and linked other bodily actions with the 
sub-human, the menial, manual, and mechanical, on the grounds that the body itself 
was a kind of machine capable of unthinking repetition. This conceptualisation 
conveniently overlooked the imagination and forethought that were involved in 
human skill and dexterity, and enabled a hierarchy to be erected in which thought 
ruled over action; but it simultaneously instantiated a fantasy in those who thought of 
themselves as bodiless heads, one which turned around those bodies imagined as free 
to act unthinkingly. The ballet was an important site where the fantasmatical pleasure 
of the subjugated yet still unruly body could be recuperated by the judging eye of 
ruling subjects.
Nineteenth-century viewers of the ballerina’s body appreciated that it was 
subjected to a strict discipline, one which made of it a malleable machine that was 
able to assume all positions and perform all actions of a codified dance vocabulary 
immediately and unquestioningly. Watching the ballerina involved a kind of scopic 
possession of an entity constructed as a kind of virtual sex toy, in that it constituted 
witnessing the domination of a reified Other by which those doing the seeing could 
appreciate themselves, by contrast, as free agents. Yet while on one level the 
ballerina comforted her audience by performing the subjected Other, on another level, 
and precisely because thought and action were conceived of as separate, she made her 
audience members aware of their discomfort, by seeming blithely unaware of the 
spiritual and moral disciplines to whose rule they themselves were subject.
A Dancing Doll and Her Public: Bozzacchi and the Reception of the 1870 Coppélia
The ballet Coppélia engaged in a complex way with the conventions of the 
time which it both reiterated and resisted, making its première, as Guest records, an 
“immediate and unequivocal success” (244). Two particular factors were consistently 
mentioned by critics reviewing the event, which may count as constituting its appeal. 
The first of these was the youth and surprising wit of its sixteen year-old debutant 
ballerina, Giuseppina Bozzacchi; the other was the work’s second act, of which 
D’Aurevilly wrote it was “the act which is all the ballet and all the piece”.^  The 
second act was the sole part of the ballet which showed an affinity with the work’s 
proclaimed literary source, E.T.A. Hoffmann’s tale “The Sandman” (1814), for it 
featured a female automaton, a dancing doll, a theme which Hoffmann had also 
treated in a slightly earlier work entitled “The Automata”(1814). Critics from the 
time of the première to the present day have remarked on how little Coppélia 
resembles “The Sandman”, noting especially the difference in tone between 
Hoffmann’s macabre tale and the sunny, bonbon-light ballet. My analysis seeks to 
address these differences in the way by which the 1814 tale was recast to address the 
ballet-going public of 1870, and to this end it considers “The Sandman” in some 
depth. Elements of the 1814 tale are conserved, and other elements are discarded, 
displaced or refigured in the ballet, while the way in which these elements undergo 
change are necessitated at times by the medium of dance, but at other times by the 
changed era in which the ballet appeared. Despite the many obvious differences in 
plot and tone, the ballet returns to the story’s concerns and themes, which were those 
of the Enlightenment par excellence.
Hoffmann’s Dancing Doll: The Ghost-Bodv-as-Clockwork in “The Sandman”
Hoffmann’s relationship to the Enlightenment is a highly ambivalent one: 
“The Sandman” could be characterised as belonging to the Gothic tradition, for it so 
exaggerates Enlightenment values that it brings about their undoing. The story traces
’ I’acte qui est tout le ballet et toute la pièce.
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the fall into madness of its hero, Nathaniel, who is separated from his fiancée Clara 
(in German, Klara, when a common expression denoting clarity is ''allés klar”) while 
he is away at university. Through his depiction of the particular’s striving for 
knowledge (Nathaniel’s university attendance) Hoffmann problematises the general 
narrative arch of the Enlightenment (or Aufklarung). For in Hoffmann’s tale the 
quest for reason paradoxically brings about unreason: the more knowledge Nathaniel 
acquires, the more he forms himself, as he studies under the respected professor of 
science Spalzani, the more he uses science’s technologies in order to see and know— 
spectacles, barometers, telescopes—the more these instruments of perception and 
bodies of knowledge get between him and his heart, and deform his ability to perceive 
and judge. A crucial moment in Hoffmann’s story is the moment when Nathaniel 
attends a ball hosted by Spalzani, where Nathaniel dances with a supremely beautiful 
girl whom Spalzani introduces to the company as his daughter Olympia. During this 
dance, Nathaniel falls in love with what is actually a hyper-real life-sized doll which 
the eminent scientist has created.
The moment when the two dance together, one an intelligent machine, the 
other an unaware human, struck the imaginations of a number of Hoffmann’s 
readership, which as R. J. Hollingdale writes, was a large one, as “long before his 
death he was the kind of author anyone who reads at all reads” (7). In 1870, nearly a 
half-century after Hoffmann’s death, his image of a dancing automaton seemed 
powerful enough to the team of Coppélia’s creators: choreographer Arthur St. Léon; 
composer Léo Delibes; and librettist Charles Nuitter, to provide the suject for an 
entire ballet. In 1906, it inspired the German literary critic Ernst Jentsch, who used 
the image of the dancing doll in Hoffmann’s tale as the paradigm of the genre he 
theorised as “die Ungeheim”, an appellation which would recur in Sigmund Freud’s 
essay of the same name “The Uncanny” (“Die Unheimlich”). Yet in this 1919 essay, 
Freud refutes the importance of the automaton-woman in the Hoffmann tale, locating 
as crucial instead an earlier moment in the tale, when Nathaniel as a child is 
frightened by “the sandman”, a bogey-man from children’s tales who steals the eyes 
of children. It is out of this figure, and by postulating a correspondence between the 
organs of sight and the male organ, that Freud theorises his castration complex.
In Hoffmann’s tale the scene in which the hero and the dancing doll dance 
together is the moment when perception is problematised. To the bystanders at the
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ball, Olympia is less than charming, and they let Nathaniel know their unflattering 
opinion, calling Olympia a “wax-faced wooden doll” (116), terms which are ironic 
because the speakers do not know their complaints in fact describe a reality (116). By 
contrast, Nathaniel’s own powers of observation are clouded: he is be-dazzled by 
what seems to him Olympia’s perfection. Hoffmann suggests that Nathaniel’s powers 
of perception are obscured by passion masquerading as reason, a passion driven by a 
bogus scientific “objectivity”. For Nathaniel’s perception, by a pun in German, both 
looks through the “objectif”, the lens of the telescope to spy on Olympia; and is 
“objectif’, an objective observer, one competent to judge Olympia’s unparalleled 
beauty^. The bodies of knowledge created by science, whether through its 
instruments of vision (the telescope) or through its simulations of the human 
(Olympia), impede both Nathaniel’s clarity of mind and his ability to judge. 
Hoffmann suggests this by imagining a punning situation which combines and 
confuses the information given the body by the visual and vestibular senses. These 
senses are at the origin of two different emotional meanings, yet in the German 
language they are expressed through a single metaphor. Home for the holidays, 
Nathaniel compares his fiancée Clara with Olympia in an inner monologue. He 
complains of Clara’s lack of imagination, and calls her a “puppet’, while recalling 
with fondness the human warmth and passion of Olympia’s glass eyes and wooden 
figure. The two meanings of the situation Hoffmann imagines could thus both be 
captured by a single German sentence: “Er kann sie nicht sehen”. Making use of a 
metaphor whose origin is the sense of vision, “not to be able to see someone” is how 
the German language figures, what the English language figures by employing the 
metaphor whose origin is the vestibular sense, or “not to be able to stand someone”. 
Nathaniel cannot see his fiancée truly; she disgusts him. Yet while the sentence 
bodies forth a change in Nathaniel’s affect, it simultaneously expresses that Nathaniel 
has lost his ability to see and to know; this was prefigured in the tale, when as a child 
he was frightened of losing his eyes to the sandman. No longer able to convert sight 
into knowledge, Nathaniel finds his very personhood called into question, for the tale 
shows the self and its agency as defined by the subject’s powers of perception.
 ^ “Objectif’ in German is both a noun designating, in English, a lens, such as that o f a telescope or 
other instrument, and an adjective meaning, in English, “objective”.
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At the same time that Hoffmann suggests Nathaniel’s loss of objectivity, he 
involves the reader in a similar loss. “The Sandman” is structured as an epistolary 
novella. The reader is positioned as the interceptor of the communications which pass 
among the tale’s three narrators, each of whom has not only different points of view, 
but also conflicting information. Each successive testimony undermines the point of 
view which has preceded it, and this ensures that the reader’s act of interpretation is 
undertaken in a mode of uncertainty.
The theme of the impossibility of complete knowledge is also figured in the 
tale’s physical settings. Sight is impeded by actual physical obstacles as well as by 
socially constructed ones. As a child, Nathaniel is kept by curtains from the certain 
knowledge of his Father’s illicit alchemical experiments with his unlikely friend; as a 
man, Nathaniel find his access to Olympia restrained by the social niceties which limit 
his portrait of her and make it a flawed one. These natural and artificial obstacles to 
sight and knowledge constitute a kind of order, one which incites disobedience, 
awakens a desire to possess this occluded and perhaps forbidden knowledge, and 
engenders the human “canniness” or ingenuity by which such obstacles can be 
circumvented. As a child, disobedient Nathaniel secretes himself behind the curtain 
in his private library; as a man he employs a tool made through human ingenuity, the 
telescope, in order to cross the barrier of distance which separates him from Olympia. 
Yet it is never clear {klar) to Nathaniel that what he manages to see through his 
scheming is actually the truth, for human art or cunning has always preceded his act 
of looking. He cannot be sure that what he sees is the thing revealing its nature, for 
what meets his eye may be the result of a clever staging or a studied portrayal.
As a child, Nathaniel believes that his father’s friend has perceived him in his 
hiding place behind the curtain in his father’s study at the start of the experiment, and 
that the reason why he has kept Nathaniel’s father in ignorance of it is because he has 
thought Nathaniel’s father may agree, given proof of his child’s disobedience, to let 
him have Nathaniel’s eyes; as a man, Nathaniel suspects that the telescope by which 
he has thought to outsmart Spalzani, and enjoy an unlimited view of Olympia, in fact 
has come into his possession through Spalzani’s scheming and with the very purpose 
of subjecting Nathaniel through his infatuation for his daughter. Hoffmann thus 
presents an Enlightenment subject through the lens of Romanticism, in that 
Nathaniel’s epistemological quest, one which brings him to university, is reduced to
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the sole desire to know (biblically) a forbidden sexual object; by which bathos, in 
characterising the desired object as literally an object—the automaton-woman— 
Hoffmann critiques Enlightenment values. Hoffmann further destabilises 
Enlightenment values by making the automaton—a figure representing the height of 
man’s knowledge, as manifested in his ability to create intelligent machines— 
concomitant with the figure of the feminine, the figure emblematic of that which 
resists being known by man. Nathaniel’s firm belief in the automaton’s passion for 
him appears to the reader as Nathaniel’s blatant projections, and in a curious reversal 
of man’s famous and obligatory uncertainty in the face of woman’s sexual pleasure, 
something which cannot be ascertained by “objective” verification. Hoffmann’s 
insistence on the outward signs of Olympia’s desire erodes the reader’s confidence in 
Nathaniel’s testimony.
Re-casting the Ghost-Bodv-as-Clockwork in Coppélia
Though the ballet Coppélia immediately discards the plot of “The Sandman”, 
the plot which it showed to the public in 1870 was one that was elaborated slowly and 
gradually. Nuitter began working on the ballet’s libretto in 1868, which was first 
entitled “La poupée de Numburg”, and wrote version after version until one was 
finally accepted by St. Léon. These unnumbered unpaginated successive libretti form 
part of the Nuitter archives that are housed in the library of the Paris Opéra, and 
analysis of them shows that, even if Nuitter immediately abandoned the Hoffmann 
plot, two kinds of elements that were present in “The Sandman” kept recurring in 
different forms in Nuitter’s libretti until they obtained their definitive shape in the 
final one. One of these elements was the configuration of its central characters; the 
other was the theme of the uncertainty of sight’s ability to lead to knowledge.
The central characters number four in Hoffmann’s tale. Besides the hero 
Nathaniel, his estranged fiancée Clara, and Olympia, the Automaton woman with 
whom he confuses her, figures a masculine character, one which conflates the homely 
and the strange, the known and the unknown, the familiar and the exotic, domestic 
order and worldly chaos. This character takes on various guises and often appears 
with a doppelganger: the father with his alchemist friend who is the sandman.
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professor Spalzani with his co-producer of Olympia, the occulist-technician Coppola. 
Nathaniel, though frightened by these characters and the victim of their plots, is at the 
same time identified with their doubled personalities, in that he is another bearer of 
his father’s name.
In Nuitter’s scenario the doubleness of Hoffmann’s masculine character is 
displaced onto a female character, in order to create a dual role out of the figures of 
the fiancée and the doll, and with the result of making her role the central one. In 
“Uncanny Women and Anxious Masters: Reading Coppélia Against Freud”, dance 
scholars Gwen Bergner and Nicole Plett engage in a triangular consideration of 
Hoffmann’s “The Sandman”, Freud’s “The Uncanny”, and the Nuitter-Saint Léon’s 
Coppélia. arguing that in view of the way in which the female position is side-lined in 
Hoffmann’s text (as proven by his pallid characterisation of the human heroine Clara) 
and radically excluded in “The Uncanny” (Freud’s theory of castration is constructed 
through an erasing of the importance of the automaton-woman in the tale, and by a 
conceptualising of woman’s genitals as absent ones), in Coppélia, by contrast, the 
female figure takes centre stage, and is thereby invested with authority. For Bergner 
and Plett, the ballet resists social conventions by leaving its male hero, Franz, in a 
drugged stupor when danger threatens, leaving it to be averted through “Swanhilda’s 
triumphant agency” (161). But the powerful methodology of analysis employed by 
Bergner and Plett, which traces the displacements in the three works, can also be 
applied to their own text. For just as the condition of Freud’s theory of castration is 
his removal of woman from the scene, so Bergner and Plett produce their theory of 
agency by excluding the role of Frantz from discussion. Franz’s role is literally 
removed from the text and confined in a footnote, in which Bergner and Plett remark 
that such a consideration is beyond the scope of their essay.
Frantz. Travestie and the Legs of Eugénie Fiocre
The part of Frantz was conceived as a travesty role for a female dancer, in 
accordance with a popular convention of the Romantic ballet, one in effect even 
before Janin’s diatribe against the male dancer had appeared, for travestie was a 
tradition, as Susan Foster remarks in Choreography and Narrative, which had begun 
at the very beginning of the nineteenth century (1996:220-222). The absence of the
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male dancer and his replacement by the ballerina en travesti meant that representing
the male hero as the central character could not have been a viable option, particularly
because, as dance historian Lynn Garafola writes in “The Travesty Dancer in
Nineteenth Century Ballet”, the Romantic ballet did not attempt a realistic
representation of the male through travesty, but rather, the travesty was meant to be
seen in its artificiality and enjoyed in that it failed convincingly to represent the male
(37). The public was not meant to be fooled by the female dancer’s male disguise, but
rather was invited to see through it, almost literally. Travesty roles, which involved
the wearing of leg- and buttock-revealing male attire, were not given to androgynous
bodies that today’s dance fashion might consider beautiful; rather these roles were
reserved for women whose figures were particularly curvaceous, sumptuous, and even
statuesquely feminine. The travesty convention was the flimsy pretext, providing the
modicum of propriety which allowed the public display of what at the time was
considered exemplary feminine beauty. The role of Frantz was given to Eugenie
Fiocre, whom Degas had painted only two years before in her leading role in La
Source. Fiocre was widely acknowledged to possess a splendid physique, and Guest
writes that she had made the travesty role something of her specialty (3). The
language of critics writing about the ballet makes clear the prurient interest in the
dancer, one example of which is the notice of Alexis Azeyede of Fiocre’s première
performance as Frantz:
Enchanté de te voir en culottes!...Tutoiement à part nous sommes 
fortement tenté d’adresser le même compliment à la belle parisienne de 
l’Opéra toutes les fois qu’elle se montre en habits masculins.^
The critic’s form of address, substituting the familiar “tu” for the more polite and 
neutral “vous” form, expresses a host of feelings towards the female dancer. It signals 
that the critic feels it is not necessary to accord her the respect convention would 
normally dictate; it shows affection but at the same time is infantilising, patronising, 
and de-humanising, for it is proper, besides one’s intimate circle, to address children, 
social inferiors and animals in the “tu” form. While the form of the critic’s comment 
suggests the dancer’s status as the public’s pet, its content forestalls the public’s 
consideration of Fiocre’s skills or artistry, and centres it upon an appreciation of her
 ^“Enchanted to see you in your knickers! . .  .we are tempted to adress the same compliment to the 
beautiful Parisian of the Opéra every time she shows herself in masculine clothing”, UOpinion  
Nationale, 31, May 1870.
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physical charms. The fact that Frantz is shown in Coppélia even more pointedly and 
explicitly as another incarnation of the feminine, makes problematic Bergner and 
Plett’s reading which would like to see a simple reversal in the male and female roles 
of Frantz and Swanhilda. I suggest that the fact that the female role becomes the 
central character in Coppélia does not reflect a greater estimation of the female sex on 
the parts of Saint Léon and Nuitter (in comparison to the estimations of Hoffmann and 
Freud), but rather that Nuitter gave the female character more importance for very 
practical reasons related specifically to the medium of dance.
Scenarios of Dancing Dolls
If we consider what are the truly significant changes that Nuitter’s scenario 
undergoes, the hero’s character is not one of them, for Nathaniel is essentially a 
passive character who submits to the adventures that are prepared for him by the 
hands of others. Rather, the significant change is undergone by the character of the 
scientist-alchemist figure, who loses the ability to create wonderment, work magic, 
design a doll so human that a man could fall in love with it. In Coppélia, the scientist- 
alchemist is become a cantankerous old man and an untalented charlatan, the butt of 
the young townspeople’s bullying, and whose doll invention makes a sorry mockery 
of magic. The central change in Nuitter’s libretto is his abandonment of the idea of 
presenting the automaton-woman as a truly credible simulacrum, one which is 
wondrously able to mimic human motion, and this choice was probably dictated by 
the medium of live theatre dance: this automaton would have either been prohibitively 
difficult, or not very effective as spectacle. It could not have been feasible to 
commission a real automaton-doll; short of this, it could not have been very effective, 
dependent as Saint-Léon would have been on the services of a flesh-and-blood dancer 
to play the part of the automaton-doll, and given that this dancer’s very palpability 
would undo the marvel of the “illusion” of human-like motion. The medium of the 
dance theatre itself undid the marvel that the medium of writing allowed, and it was 
this fact that made it necessary for Nuitter to look for new twists in the plot by which 
the spectacle of what would be manifest as a human girl (impersonating a human-like 
doll) would become magical again.
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Nuitter’s scenarios began by inventing situations in which the human heroine 
was substituted for the doll, but by this reversal the marvel now consisted, not in the 
doll’s incredibly life-like quality, but rather, in the human ballerina’s ability to play 
the doll convincingly. This effectively added several layers of character to the female 
role, for in a sense the ballerina would be playing herself: playing a depiction of ideal 
femininity artificially constructed through a process which shaped the body and 
mechanised its actions. Nuitter’s founding reversal also engendered an inversion in 
dance qualities: rather than aiming to stage the doll’s dancing as uncannily natural, the 
aim would be to show the ballerina’s technique as a mechanical assemblage of parts. 
Perhaps in order to dramatise the ballerina’s powerful impersonation, the automaton- 
woman began to be figured as powerless, as an inert and lifeless hoax.
Nuitter’s shift from presenting a mechanical wonder to presenting a woman 
playing at performing the feminine implied that the themes of will and wilfulness 
arose, displacing that of perception from the uppermost position it had held in the 
Hoffmann tale. These themes, which emerged as soon as Nuitter imagined the 
ballerina as playing a double role, underwent several forms before finding the one 
presented to 1870 audiences. In one libretto, Nuitter assembled the characters of the 
scientist-watchmaker Coppélius, Frantz (in this version imagined as Coppélius’ 
nephew), and the dual heroine role (in this version called Antonia) at a public ball. 
All the ball-goers marvel at Antonia’s beauty and grace, thinking she is human, and 
Coppélius is prouder than ever of what he mistakenly thinks is his handiwork, for 
Frantz has substituted Antonia (the woman he longs to marry, but is being kept from 
by Coppélius’ meanness) for the Coppélius automaton. After Antonia has danced 
before the company, Coppélius wants to leave the ball and order her to come with 
him. When she refuses, he makes to drag her from the room when he is stopped by 
the Bourgemestre. Below, I have attempted to reproduce the mise en page of 
Nuitter’s unnumbered, undated, manuscript as well as the words he has the
Bourgemestre mime:
De quel droit veux-tu emmener cette jeune fille?
Est-ce ta fille?
Non!
Est-ce ta femme?
Non!
Eh bien, alors que lui veux-tu? Quel droit as-tu sur elle?
Coppélius alors se redresse, et d’un air inspiré
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Cette femme est à moi 
Elle m’appartient
Je l’ai créée! C’est mon oeuvre! Le fruit de mon génie!
This embryonic version of Coppélia shows clear ties with the Pygmalion theme 
whose lineage Foster traces in the first pages of her Choreography and Narrative, 
with the enhancement that in the Nuitter scenario it is not only woman’s form that has 
been sculpted by the artist/scientist, but rather even her very movements, which have 
been designed, preordained, and controlled by her maker (1-12). After the exchange 
between Coppélius and the Bourgemestre, the automaton is proved to belong to 
Frantz and not to Coppélius, because she obeys Frantz’s orders while ignoring those 
of Coppélius.
In a further early scenario, Nuitter imagines Frantz as both Coppélius’ 
nephew and his apprentice, and the plot of the ballet revolves around his scheming to 
get the money to marry his beloved Antonia. At a fair where automata are displayed, 
Coppélius thinks he has entered his doll into the competition, when in fact, Frantz has 
substituted Antonia for the clockwork doll. The spectators and judges admire 
Coppélius’ workmanship and award him the prize money, when Frantz intervenes and 
accuses him of stealing his invention from him. The automaton is in fact his own 
creation, and this is ostensibly proved by the fact that Coppélius cannot make the doll 
do what he wants.
La preuve c’est que Frantz seul désormais fera obéir l’automate
Antonia, en effet, docile au moindre geste de Frantz reste immobile
lorsque Coppélius veut la faire agir
Coppélia/Antonia will do whatever Frantz wants, and according to the logic of 
Nuitter’s scenario this proves simultaneously that she is his property and that she 
loves him.
In “A Controversial Ballet: Reflections on Coppélia”, Giannandrea Poesio 
remarks that the ambiguous relation between Coppélius and Coppélia, is suggestive of 
incest, noting that the scientist is ostensibly her father, yet seems to envisage Coppélia 
as his life-long companion and servant. Coppélia is a thing that Coppélius makes: 
both to look how he wants and to provide whatever services he orders. In Nuitter’s 
early scenarios it is the mimed sequences which hint at the female-automaton’s sexual
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complacency; in the version presented in 1870 (and in the several versions audiences 
enjoy in the present day), this complacency is suggested by the postures Swanhilda is 
placed in and holds as the dancing doll, suggestions which are particularly broad 
today because of modem costuming. A short tutu, such as Swanhilda wears as the 
doll, is conventionally kept parallel to the floor by the ballerina’s upright posture; in 
Coppélia’s second act, as the doll Coppélia seems to be coming to life, the novice 
dancer that she is finishes her dances in postures in which her upper body is inclined 
too far forwards. Bent forward at the hips, the doll sends the back of her tutu to jut up 
to the ceiling, which means her hind quarters are offered to her father/inventor. 
Coppélius, slightly disconcerted by the sight, takes the doll by the waist and 
repositions her body at a more obtuse angle so that she is decent again. As he does so, 
from behind the dancer, for a moment the disposition of their bodies hints at coitus a 
tergo, a comic moment which many enjoy. Yet such a direct allusion to sexual 
intercourse could not be made in 1870 on the ballet stage if the female party were 
seen at that moment as a real woman; it is because she is an automaton, because her 
personality is studiedly absent, that Coppélia’s postures are also ostensibly 
unconscious and therefore innocent, an innocence which provides the necessary alibi 
for the enjoyment of the joke. The removal of the ballerina’s personality allows the 
spectators the space in which to get deeper into the visual act, and to see and enjoy a 
sense in which they are not. Here, my argument contradicts the reading of the balletic 
body that Foster elaborates in “The Ballerina’s Phallic Pointe” (1996). Foster writes:
Today’s viewers seem not to view the exposed crotch of the ballerina 
in arabesque promenade as genitals. They do not view the moment 
where her thighs slide over her partner’s face as she descends from a 
high lift as oral sex. Nor do they quite see her gentle fall onto her 
partner’s prone body as copulation. The formality of balletic bodily 
shape and line dominates all coding of body parts and conventions of 
touching. (Ballerina’s 7-8)
Foster argues that the audience’s fascination with the codified balletic body arrests 
their point of view on just that one level. By contrast, I argue that the audience sees 
many levels at the same time, even though it may not be conscious of all of them, and 
that it is the contrast between the levels which creates moments of tension and release 
in the texture of the performance. In the scene between Coppélia and Coppélius, it is 
the extreme codification of the ballerina’s body which permits a prurient view, for
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under cover of the ostensible innocence of Coppélia and the devices of the plot, a real 
man is positioning a woman as if for coitus.
Acts of Seeing and Knowing, and of Acting in Ignorance
The problematisation of the act of seeing, which was immediately apparent 
in Hoffmann’s “The Sandman”, by contrast developed slowly in Coppélia. In the 
content of the tale, the act of seeing is often illicit and constantly fraught with 
difficulties; in its form, the act of seeing is undermined by the epistolary testimonies 
which do not add up. Both form and content therefore made it difficult for the reader 
of “The Sandman” to assume the position of omniscient observer. By contrast, in 
Coppélia, every choreographic and scenic device is used to legitimise the act of 
seeing and to equate the audience’s position as observer with that of knower. In the 
Hoffmann tale, the successive layers of testimony work like mirrors in a fun house, 
distorting the reader’s ability to construct a clear picture of events; in the Saint Léon 
ballet, theatrical techniques of staging are employed to frame the automaton-dancer 
for the spectator’s view, and to make her movements foreseeable. The ballet audience 
is lulled by the presentation of what it expects to see, rather than surprised by a 
deviation from conventional unfolding.
In a conventional manner, then, Coppélia starts with the introduction of its 
heroine Swanhilda, and with a display of her dancing in a solo variation. As the 
curtain opens, day is breaking and Swanhilda emerges from one of the two houses 
onstage. Leaving her abode stage right, Swanhilda crosses the stage to gaze at a 
beautiful female figure sitting on the balcony of the stage left house. It is Coppélia, 
the daughter of the town watchmaker, Coppélius. Swanhilda is curious about 
Coppélia for she is never allowed out of her father’s house, a structure into which 
none of the townspeople have ever been allowed. Swanhilda’s solo starts with a wave 
of greeting to her unknown neighbour; she curtsies and bows, and then turns and 
jumps to catch the girl’s attention, but to no avail: her eyes remain fixed on a book. 
Swanhilda finally stomps off in indignation at the snubbing she has endured, but not 
before this is made worse by seeing another succeed where she has just failed. She 
has removed herself to the other edge of the stage, but before disappearing into her
house, she spies her fiancé Frantz arrive and blow the beautiful girl a kiss. A moment 
before this, Coppélius has come out on the balcony behind Coppélia’s seated figure, 
where he cannot be viewed by either Frantz or Swanhilda who are on the level of the 
stage, but who can be seen by the audience from their raised position in the theatre’s 
house. At the moment Frantz blows his kiss, Coppélius winds up his creation and the 
ballet’s eponymous heroine suddenly rises, puts aside her book, and blows Frantz 
back a distinctly mechanical kiss.
The structure of seeing and knowing elaborated in “The Sandman” is thus 
radically transformed in Coppélia’s first moments. The ballet’s spectator is enthroned 
in a place of intelligence, especially if he or she enjoys the raised view from one of 
the expensive loges. By contrast, crucial knowledge is withheld from the ballet’s 
characters, and I should like to suggest that the different degrees in which they know 
and do not know establishes a graduated hierarchy over which the audience reigns. 
One tier in this hierarchy is constituted at the moment when Coppélia moves, a 
moment which holds the dual possibility, either of being taken in by illusion, or of 
“seeing through” it. Swanhilda and Frantz are fooled; the audience, who cannot be 
duped by it, is identified with Coppélius who as the author of this illusion can also not 
be taken in by it. A further moment establishes a hierarchical difference between 
Frantz and Swanhilda. Swanhilda has witnessed Frantz’s flirtation with Coppélia, a 
fact of which Frantz is unaware. This places Frantz on one tier of knowledge lower 
than Swanhilda, for while her intelligence of his inconstancy allows her to plot to 
thwart his plans for infidelity, Frantz’s unawareness that his fluctuating desires have 
been noted makes his actions, as he seeks to further his suit with Coppélia, appear the 
more predictable and puppet-like.
In the same scene, the stage space is hierarchised according to its potential to 
disclose knowledge. Coppélius’ house appears as the locus of knowledge, for he is a 
skilled craftsman; but this knowledge could also be forbidden alchemical knowledge, 
because the townspeople are not allowed to enter the house, and strange sounds and 
smells have been known to issue from it. It is intimated that this forbidden knowledge 
may concern the mystery of femininity, both because the house is the site where a 
perfectly beautiful girl is sequestered, and because the intense adolescent curiosity of 
both Swanhilda and Frantz is directed there. Yet the apparently similar desires of 
Swanhilda and Frantz are shown to be different by Coppélia’s mise en scène which
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distinguishes between their different rights to aspire to the knowledge which they 
covet. When, one evening, leaving his house, Coppélius is made the butt of the young 
townspeople’s joke, and in the ensuing scuffle loses his key, it is Swanhilda, and not 
Frantz, who finds it. Thus, while both the lovers will transgress in order to fathom 
Coppélia’s mystery, Swanhilda’s possession of the key ensures that the mode of her 
transgression will take a natural form. She enters the house, accompanied by her 
girlfriends, through the front door, and accedes by its internal staircase to the second 
floor, to Coppélius’ workshop where knowledge will be hers. By contrast, Frantz’s 
attempt to fathom the mystery takes form in a physically difficult and tangential way. 
As the curtain closes on Act 1, Frantz is seen comically carrying an immense ladder to 
the foot of Coppélia’s balcony. Through these devices of staging, Coppélius’ house 
becomes a sexualised topos: inscrutable Woman’s body. Swanhilda and her 
girlfriends steal these secrets, precociously and illegitimately, but from the inside of 
that body; whereas Frantz must attempt to possess them from a position outside of it.
The curtain opens on Act 2 to reveal the girls’ fearful entrance to Coppélius’ 
house, where they discover what the audience has known all along: that the image of 
perfect female beauty as embodied by Coppélia is artifice. The ballet gives the girls 
time to discover and play with each of Coppélius’ creations in turn, to find the springs 
which make each work, and to appreciate that Coppélia is by far the most 
accomplished of these toys, before Coppélius returns home, discovers the trespassers, 
and chases all of them (except Swanhilda who secretes herself within Coppélia’s 
curtained alcove) from his door. By contrast, Frantz’s venture into the locus of 
knowledge leaves him ignorant of all of this. The ballet’s mise en scène gives him no 
time to explore the workshop, for from the moment he appears on Coppélius’ 
balcony, Coppélius catches him, and for sinister reasons of his own pretends to 
befriend him, serving him cup after cup of drugged wine.
In his drugged state, Frantz is unconscious of what now unfolds to the 
audience, the heart of the ballet, the sequence in which the doll Coppélia dances, the 
sole direct link with the Hoffmann tale that inspired the ballet. This was the moment, 
as Bergner and Plett remind us, that Jentsch wrote was uncanny, because it fostered 
doubts as to “whether an apparently animate being is really alive; or conversely, 
whether a lifeless object might not in fact be animate” (163). In contrast to 
Hoffmann’s tale, the ballet stages this moment as the one when the audience will
90
realise itself as the possessor of knowledge: for it is offered the pleasure of being 
knowingly deceived by an illusion, an illusion created by the technical mastery of the 
ballerina they know to be a flesh and blood girl, who now takes on the task to make 
Coppélia seem to come to life.
As Frantz falls into his stupor, Coppélius seizes his chance. Hurriedly, he 
searches his book of spells for the passage which will allow him to rob Frantz of his 
immortal soul, and to bestow it upon his automaton ballerina. He goes to Coppélia’s 
alcove, disappears briefly behind its curtains, and then reappears wheeling Coppélia’s 
chair downstage to his open magic book. The audience immediately sees that the 
figure seated in the chair is not Coppélia, but rather, Swanhilda dressed in her clothes. 
Coppélius is apparently deceived by the illusion that the audience sees through, for he 
notices nothing suspicious in the doll’s figure or bearing, and applies himself to the 
business of working the spell to bring his doll to life. The scene thus builds a 
complicity between Swanhilda and the audience, for the audience is privy to the fact 
that she is an impostor, which makes Coppélius the butt of a joke they will enjoy 
together. Yet, as Coppélius’ spell gradually seems to awaken, bit by bit, the pretend 
automaton to life, the audience is assured of its special position of privilege at the top 
of the sight/knowledge hierarchy. The audience feels that the ballet is now about to 
reveal its innermost secrets, because it now seems to be exposing its very means of 
production to view: the process that trains a dancer.
Up to this point, the ballet’s mise en scène has created, through its various 
distinctions between those who know, and those who do not, an epistemological 
project for the audience. As Coppélius prepares to cast a spell upon Frantz and 
enliven Coppélia, this project seems to be about to fulfil its promise; for, ostensibly 
about waking up the doll, at a different level the scene presents to the audience how 
the body of the young dancer is trained into a proficient technician. On the level of 
the plot, the choreography reveals the automaton as the human dancer Swanhilda, yet 
on the level of its dance material, the scene shows the human ballerina as an 
automaton. That is, the waking up, or freeing, of Coppélia is simultaneously the 
training, and disciplining, of a body such that it can dance the ballerina role of 
Swanhilda.
Until now, the audience has witnessed Swanhilda’s smooth and vibrant 
movements, of a speed, intricacy, and fluidity which have made it impossible for the
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audience to see how they have been executed, Bergner and Plett write that 
Swanhilda’s role is characterised by the rapid technically difficult steps associated 
with the bravura Italian technique of the period. Her “mandate to perform femininity” 
is achieved:
By means of a dazzling and painstaking ballet technique. Her small 
rapid pas de bourées piqués, articulate pointe work and multiple 
entrechats [are] precise and detailed like the “feminine art of 
needlework”. (170)
In the first act, the audience has enjoyed an illusion; in the second act, it is promised 
that this illusion will be explained and demystified. As Coppélius brings the doll to 
life, the audience will see the movements of classical ballet broken down into their 
most basic form, as though the vocabulary of dance were becoming part of the 
audience’s epistemological project. Just as Swanhilda’s complex and rapid 
movements are simplified and slowed down in order to be intelligible to the general or 
uninitiated public, so the dancer’s body is now revealed, not as mysteriously and 
miraculously graceful and agile, but rather, as a mere machine, an assemblage of 
clever mechanisms, docile to the technical laws which govern it.
The Ghost-Bodv-as-Clockwork in Parts
The ballet Coppélia shows the process of bringing the dancing doll to life as a 
matter of enlivening each of her body parts separately, one after another. As 
Coppélius surveys his creation, selecting which part will receive his attention next, the 
audience’s attention is also being trained to look solely at the part in question. 
Coppélius first attends to Coppélia’s shoulders. He surveys them, and, finding them 
insufficiently vital, moves to Frantz, over whose sleeping form he gesticulates, 
seeming to draw a life force from the shoulders of his sleeping form. Returning to the 
automaton, Coppélius casts this force over the doll’s inert shoulders, which respond 
by moving in an isolated fashion, up, down, up, down, at first slowly, and then more 
quickly in the same motion. The same method successively wakes up the doll’s eyes, 
eyelids, elbows, hands and pointed feet; as a finishing touch, Coppélius tries to give 
Frantz’s immortal soul to Coppélia.
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The Live Wit in the Mechanical Dancer
As animation is drawn from the various parts of the unwitting Frantz, the 
audience watches that part moving in the doll in an isolated way, as if it were separate 
from the global body, a way which arrests the gaze on that sole moving part. But this 
fetishizing method is undone just afterwards in the scene, through its very 
amplification. For, after having given life to his automaton, Coppélius wants to see 
what she can do, and so he winds her up. Now the ballerina (playing-Swanhilda- 
playing-Coppélia) makes a parody of the project to reduce her body to parts, for she 
shows how, in even the smallest part of something, its whole lies in immanence, 
waiting to emerge. Running around Coppélius’s workshop, she steals a fan from the 
Spanish automaton, and suddenly transforms herself into a Spanish dancer. 
D’Aurevilly notes that this moment was a magical one, precisely because 
Giuseppina’s metamorphosis depended so little on artifice, and so much on art:
Elle a pris une misère de voile noir, un chiffon de dentelle, grand
comme un mouchoir de poche, et avec ce bout de voile noir elle s’est
faite Espagnole, mais une Espagnole grandiose, digne de danser dans 
la cour du Cid Campéador, et elle a improvisé une cachucha qui l’a 
fait monter jusqu’aux frises, cette petite...[...]comme il n’y a qu’un 
instant elle jouait à la poupée, et qui n’a même pas de castagnettes!
Swanhilda’s incarnation as Spanish dancer gives way to a Highland dance which 
impresses D’Aurevilly only slightly less. Snatching the Scottish automaton’s tartan 
stole, and winding it around her waist, she breaks into an equally spirited gigue.
Swanhilda’s flickering between Spanish and Scottish identities is merely the 
culmination of a similar flickering between the identities of Swanhilda and Coppélia, 
one which begins as Coppélia is brought to life. For as Coppélius works his magic
over her body, Swanhilda-as-Coppélia earnestly imitates a doll’s movements; but as
soon as Coppélius removes his gaze, and turns his attention to Frantz, the doll 
Coppélia transforms into Swanhilda. She relaxes from the pose she has been holding 
as the doll, and tries to get an idea of what Coppélius is planning for her and Frantz by 
spying on him behind his back as he pores over his magic book. Her mischievous 
personality is suddenly present to the audience, and seems to be including it in the 
joke she is at the same time playing on the unsuspecting Coppélius. Yet, however 
swiftly Coppélius turns back to face Coppélia, to survey and admire his elegant
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design, Swanhilda is never caught showing her true self. Before his gaze alights on 
her, she has removed her personality from view, and Coppélia is already in the pose in 
which Coppélius last saw her: she has become the doll he wants to see. The audience 
can first enjoy the joke at Coppélius’ expense, for what is hidden to Coppélius’ 
perspective is visible to theirs. But soon the very ease and exactitude with which 
Swanhilda changes herself into Coppélia—into a dancing doll—points to the fact that, 
generically, the young person they are watching is also typically the site of an 
analogous transformation. This transformation is that of woman to ballerina and 
involves becoming another kind of dancing ‘doll’: the well-established role of dancer 
as exquisite plaything available for the pleasure of the male bourgeois audience.
The young Giuseppina’s ability to oscillate instantaneously and with ease 
between two meta-feminine roles, the sprightly and passionate peasant girl, and the 
elegant and formally perfect automaton, as well as between two local incarnations— 
the Spaniard and the Scot—made the audience aware of something behind the 
illusions she created: intelligence,"  ^ wit,  ^ will,^ and energy^ senses which are all 
contained in the French word “esprit”. D’Aurevilly’s review of the première of 
Coppélia gave Giuseppina’s performance the highest possible accolade by comparing 
her to her two most distinguished forbears, the already legendary duo of ballerinas of 
Romanticism:
Taglioni dansait comme une âme, Essler, comme un corps...Mlle 
Bozzacchi sera la danseuse de l’esprit... le caractère de son 
talent...c’est l’esprit français avec sa distinction et son piquant et ses 
nuances moqueuses.
Recognising a dancer for her intelligence posed a challenge to contemporary 
sensibilities, which presupposed, as we have seen, that the dancer was proverbially 
stupid. Such suppositions were underpinned by the binary oppositions that were 
functioning in dividing labour from intelligence, and they dictated that a dancer was 
mindless precisely because she engaged in repetitive physical action. But in the 
person of Giuseppina Bozzacchi, the different threads, which were carefully separated 
by and in culture, in order to form clear distinctions, and by which the perceived 
objects of culture were identified, were shown to be part of the same skein once more.
* This sense may be felt in the phrase “reprendre ses esprits”, (to come to one’s senses). 
 ^A “jeu d’esprit” being a joke or witticism.
 ^“Will” as in the sense of a “spirited horse” in English.
’ As in the sense of ‘high spirits’ in English.
94
Giuseppina was a dancer, hence purportedly simple. Yet while remaining simple in 
the sense of being naive, she manifested a lively wit. She was precocious in the sense 
of being a formidable technician at the very early age of sixteen; yet not precocious in 
the sexual and evolutionary senses that were in vogue at the time. The ballet was a 
demi-monde where dancers were aware of being on display and often exploited the 
situation to their advantage. By contrast, Guiseppinna seemed unaffected by the 
conventions of display which founded the condition of her performance. She was so 
unworldly that during the bows at the première, she forgot to acknowledge the 
applause coming from the Imperial box, and had to be prompted in the right gestures 
by her partner, Eugénie Fiocre. This was especially ironic, and potentially 
embarrassing, given that the Emperor Louis Napoléon had taken the time, before the 
ballet, to spy upon Giuseppina. Dance historian Ivor Guest recounts:
During the interval between the opera and the ballet the Emperor 
entered a small box, adjoining the Imperial box and overlooking the 
stage from behind the curtain, and from there, unobserved, watched 
the stage being set for the first act of Coppélia. His intention had 
been made known beforehand to Perrin [director of the Opéra] who 
purposely engaged Giuseppina and the Italian Ambassador in 
conversation in full view of the little box. The Emperor only 
rejoined the Empress when the order was given for the rising of the 
curtain. {Second Empire 244)
The Emperor had a habit of using this perch as well as the Imperial box as
vantage points from which to scout out women at the theatre, women who, as Herbert
remarks, were usually “the woman of the evening” (103-104). But this unworldliness
or ingenuousness constituted a great part of Giuseppina’s powerful stage presence.
D’Aurevilly writes:
She danced before a public who was so suddenly charmed by her, 
because she didn’t dance for the public, but for herself, because she 
danced before the public as she would have danced alone in her room, 
and before her mirror, for the sheer voluptuousness of dancing! . . . She 
dances to make herself happy, and therefore makes us happy in watching 
her dance !^
Giuseppina broke the rules which identified the perceived object, and these 
rules, now broken, were the same ones which constructed the perceiving subject.
® Elle a dansé devant ce public encharmé, si soudainement par elle, parce qu’elle ne dansait pas pour 
lui, mais pour elle-même, parce qu’elle dansait devant lui comme elle eût dansé seule, dans sa 
chambre, et devant sa glace, pour la volupté de danser!...Elle danse pour se faire heureuse et voilà 
qu’elle nous fait heueuse en la voyant danser!
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Seeming free of the rules which ordered a dancer’s existence, she freed her audience 
in turn from the perceptual order which normally governed their cast of mind. In the 
same review in which D’Aurevilly acclaimed Giuseppina for her spirit, he attacked 
the proverb “bête comme un danseur” .^ He asked:
Mais s’il ne l’est pas? S’il a de l’expression, de la physiognomie, du 
geste, de la passion, il peut avoir de l’esprit, de l’âme, et même du 
génie . . .  le proverbe est donc injuste et bête lui-même, car, 
l’injustice n’est pas qu’une vilaine, c’est une sotte aussi.*®
Noticeable in D’Aurevilly’s argument is how his use of language bears testimony to 
the value placed on intellect at the time of writing. Its emotional tone shows the insult 
of stupidity to have been a great provocation, and its championing of the dancer, as 
just possibly intelligent, is couched in terms which make one suspect that the 
intimation of stupidity may indeed have been the unique insult whose sting seemed 
potent. For in refuting the proverb, D’Aurevilly does not criticise it on different 
grounds: rather he turns the insult back upon itself, implying the proverb itself to be 
“une sotte”, a fool. Interestingly, D’Aurevilly’s “rave” review of Giuseppina, which 
recognised the wit of a female dancer, employed language which, seemingly despite 
its author, told a different story on another level. For D’Aurevilly chooses to write of 
the possibly intelligent and creative dancer in the impersonal form, which thus 
becomes the masculine “il”, even though, as we have seen, the male dancer was 
conspicuous by his absence ever since the 1840s. He also chooses to personify his 
complaint against the proverb, and embodies it as a feminine noun: “l’injustice”. 
Thus, perhaps conveniently or even necessarily, the form of D’Aurevilly’s writing 
(the insults of “une sotte” and “une vilaine”) continues in a covert way to disparage 
the feminine, even as its content is involved in entertaining the possibility of 
alternative feminine identities.
 ^“Bête” can mean stupid, or silly, as well as foolish, senses which it builds through the idea that 
humans are more intelligent than beasts, les bêtes.
But what if he isn’t? If he has expression, physiognomy, gesture, passion, he can have spirit, soul, 
and even genius . . .  the proverb is thus unjust and foolish itself, for injustice is not only vile, but [she] 
is a fool as well.
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Chapter 5 
The Ghost-Body-as-Clockwork in the Present 
and in Practice
My analysis of the ballet Coppélia and of its reception in 1870 in Chapter 4, 
reveals the different conceptual and social strands which were woven together to 
create the dancer as a particular kind of body, moving as though it were a mechanised 
object. These different strands, which formed a nexus of concerns in the art form of 
dance, both existed in, and were fed into it from, the greater cultural context in which 
dance was embedded. Similarly, today, the conception of the body-as-clockwork is 
one which exists both in popular culture and in the culture of dance, taking on myriad 
different forms.
In this chapter I trace several of the different incorporations of the clockwork 
body in the present. I show how the clockwork body appears in three distinct kinds of 
activity in dance: in performance, in writing, and in practice. In the category of 
performance, I include the new creation of dance works as well as continuing 
performances of the repertoire. In that of practice, I analyse the institutions which 
surround and support the training of a dancer, as well as the methods of teaching 
dance technique. In respect to the writing of dance, I discuss a kind of scholarly 
writing about dance that uses categories which are indebted to the clockwork-body.
The above manifestations of the ghost-body-as-clockwork are sometimes 
explicitly evoked, as in the case of the classical repertoire, where, as I have discussed, 
the ideal of the interchangeable ballerina, and of the interchangeable body, forms part 
of the mechanism of the ballet academy. Inside the tradition of ballet, the 
reappearance of the clockwork body, through the themes treated in a ballet, through 
how the stage space is treated, and through how the collective body of dancers is 
used, often constitutes a means by which a choreographer lays claim to the ground of 
tradition. But at other times, particularly in the work of contemporary choreographers
and teachers, the appearance of the ghost-body-as-clockwork may be less consciously 
evoked, and may even appear despite these practitioners’ quite other intentions.
Sightings in the Present: The Ghost-Bodv-as-Clockwork in Performance
As I argued in Chapters 1 and 4, the repertoire is a powerful tool through 
which the body-states of past times are visited upon bodies in the present. The 
repertoire is an inanimate body of knowledge which lives through and beyond the 
animate bodies that create it. In Chapter 3 I stressed the temporal aspect of this 
phenomenon, writing that the bodies of Saint Léon and Bozzacchi had found eternal 
rest during the year of their creation of Coppélia, while the ballet itself remained alive 
in the Paris Opéra repertoire. Yet here I would like to add that the ballet surpassed its 
creators, not only in time, but also in space. Coppélia was exported in various 
versions to Vienna (1876), to Berlin (1881), to London (1884 and 1906), to St. 
Petersburg (1884), to New York (1887), to Munich, and to Copenhagen (the last two 
both in 1896) (Koegler 104).
The history of the ballet Coppélia shows the extent to which two of the strands 
I am considering separately—performance and practice—are intimately entwined. Up 
until the 1960s, the ballet Coppélia remained in its original version, complete with a 
ballerina en travesti as Frantz (Koegler 104). In 1966, the then ballet director at the 
Paris Opéra, Michel Descombey, re-choreographed the work, in what seems a 
precursor of the trend of revivalism now prevalent in contemporary dance, in which 
choreographers such as Matthew Bourne, Mats Ek, Mark Morris and Maguy Marin 
have all made use of certain themes of the repertoire, all the while disregarding its 
original dance material. Descombey’s version was set, not in the eighteenth century 
like the original, but rather at the end of the nineteenth century, at the World’s Fair in 
Paris, a setting which emphasised the theme of technology. The pair of lovers 
escaped the wicked Coppélius in a Montgolfier, while they were themselves show­
cased as dancers of a heightened technicity. The demands of this new technicity, 
especially in the pas de deux between Frantz and Swanhilda, meant that the travesty 
convention was dispensed with, and the role of Frantz given to a male dancer. (One 
of the reviews of the 1966 revival of Descombey’s version wrote with regret of the
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passing of this tradition, reminiscing on Pauline Dynalix, famous for her 
characteristion of Frantz, “qui dans le rôle de Frantz, alors, travesti, nous aurait donné 
des goûts contre-nature”.)* This dancer was Cyril Anastassof, who is now a senior 
teacher at France’s most respected school of dance, outside that of the Opéra: the 
Conservatoire National Supérieur de Musique et de Danse. He was dancing opposite 
Claude Bessy as Swanhilda, the same Bessy who for the past thirty years has been the 
director of the Opéra’s school, and who has recently come under attack in the press, 
for her “comportement autoritaire” .^ From December 2002 to April 2003, a series of 
articles appeared in the French newspapers denouncing Bessy’s regime at the Opéra’s 
public-funded ballet school at Nanterre. Dominique Le Guilledoux reporting in Le 
Monde, noted that a private investigatory service, as well as staff, parents and 
attending doctors, accused Bessy of the moral harassment of the young dance students 
under her direction, in a regime which consisted in a “denial of pain, blows to dignity, 
a discipline of psychological terror, and verbal outrageousness”.^  Refuting these 
accusations as “calomny”, Bessy, who is now seventy years of age, was quoted as 
saying:
I was brought up by the stick. Today when you do a bloody stupid 
thing, there isn’t any punishment. People work less and less and earn 
more money for it. Everyone cavils. I have nothing more to do with 
this society. (32)"*
Bessy’s inscription in a certain tradition, which was produced in part through 
incarnating the automaton Coppélia, is precisely what she now tries to reproduce on 
and in the bodies of her young charges.
The body Bessy has most famously produced is that of Sylvie Guillem, whom 
Bessy recruited to the Opéra school at age 12, diverting her from a planned career as a 
gymnast. A month after the scandal around Bessy became public, Guillem came to 
her defence in print in an article by Dominique Frétard that also appeared in Le 
Monde. Here, while admitting that Bessy was a difficult woman, Guillem insisted it
‘ Pauline Dynalix was so delightful in “the role o f Frantz, then danced by a ballerina in travesty, that 
she could have given us tastes running counter to nature” Olivier Merlin, Le Monde, May 7, 1966.
 ^D.L.G. Le Monde, 1 December, 2002
 ^déni de la douleur, d’atteintes à la dignité, de discipline de terreur psychologique, d’outrances 
verbales.
Moi, j ’ai été élevée à la baguette. Aujourd’hui quand tu fais une connerie, il n’y a plus de sanction. 
Moins on travaille, plus on gagne de l’argent. Tout le monde discute. Je n’ai plus rien à voir avec cette 
société.
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was up to the children “to learn to dominate the situation” (26)/ Yet the ideal of 
domination that Guillem upholds was ironically at the heart of the problem. For what 
was known in the Paris dance world, though so potentially embarrassing for a State- 
funded institution that it was kept out of the newspapers, was the event which had 
occurred to bring Bessy’s responsibility into question in the limelight. The inquiry 
around Bessy’s direction had apparently been sparked by the rape of a twelve year old 
boy by two boys of fifteen years, who were all students at the Opéra school. My 
source of information, a kinesiologist with ties to the Opéra, wishes to remain 
anonymous. But when she recounted the event to me, she declared herself to be 
unsurprised that such an event could have occurred, and that, rather, it seemed to her 
entirely logical and foreseeable. For her, the atmosphere of the Opéra school instils 
an imperative within the young dancing subject, a directive that he or she must master 
his or her body. For my source it was thus natural that the relationship which 
characterises that of the dancer to his or her own body should become the model 
which shapes relations between the self and the other.
Conscious Coppélius and Unwitting Ones
If Descombey’s 1966 version reworked Coppélia's theme of technology, in 
1978 Roland Petit’s version, which premiered in Paris at the Théâtre de la Porte St. 
Martin, underlined its diverging gender identities. As if aiming literally to embody 
Janin’s 1840 writing, Petit’s version boasted two corps de ballets. One was male and 
dressed as soldiers; the other was female and dressed as ballet girls. The gender roles 
which Petit explored in 1978 by division and exaggeration, would be explicitly 
critiqued, by the contrasting means of conflation in 1994. This later version of 
Coppélia, choregraphed by Maguy Marin for the Ballet de Lyon, would dress the 
entire cast, both men and women, as identical dolls. In Marin’s production the 
automaton was imaged, not as the doll-as-ballet-dancer, perhaps because this form, 
which spoke powerfully to late nineteenth-century French culture, no longer reaches 
contemporary French audiences. Instead, Marin translated the doll-woman automaton 
into a contemporary idiom. If the ballet enjoyed a central role socially and artistically
 ^“II faut appprendre à dominer cette situation”.
100
in the nineteenth century, its form of specularity has given way to the worlds of 
cinema and fashion. In Marin’s version of Coppélia, the doll Coppélia is figured as a 
cross between a movie-star and a top model, an ideal of woman which shows the 
connection between eroticism, new technology, and consumerism. For the movie- 
star/top-model is produced and held in the public eye by the technologies of film, in 
large part through a project to sell a way of life and consumer objects to mass 
audiences who attempt to be like her. In the filmed version of Marin’s Coppélia, the 
Coppélius figure is characterised as a reclusive photographer, whose technological 
control over woman’s image allows him to do without a real woman. Able to 
reproduce the part of woman he wants by technological means, by focusing in on a 
part and capturing it on film, Coppélius is associated with a sad and solipsistically 
fetishistic pornography. (Frantz, who also wants to take only what he wants from 
woman, is shown as a Coppélius in the making.) But even idealised visions may have 
their revenge. In Marin’s many-layered filmed version, it is Swanhilda’s pre-filmed 
image who drugs both Frantz and Coppélius, as they watch a movie starring their 
favourite sex-goddess. In this drugged state they are terrorised by the replication of 
their idol. A host of identical dolls—a cross between mass-produced Barbies and the 
multiplied image of Marilyn Monroe of a Warhol silk-screen, costumed in red 1960s 
suits, with stiletto heels and peroxide-blonde wigs—runs amok and creates havoc.
While the above versions name their relation to Coppélia and may explicitly 
reiterate or criticise the clockwork body, the clockwork body is present in undeclared 
ways in other works of contemporary choreography. The doll Coppélia enjoys a 
cameo roll in Lloyd Newson’s Enter Achilles: not by chance, I am suggesting, in a 
work which critiques the rigidity of gender stereotypes. In Newson’s piece the 
inhuman clockwork dancer that Hoffmann imagined as the unsuitable object of 
Nathaniel’s desire appears in a new guise as a blow-up sex toy. Appearing only 
briefly onscreen at the beginning and the end of Newson’s piece, this facsimile of the 
dumb-blond bimbo incarnates his critique of the way in which society mechanises, 
and institutionalises the process of sexual identification, and polarises those identities.
In the opening frames of the film, we see a man in the bedroom of his flat 
above a pub, with the plastic sex-doll which he seems to adore. The camera then 
follows the man as he descends to the pub where the man ostensibly works, and where 
the film’s main action is set, the local haunt of a group of young men. For Enter
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Achilles explores the fine line between homosociality, which Newson sees as 
permitted and even encouraged in British pub culture, and homosexuality, which is 
virulently rejected and punished. Newson imagines a scenario in which two kinds of 
men confront each other: one, a group of beer-drinking lads; the other, their 
“Achilles’ heel”, a sole man who enters their territory and disturbs the group’s rites of 
identity and solidarity, and who does so by dressing and drinking—but above all by 
dancing—differently.
The lads have been occupying their “local” with expansive, energetic gestures, 
deploying movements that are competitive and goal-oriented; Achilles engages in 
more lyrical movements in which the body’s role as manipulator, and the object’s role 
as manipulated are confused. Exemplary of the lads’ goal-oriented movement is a 
sequence in the opening scene in the pub, when two of the men hold a full glass of 
beer aloft by the contact of their bodies pressed together in different ways. Like the 
huddles and scrums of players in contact sports such as rugby, the clearly ambiguous 
pleasure of the contact between male bodies can be enjoyed without the implication of 
homosexuality through the alibi given to them by the presence of an object, the glass. 
This glass both unites and separates them, and, when they manage to set it unspilled 
and upright on the floor, it becomes that by which their mastery and masculinity are 
proved.
By contrast, Achilles’ relation to objects is seen as effeminate and therefore 
punishable by the lads. Thrown a ball, Achilles spins it on his fingers, manipulating 
it, but a moment later his body responds to the motion of the ball and takes on some 
of its character as, in order to keep the ball rolling over his back, shoulders and hips, 
he begins to undulate his torso in smooth circular patterns, as if continued play and 
not mastery were his intention. Observing this, one of the lads grabs the ball from 
him and bounces it vigorously on the floor, as if to demonstrate its proper use. 
Struggle and mastery constitute the proper mode of relating with an object, he seems 
to say, for such a dialectic constructs one’s (masculine) subjectivity; play and 
interplay are an improper mode of such relations, for these do not not make clear who 
is the user in the game. But Achilles seems not to know, and determined not to learn, 
what objects are “for”. Suddenly he seems to grow enraged, and taking out a knife he 
threatens the other man, forcing him to strip off his clothing and lie down, as though 
he planned sexual violence. Yet once the man is cringing, naked on the ground,
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Achilles sprays shaving cream at him and thrusts the knife violently, not into his 
frightened victim, but into the ball which deflates in a moment of bathos.
Here, the ball metonymically replaces the sex-doll, that we have seen in the 
opening frames of the film. For this other plastic inflated toy is also stabbed violently 
at the very end of the film, by the group of lads who have discovered the doll inside 
their mate’s bedroom, “killing” it before his eyes and taking great pleasure in the pain 
this gives him. This character has been one of the ring-leaders in the gay-bashing 
behaviour that was dealt out to Achilles, and now that he has become a figure of 
derision himself, he can no longer successfully organise the bullying by the others. 
The doll thus becomes the measure by which the piece distinguishes between men 
who can assume their divergent and complex sexual identities and tolerate them in 
others, and those who can not.
If Newson’s treatment of the theme of gender in Enter Achilles was premised 
upon a re-incamation of a Coppélia-like doll, the ghost-body-as-clockwork has 
likewise reappeared in contemporary works where technology has been a central 
concern. Norbert Corsino is perhaps the foremost French choreographer who uses 
computer technology to create choreographic works for multi-media. The body that 
he deploys in his digital productions is a computer-generated model that moves within 
a virtual landscape. Yet despite the sophistication of the technology that he employs, 
Corsino’s dancing body remains a resolutely clockwork body. Corsino presented his 
work in the context of a Master of Arts degree programme in Dance History, entitled 
“Pour la culture chorégraphique”, directed by dance historian Laurence Louppe. The 
programme collected, as its students, a number of contemporary dancers, 
choreographers and dance teachers. In discussion, after having viewed the work, 
choreographer Michèle Marcucci asked a question about the technology of the 
computer-generated dancing body. In designating the model, Marcucci spontaneously 
spoke of the virtual dancing body as “la poupée” and then referred to it as “la Barbie”. 
These appellations seemed to disconcert Corsino, but they also drew sighs of 
recognition from the others in the group. Corsino then explained to the group that the 
model had been created by placing lights on certain parts of the body, which were 
then mapped during motion. The points chosen to be lit were, unsurprisingly, the 
body’s articulations. For, as I have argued, a focus on the articulations can make it 
possible to understand the body as a collection of segments which all have their own
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precise, local, invariable, mechanical movement, rather than seeing it as an organism, 
in which the movement of the parts may be influenced by the higher levels of that 
unity. Corsino’s exploration of new technology only made clearer the limits of the 
perception that were conducting it: that produced by and dedicated to the clockwork 
body.®
One further way in which the ghost-body-as-clockwork is reanimated in our 
day is through a choreographic interest in extreme precision. For the last twenty 
years, the bruxelloise Anne Teresa De Keersmaeker has been showing her work at the 
prestigious Théâtre de la Ville in Paris, a distribution which has allowed her to 
influence generations of French dancers and choreographers, all the while 
spearheading^ a style of movement and choreography known in France as “la danse 
beige”.  ^ The Théâtre de la Ville is a state-funded institution. This keeps the prices of 
the tickets down, and means that the dance community in France can afford to attend 
the theatre. A substantial part of this theatre’s audience is made up of dancers and 
choreographers. When this dance community attended De Keersmaeker’s first 
performances there in the 1980s, it had been accustomed to seeing the dancing body 
presented in unisex unitards à la Cunningham. It was therefore immediately struck by 
the new look that De Keersmaeker had invented through her costuming.® The 
members of her all-female company, Rosas, were dressed in identical short black 
pinafores, lace-up boots, and Dutch-doll hair cuts, the uniform of primary school girls, 
one which is a favourite image in pornography, as explored in the Canadian film 
Erotica, as well as in many Japanese comic books. In 1996, the Théâtre de la Ville 
hosted a revival of one of De Keersmaeker’s early works, precisely because De 
Keersmaeker had been and continues to be an influential dance-maker in France. The 
commission was for one of the pieces which had helped make her reputation: Rosas 
danst Rosas. This piece, which premiered in 1984, features only two dancers. De 
Keersmaeker herself, and Michèle-Anne De Mey, then a member of De 
Keersmaeker’s company, and consists in an elaboration of movement material that 
exploits the mechanisms of mathematics known as “phases”.
 ^Corsino showed his work at CEFEDEM Sud in Aubagne, France, in Octobre 2000.
’ Nouvelles de danse no.9: Le “Boom” de la danse en Belgique. (Bruxelles: Contredanse, 1992).
 ^Other choreographers often placed in this category are Alain Platel, Michèle-Anne De Mey, Wim 
Vandekeybus, Jan Fabre, Jan Lauwers.
 ^As seen in Mikrokosmos and other pieces.
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Emblematic of the piece is a section which places the two women side by side 
in a thin horizontal corridor of space upstage, almost flattened against a neutral 
backdrop. Here they begin a simple phrase: a step out on one leg, the use of this leg 
as the pivot point to turn sharply and to fall smartly back on the first leg and in the 
same place. Beginning and ending in same sagittal orientation, their bodies are 
always given to the audience in profile, a view of the body whose tendency to make it 
seem two-dimensional is here accentuated by the speed of the pivoting, flipping 
movements the women perform.
At the 1996 revival of this piece, the two dancers started the phrase, which 
they were to repeat seemingly countless times, exactly at the same time and in the 
same direction. Yet by the third or fourth time they performed it, it became clear that 
one of the women was dancing very slightly slower than the other. At the beginning 
of this discrepancy, it was its very slightness which made it worrisome to the 
audience, and created a tension which lessened as it became clear that the difference 
between the two women’s speeds must be intentional, for as the phrase went on and 
on, the discrepancy between them was confirmed and consolidated. With every 
repetition, one of the women seemed to be losing time to the other, until this lateness 
resolved itself in a brief moment in which they were again moving together, though 
now in opposite directions. This moment opened out as a space of concord, as the 
tension created in the audience by the women’s different speeds was appeased. 
During this moment of half-resolution, in the space of concord that opened out, the 
spectator’s eye was suddenly able to be sensible of the over-all pattern formed by the 
two women’s bodies: a perception opened of the pendulum swing, back and forth, that 
was composed of the dancers’ two bodies moving exactly in opposition. This 
perception faded as a possibility, as ineluctably the slower-moving woman began to 
lose time again, and the incredibly precise process of imprecision began again. Since 
this process was now one the audience could foresee, it could thus become one whose 
smoothness and exactitude could be evaluated. The audience could now measure and 
enjoy the gradations of difference: first ever so slight, then gradually less and less 
slight, until they grew slighter again, as, in a curious reversal, though still by losing 
time, the slower woman now appeared to be slightly ahead of the faster woman; while 
the latter now seemed to be trying to catch up with her slower partner. Then the cycle 
of the phase came around completely, and the two women were seen as they had
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started, performing the same phrase at the same time and in the same direction. This 
section consistently brought audible sighs from the 1996 audience, at all three 
performances 1 attended.
In another section of the piece, which called on a clockwork precision from its 
dancers, appeared a solo for De Keersmaeker. The convention of this section was that 
a circle had been marked on the stage floor. Beginning in the middle of the circle, 
also marked out on the floor. De Keersmaeker, again by means of pivoting 
movements, went to one point on the periphery of the circle, back again to the central 
point, and then returned to the periphery again, this time, very slightly further along 
on its periphery, as though moving from 12 o’clock on the clock face to 1, and so on 
until coming full circle.
Sightings in the Present: The Ghost-Bodv-as-Clockwork in Dance Writing
The ghost-body-as-clockwork haunts not only choreographic vision, which 
gives it body in repertoire and in new creation, but also a body of writing which 
promotes a very particular vision of the body and of subjectivity. This body of 
writing comprises at least two distinct kinds of work: one is constituted by manuals on 
the technique of dance; another is constituted by more scholarly writing destined for 
the readers of Dance Studies.
One recent example of the first kind of literature, as it has emerged in France, 
may best be presented here autobiographically or anecdotally. After giving my 
morning class at the École Peter Goss in Paris, I found a young man waiting for me in 
the reception area. He presented himself as a candidate for a course on film directing, 
to which he was preparing his entry, which is by a selective audition {concours). In 
support of his candidature he needed to write a project for film, and wanted his 
subject to be dance and dancers. He sought advice for his project, and, ever-willing to 
promote an interest in dance, I accepted to discuss it with him. But soon I found 
myself, curiously, discouraging him and criticising the project he had described to me, 
for it became clear that his vision of the dance was not only reductive, but reductive in 
a way I found particularly tiresome -  because so predictable. With suggestions here
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and there, I tried to give him new openings, new ways to see dance, to shift his point 
of view, but to no avail.
During the conversation, he slipped a book out of his rucksack and placed it 
on the bistro table at which we were having coffee. This, it appeared, had been his 
principal source of information until meeting me, and its subtitle made me freeze: Le 
corps humain, instrument de la danse, I flicked through the book, beginning with the 
table of contents, which did indeed reflect the instrumentalist way in which the 
author. Georgette Bordier, who also illustrated the book, saw the dancing body. The 
work purported to offering a scientific rather than an aesthetic view of the body. Yet 
its text began, not with an overview of how the body works globally, but by 
segmenting the body into distinct chapters—the hips, the knee, the foot, the torso, the 
arms—which were studied locally, as though each of these parts, like the hard metal 
parts of a machine, would respond to separate inspection and polishing. The ghost- 
body-as-clockwork was apparent not only in the way in which the author organised 
the presentation of the body. On a semantic level the chapters abounded with 
machine-like metaphors, and on a pictoral level the work, illustrated by the author’s 
own drawings, presented the body as an articulating doll, with hard volumes for head, 
torso, and hips, volumes that were imaged, less connected than intersected by lines, 
whether of spine, leg or arm. Examples of these illustrations are reproduced in Plate 6 
and 7. Even more clearly than the way the book is categorised, these illustrations 
show the way in which the author’s view on the body dissolves its flesh, leaving 
apparent only that which seems to be the mechanical apparatus of its joints
I asked the young man what was his investment in treating the dancing body 
as if it were an instrument. He replied that I had misunderstood him. He had not 
chosen to look at the dancing body, and then decided to treat it as an instrument. 
Rather, the theme “instrument” was the one of three possible imposed themes he had 
picked. And after deciding upon this theme, it had occurred to him that nothing was 
better suited to illustration of the body’s instrumentality than the body of the dancer. I 
stated my objections: this was nothing new; he could demonstrate no originality, 
since, as own immediate association proved, the dancing body as instrument is 
something of a cliché. If he wanted to explore the body as instrument, I encouraged, 
it would be more original and subversive to work on the figure of that super-agent.
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giant of popular culture, but more importantly, the inverted doppelganger of the 
dancing body, James Bond.
In the writing destined for the readers of Dance Studies, a discourse of agency 
has recently become popular, which in order to critique, I shall return to an essay I 
have already discussed, “Uncanny Women and Anxious Masters”, by Bergner and 
Plett. Here, the explicit feminist project of the authors, to show the agency of woman 
as manifested in Swanhilda’s role, involves them in a close analysis of the ballet’s 
movement vocabulary. They write:
The role of Swanhilda is characterized, from the start, by rapid, 
technically difficult steps associated with the bravura Italian school 
of the period. If Swanhilda’s mandate is to perform femininity, she 
does so by means of a dazzling, and painstaking, ballet technique.
(my emphasis 170)
Yet it is actually the doll Coppélia that is associated with the type of movement 
highlighted here. Swanhilda’s role is also notable for its bounding jumps, and its 
breezy and expansive use of the torso and épaulement during them. There is a 
moment in the first act, during a dance for Swanhilda and her six girlfriends, which 
rarely fails to thrill the audience. The choreography deploys the friends in a diagonal 
line in regular intervals, one which stretches from upstage-right to downstage-left. In 
eight counts of music, Swanhilda travels at breakneck speed from the start of this line 
upstage to its downstage finish, in a series of eight consecutive brilliant and airy brisé 
volé. Were that not enough, the choreography sees her returning to her starting point 
upstage, in the same amount of music, even more breathtakingly and dizzyingly, by 
means of the steps, repeated four times, of glissade jeté en tournant et en remontant. 
This means that Swanhilda is flying upstage along her diagonal, all the while 
changing her body orientation as she turns in the air, and while she is looking, not to 
where she is going, but rather, downstage to the audience.
Bergner and Plett discuss neither this moment nor others when Swanhilda 
displays a racing energy and an ability to cover space with expansive joyous 
movement. Yet if they do not, this is surely not because they wish to mislead their 
readers. Rather, they may not be sensitive to these moments, because their perception 
is being guided by desire, their avowed one to read Swanhilda as performing an 
archetypal femininity, a desire which these moments do not serve. Instead, their 
reading focuses on Swanhilda’s ready wit and resourcefulness, in opposition to
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Frantz’s gullibility and stupor, and to Coppélius’ pseudo-science. If they construct 
Swanhilda as an agent, they do so by staging her superiority to passive objects: 
comatose Frantz and inert Coppélia. The discourse of agency is a curious one in 
which the writer accepts the values which uphold the positionalities of subject and 
object. Here, the attempt to remove the woman from her habitual position of 
subjectedness, succeeds in altering the way these roles are distributed, reversing the 
genders of those who become subjects and those who become objectified, and fails to 
dismantle the process by which those positionalities are instantiated.
Sightings in the Present: the Ghost-Bodv-as-Clockwork in Practice
In July 2001, I participated in a week-long intensive workshop organised by 
the Centre National de la Danse*® in Paris, entitled “L’Ecole Balanchine”, which was 
designed as continuing education for ballet teachers. Even though I now usually teach 
contemporary dance, the workshop’s organiser, dance practitioner and dancer writer 
Agnès Bretel, who knew that I had danced the Balanchine repertory, and that I was 
working towards a Doctorate in Dance, invited me both to speak on the history of 
ballet in America and to teach a selection of the works that I had performed as a 
young dancer. The principal contributor was Suki Schorer, senior teacher at the 
School of American Ballet (the school which Lincoln Kirstein and George Balanchine 
founded in order to train the dancers of the New York City Ballet), the author of Suki 
Schorer on Balanchine Technique (2000), and the co-author with Merrill Ashley of 
the several videos in the Balanchine library collection called The Balanchine Essays}^ 
More importantly for me, Suki Schorer had been my own teacher at the School from 
1973 to 1979, when I had been a teenager and young dancer-in-training, and this 
workshop would provide the occasion of my first meeting with her after twenty-five 
years.
Since I intended my contribution to work both body and mind, and intended to 
anchor my historical arguments in the development of the style by giving the teachers
Centre National de la Danse, a government-funded institution, one of whose missions is the support 
of the training of dance teachers.
" There are three videos in this collection, and the categorisation of their themes reveal the analysis of 
the clockwork body at work: The Balanchine Essays: Arabesque', The Balanchine Essays: Passé and 
Attitude', The Balanchine Essays: Port de Bras and Epaulement.
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the physical experience of the repertoire from different periods, it was important for 
me to be able to demonstrate the movements I proposed to teach. Yet here again, 
there was an absence, a span of time that needed to be bridged. For in thirteen years 
(during which I had studied release technique, yoga, the Feldenkrais method, and the 
Limon-based contemporary technique which I teach at the Peter Goss school in Paris 
and which I discuss in greater detail in Chapter 8) I had not taken a single ballet class. 
I decided to take Suki’s daily morning class, before attempting to teach the repertoire 
in the afternoon period of the workshop, which meant that I was coming back to ballet 
training and back to my memories of training as an adolescent at one and the same 
time.
It was precisely this long absence which allowed me to see what as a child and 
young dancer I had taken for granted. Arriving before the class to stretch a little, I 
greeted friends and colleagues, and as the Balanchine technique is famously punishing 
for the body, exchanged apprehensive jokes with them. The sense of contact that I 
experienced with the others taking the workshop, and the apprehensive tensions that it 
kept in circuit, suddenly dissolved as Suki Schorer clapped her hands and we began 
the class. I noticed how the concentration that suddenly was mine, as I executed the 
first exercise of grand plié, emerged from the way the exercises at the barre deploy 
bodies in space. From being oriented in all directions, the class was suddenly 
uniformly standing profile, each dancer holding the barre, which was fixed on parallel 
walls of the rectangular room, with the left hand. The action of holding the barre 
created a homogeny of orientation in the students’ bodies; the regular intervals 
between bodies (the space necessary to execute a grand battement front and back, also 
heightened the visibility of each). From the point of view of the teacher walking 
freely in the centre of the room, this heightened visibility and homogeny makes 
discrepancies between bodies easier to spot immediately, and thus helps to pinpoint 
where corrections are needed. From the point of view of the student, this arrangement 
assures everyone of a private space of concentration and work. Despite the crowded 
room, I was suddenly alone with my teacher. The spatial plan in which the plié takes 
place also contributes to an introversion of attention and to the creation of a private 
space. For as the knees bend, the dancer must channel the body’s energy in an effort 
to keep the body from losing its vertical line, all the while trying to make the body 
expand in a frontal plane, by the outward rotation of the thighs, or turn-out, and their
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abduction. Thus, attention is directed towards the sides of the body, inhibiting the 
projection of the body forward in space.
Although the stress placed on turn-out and movement in a frontal plane is 
characteristic of any ballet class, the Balanchine technique is remarkable for the 
degree to which it isolates the parts of the body, the one from the other, and the 
attention it places on the mechanics of the component parts of ballet vocabulary. 
Balanchine famously said to one of his ballerinas (and wives), Maria Tallchief, who 
repeated it onscreen in the documentary film Dancing For Mr B., “that if she would 
leam to do tendu that would be all she’d need to know”. This puzzled Tallchief, who 
remarked that it was the easiest step she performed. However, the remark can 
enlighten an analysis of Balanchine’s vision of technique.
For Balanchine, the tendu provided the basis for almost all the movements he 
was interested in seeing his dancers perform. From the point of view of codified 
ballet vocabulary, the battement tendu is the source of battement jeté, and thus of all 
the movements of petite batterie which it permits; battement tendu condenses the 
impulse for grand battement and the big jumps which obtain their lift from grand 
battement, such as cabriole and grand jeté. From the point of view of anatomical and 
muscular analysis, the battement tendu in the Balanchine school, which is always 
done with accents which stress the positions of beginning and ending, from fifth 
position (most usually) and the arrival of the foot in its pointed position par terre to 
the front, side, or back of the body. This dynamic is one which trains an exceptional 
acceleration and strength in the foot’s push off from the floor. An equation exists in 
human bio-mechanical anatomy, by which, during a rise of the leg, however strongly 
the foot works to push the floor and throw the leg up, the thigh can work 
correspondingly less powerfully in the same action. This relative diminishing of work 
in the thigh prepares the conditions of a correspondingly increased flexibility in the 
hips.. The barre of a Balanchine class, which typically includes a far greater 
proportion of tendm than most other classes in classical technique, works the tendu in 
ordfer to prepare the vocabulary of ballet at its micro-level. Every moment of the 
tendm is subjected to analysis, and honed through numerous exercises which first 
corttarn painstakinglty slow repetitions of the step, and then ever faster ones.
The Bafanehdffie itarre progresses through an analysis of the components of 
baiiet technique, and involves the dancing body in a similar analysis, in which its
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parts are trained one after another in isolation. In Schorer’s class each exercise 
focused on one action of a particular body part, which it trained through a great 
number of repetitions of a simple movement, in order to force concentration in each 
case upon a specific detail. Schorer warned teachers about “combinations”, or 
phrases of movement that she felt included too many different steps of the ballet 
vocabulary. Mixing steps fosters a loss of precision in the training dancer, Schorer 
implied, and at the same time involves him or her in an effort of memorisation which 
diverts concentration from its rightful focus. Students should not be thinking about 
what steps are to be done, but rather about how they are to be done: they should be 
thinking about the rules governing the execution of each step. Schorer corrected the 
plié excercise which began the barre, by asking that the dancers not move their heads 
during its port de bras. Plié, a deep bending of the knees, in most schools of ballet is 
customarily accompanied by a port de bras, often a circular trajectory in which the 
arm opens sideways slightly lower than shoulder height, extends to the periphery of 
the body’s kinesphere, lowers along this line, and then traces a medial line projected 
in front of the body’s axis as it returns to a height where hand and shoulder form a 
curve that is parallel to the floor again. Typically, an integral part of this port de bras 
is the relation of the dancer’s eyes to the moving hand, which he or she is meant to 
follow as it moves through space. This focus involves the head in subtle turning, 
lifting, lowering and inclining movements, and also brings the shoulder girdle and 
torso into play. This global engagement was exactly what Schorer did not want, 
perhaps because it meant that too many variables were involved in the movement, 
which rendered it difficult to hone and train them. After several exercises in which 
Schorer told the dancers not to move their heads, she gave an exercise specifically for 
épaulement, in which we simply stood in a (well-crossed) fifth position, not moving 
our feet. This exercise was composed of rapid changes between codified ballet 
épaulement: croisé, ejfacé, and écarté, in which each position was corrected minutely, 
and special attention was placed on how the arm entered and exited each position. 
Schorer’s centre work continued in the manner of her barre, by an aesthetic analysis 
which identified the components of movements it aimed to train in selected parts of 
the body. Only in the repertoire which she taught after the class were the polished 
components of the body set to articulating together.
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Schorer’s teaching method is an extreme version of a vision of the body which 
sees its articulations as separable entities, yet it is one that is typical of the perception 
that emerges through the practice of classical ballet. What is important in the present 
context is to recognise the extent to which this vision of the body has influenced the 
teaching of contemporary dance, an influence which tends to go quite unrecognised. 
In the course of many workshops given in Louppe’s teacher training course, “Pour la 
Culture Chorégraphique”, which I followed from 2000 to 2002, the students on the 
course—working choreographers, dancers and dance teachers—each contributed to it 
by presenting either a theoretical or a practical element, or both. One of the teachers 
of the group was Françoise Benet, whose commitment to contemporary dance in 
France has been serious and constant, both in terms of her work inside the 
conservatory system and of her work to create organisations supporting new 
choreography and research in contemporary dance outside government institutions. 
Benet offered the group a class which shared with them her experience of working 
with Alwin Nikolais, who had been director of the dance theatre at Angers from 1978 
to 1981, when Benet was a young dancer in training there. Nikolais had studied 
almost exclusively with Holm, Graham, Humphrey, and Weideman; nevertheless, I 
was struck by what I saw as methodological similarities between Benet’s Nikolais- 
style class and Schorer’s Balanchine one.
Benet’s class began on the floor, but this difference from the beginning of 
Schorer’s class also became a similarity because of the way in which the exercises 
placed emphasis on the body singular. We were all on the floor together, yet 
everyone was also alone in his or her space, because what now followed were 
movements of the arms and legs that necessitated regular and symmetrical spaces 
between persons. We pointed and flexed feet a certain number of times, then rotated 
the legs in their sockets—in, out, in—and then began moving the next articulation, the 
knees, lifting them separately to and away from the chest with the same number of 
repetitions. For the next movement, we rolled onto our sides, bent the leg that was 
not touching the floor, pointed its knee in the direction of the ceiling, and rapidly 
executed a series of grand battement en attitude à la seconde. There followed a leg 
stretch in which, after returning with our backs flat against the floor, we first caught 
one foot with the hands. Straightening the knee, we pulled the leg closer towards the
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torso, before repeating the exercise with the other leg. The floor section of the class, 
which took about half an hour, ended with backbends.
Once we stood up from the floor, the class was suddenly in a different mode 
altogether. Benet’s work standing up explored space and dynamics in ways that were 
original and rich, and which, importantly, exposed the method that was guiding her 
class: Nikolais’s four-fold categorisation: Space, Time, Form, and Motion. These 
were the categories which were to provide a framework that was at one and the same 
time rigorous and open as a teaching tool. Yet in the difference between Benet’s 
lying and standing sections in the class, I felt the presence of the ghost-body-as- 
clockwork through a decidedly dualistic determination. We students were doing the 
first exercises as if the body were a motor which needed to be started and revved up; 
yet once we had warmed up the machine, these exercises were consigned to the past. 
That is, their status was to warm up a body-machine, without leaving any trace on 
body-feeling or body-fantasy. They would not necessarily have any direct relevance 
for the movements or qualities that the body would work on or invent later.
The Ghost-Bodv-as-Clockwork at Rest
In this chapter I have argued that the clockwork body involves a particular 
figuring of body/mind dualism. It is one that was elaborated with the help of the 
science of the seventeenth century, which was aware of the ability of the body to 
leam to execute and repeat the mind’s orders, but not of the mind’s ability to leam 
from the body’s sensing and doing. In neurological terms, it was aware of “efferent” 
relations, information emanating from the mind to the body, but not of “afferent” 
ones, information arising to the mind from the body. It conceived of orders as 
originating in the head and proceeding to the body, after which the well-ordered body 
would move entirely without further thought. The skill of the dancer’s body was 
admired but also dismissed as a purely mechanical one. This vision of the dancing 
body elided two physical facts. The first: the degree to which the mind of the dancer 
needed initially to be active when acquiring the skills that were to become like second 
nature through repetition. The second: that the body has afferent as well as efferent
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messages: a communication existed that began in the body and proceeded to the mind. 
The experience of the body—the way it occupies space, its appreciation of gravity 
through the momentum of movement, the sensation of muscle pressure, stretch, 
resistance, and give, its degrees of effort, its pleasure or pain in moving—constitutes 
important information which rises up in a body to its brain. Action influences 
perception, and the body changes its mind.
Yet the information that the body gives the brain can be overlooked by it. 
Instead of heeding what the body tells the brain, the brain may choose to ignore the 
body’s messages. Easier to commit are sins of omission. A subject may neglect to 
develop an ability to be sensitive to the messages the body gives the mind in the first 
place. And even before the question of the subject developing a sensibility arises, that 
subject’s perception may be so filtered by a conception of what the body is, that it 
may render it impossible for the subject to experience it in any other way
Our perception is filtered by preconceptions of which we may not be 
conscious, whose working Jonathan Miller explains by considering the phenomenon 
of “puzzle” pictures. Miller urges his readers to remember that in one well-known 
puzzle picture it is possible to see either an image of a beautiful woman or one of an 
ugly gypsy. He writes that if we see the beautiful woman, the fact of our seeing this 
image is the reason why, at that present moment, we cannot see the other one. 
{Darwin 8-9). The concept of the body-as-clockwork acts in the same way: if it is 
held in mind, consciously or unconsciously, it tends to obscure information which 
would make the body see otherwise. For the function of perception is not to see what 
is actually there, but rather to create a fit between what we expect to see and what the 
world affords as a possible vision. As V.S. Ramachandran puts it, “the mechanisms 
of perception are mainly involved in extracting statistical correlations from the world 
to create a model which is temporarily useful” (59). The temporary usefulness of this 
model is determined by the extent to which it perturbs homeostasis. Perception will 
edit out what it does not want to contemplate, through the very act of which choosing 
the elements it does want to take on board (59). In “Scotoma: Forgetting and Neglect 
in Science”, Oliver Sacks reflects on why certain scientific discoveries took so long a 
time to be made, and why others that were made in time, are not recognised and 
incorporated into the body of thought of science, but rather, refuted or ignored. He 
writes:
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It is not enough to apprehend something, to “get” something, in a 
flash. The mind must be able to accommodate it, to retain it. This 
process of accommodation, of being able to create a mental space, a 
category with potential connections—and the readiness to do this— 
seems tome crucial in determining whether an idea or discovery will 
take hold and bear fruit, or whether it will be forgotten, fade, and die 
without issue. (159)
Curiously, it is often enough to know, while one is seeing the image of a beautiful 
girl, that it can also be seen as a gypsy, for our perception to change so that we are 
able to see this image in alternation with the one more immediately perceptible to us. 
Similarly, becoming conscious of the extent to which our culture as a whole, and 
ourselves as singular bodies, are inhabited by the Ghost-Body-as-Clockwork may 
constitute the first step towards our being able to accommodate other ghosts as well.
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PARTIE
THE GHOST-BODY-AS-MARIONETTE
r ' . '
Chapter 6 
Vitalism and its Cultural Ramifications
The ghost-body-as-marionette is a second total programme which organises 
into a coherent whole the body’s conceptualisation, sensation and practice. Yet if the 
organisational function of this ghost body is the same as that of the ghost-body-as- 
clockwork, the mode of its organisation diverges. In Part II of this study I have 
argued that the principal metaphors of the ghost-body-as-clockwork are those of 
articulation. The ghost-body-as-clockwork seeks to segment the body into ever 
smaller units, whose local movements it attempts to discern and polish one at a time. 
This vivisection of the body takes place ostensibly to benefit the smoother working of 
its whole, at a future moment when the parts of the dancing body will have been 
reassembled. Yet this moment of coordination is often deferred, because the 
epistemological gaze of this ghost-body locates knowledge at the level of the body’s 
separate parts rather than at the level of the organism which they combine to create. 
By contrast, the principal metaphor of the ghost-body-as-marionette is that of 
relation} In opposition to the focused, segmenting, analytical gaze of the ghost- 
body-as-clockwork, the ghost-body-as-marionette induces a holistic way of looking 
that takes into account ever larger, more diffused and global correspondences within 
an organism and outside of it. It requires the dancing body to be observed less in the 
positions that the dancer creates in space than in the movement trajectory which 
connects them, and thus it is sensitive to patterns of intensity. It therefore understands 
sequence, not as the logical succession of steps in a mechanical process of addition, 
but rather as patterns in which the tonicity of the body changes, and in which the 
body’s energies may be cumulative or diminishing.
The ghost-body-as-marionette manifests itself in varied types of dance and 
their techniques, and has emerged at different times throughout the history of Western
‘ The O xford English D ictionary  gives the meaning of the word “marionette” as “a puppet actuated by 
strings and used to represent persons (or animals) in action”. The etymology o f the word, interestingly, 
is a diminutive of the name “Mary”. Other words with the same root are: “mariola, meaning an image 
of Mary, and “Mariolatry”, meaning “the idolatrous worship of the Virgin Mary attributed by 
opponents to Roman Catholics” (1726). So the marionette is an icon, a figure of the Godhead, made 
small, and also feminised through its feminine ending.
dance. Its sensitivity to the phases of bodily energy can be seen to inform the 
principles of Fall and Recovery as elaborated by Doris Humphrey beginning in the 
1930s. The interest of the ghost-body-as-marionette in the fluctuations of tonicity in 
the body is one that re-emerges in Release technique as developed by Trisha Brown in 
the 1970s and 1980s. It also influences the form of dance known as Contact 
Improvisation whose development is accredited in large part to Steve Paxton and 
Nancy Stark Smith. Yet I argue that its values can be historically traced to the 
Romantic ballet, the first recorded moment in European dance history in which the 
correctness of technique became less important than creating the illusion that the 
dancing body was moved passively by means of an outside force, was wafted by 
invisible air currents, was held aloft by unseen powers, was traversed by passions that 
were greater than the body could contain.
For the concern of the ghost-body-as-marionette with the global dynamics of 
movement cuts across the distinctions which today typically keep contemporary and 
classical dance separate, and it also creates distinctions within the ostensibly unified 
discipline called “ballet”. It is the ghost-body-as-marionette’s interest in global 
movement line, rather than in the details of a movement’s articulation that can be seen 
to encapsulate, for example, the difference between the Russian and the French 
schools of ballet, a difference which was particularly apparent during the Cold War 
period. This difference provided a shock to Western audiences confronted by Yuri 
Grigorovich’s Spartacus (1968), when the Bolshoi Ballet toured the West in the 
1970s. The French school, whose identity is associated with the ballet Coppélia, was 
concerned with the transmission of a code of dancing, and developed ballerinas who 
were famous for their balances, the elegance of their line, and the utter correctness of 
their refined épaulement and port de bras', whereas the Russian dancers seemed 
blithely unconcerned by matters of correctness. The choreography featured acrobatic 
lifts celebrating a cumulative energy which lifted the female dancer on its crest. Male 
and female dancers alike excelled in spectacular leaps which manifested a body that 
was always impelled further, thus celebrating a corporeality shown as always in 
excess, always transgressing the very discipline of dance which it exploited to express 
its energies.
If, as we have seen in Part H, the ghost-body-as-clockwork glorifies the 
articulation of the body, and locates the skill or virtuosity of the dancer in the ability
119
to make the detailed movement of each articulation invisible within the form he or she 
gives to be seen, the ghost-body-as-marionette celebrates the global way in which the 
body adapts to forces outside it, and exploits these exterior forces to produce 
seemingly effortless movement in the body. These forces may be actual ones such as 
gravity, the contour, proportion, and materiality of the dance space, and the actions of 
other bodies. But they may also be immaterial forces of metaphor. As we have seen 
in Part II, metaphors, or images, when they are held in mind, have an effect on the 
dancing body. Metaphors and images encapsulate, in condensed form, a programme 
or pattern which organises the body along its lines. The metaphors belonging to the 
realm of the ghost-body-as-marionette are far from the hard metal parts of the ghost- 
body-as-clockwork. Rather, the metaphors of the ghost-body-as-marionette are those 
of natural and supernatural forces. These metaphors—wind which bends trees and 
makes their branches sway; water which lifts, floats, displaces, and supports a body 
submerged in it; sun whose heat and rays make the body relax and distend; sand or 
earth whose textures provide a model for that of the body of the dancer—these 
metaphors image the body as in a process of becoming one with the element in 
question. Thus, if the ideal of the ghost-body-as-clockwork is one of agency, that of 
the ghost-body-as-marionette, is by contrast, an ideal of passivity.
The Movement of Vitalism
In Chapter 3, I showed how the metaphors which inform the ghost-body-as- 
clockwork can be traced to Enlightenment science and the philosophy of Descartes; in 
the present chapter I consider the way in which the metaphors of ghost-body-as- 
marionette are informed by the medical movement known as vitalism. Although 
vitalism is a current of thought which has been dated as happening at a particular 
delimited period of time, from 1720-1850, in the introductory chapter of The Crisis of 
Modernism: Bergson and the Vitalist Controversy, editors Frederick Burwick and 
Paul Douglass write that vitalism has been a theme of Western thought since 
Aristotle, and that there “continues to be an interest in the place of an “organismic” 
approach to science and philosophy in the post-modern world (1). In Stahl and
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Hoffmann: A study in Eighteenth-Century Animism”, Lester S. King writes that the 
vitalistic
notion that organisation has levels, that wholes may exert special 
influences on the parts, that successively more comprehensive 
wholes exist to make up an ecological environment: ideas of this 
type are part of present day biology. (129)
In the essay, “The Perpetual Crises of Modernism and the Traditions of 
Enlightenment Vitalism: With a Note on Mikhail Bakhtin”, scholar of French studies 
George S. Rousseau writes that vitalism
amounts to the notion that no single part of an organism is alive.
Instead, properties of living matter are somehow shared—this 
somehow remains the issue—by the entire organism in each of its 
parts. (24)
For Rousseau, vitalism is such an integrated and important part of Western culture 
that the task of doing it justice is akin to condensing the entire intellectual history of 
the last four hundred years, even if contemporary biology “spurns traditional vitalism 
as the failed credo of ideological heretics and incompetent scientists” (21). Yet 
Rousseau warns that the vitalistic strain in culture cannot be seen as rising in a 
continuous, progressive, or independent manner. Rather, he suggests that vitalism is 
engaged in a dialectical relationship with the tradition of mechanism as informed by 
Descartes, and that the two different sciences and philosophies enjoy discontinuous 
and interrupted influence in Western culture. “Both philosophies”, writes Rousseau, 
“developed hand in hand. When one faded the other blossomed; but neither waned 
for very long” (32).
Descartes’s formulation of l ’homme l ’horloge was, among other things, an 
argument that a consideration of the divine could be excluded from the study of man, 
because man’s inner mechanisms provided sufficient cause for his motion. In “G. 
E.Stahl’s Psychological Physiology”, L.J. Rather records how the eighteenth-century 
animistic philosopher, whose work constituted an important resistance to mechanistic 
philosophy, critiqued Descartes’s formulation. In 1730 Stahl pointed out that the 
clock is an instrument only for so long as it is not synchronised with the movements 
of the sun, and that it owes this status to the hand that winds it. Thus it is insufficient 
to limit study to the clock itself, for a part of its intelligence lies outside it. This was 
evident to Stahl, for if the clock were damaged by an unskilful hand it would cease to
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be an instrument, even though it might remain in perpetual motion as driven by the 
endless activity of its spring (42), Stahl’s approach to Descartes’s theory is 
characteristic of the ghost-body-as-marionette, for rather than focusing on the details 
of the theory that it problematises, Stahl looks at the theory in relation to what it 
excludes, what is outside of it. For Stahl, questions of design and purpose could not 
be excluded from considerations of functioning (Rather 43).
For George S. Rousseau, vitalism sprang up with force in the eighteenth 
century because scientific interests shifted then from questions of physics to questions 
of biology (53). Mechanistic science had been a science of motion, and it applied 
mathematical procedures rather than philosophical analogy to the measurement of 
phenomena such as friction, pressure, centrifugal force, elasticity, equilibrium, inertia 
and velocity. These methods were so successful, and had obtained such a high level 
of sophistication by the 1600s, that they began to exert a dominant influence over 
other disciplines. These methods, applied to the biological sciences, yielded the 
medicine known as iatromechanism.^ But the problem with mechanisist methods was 
that their results were contradicted by direct observation, observation which led the 
vitalists to their fundamental principle: that there was a difference between living 
structures and inert matter, a difference which meant that living matter could not be 
studied through mechanistic methodology.
In “The Roots of Vitalism of Xavier Bichat”, Elizabeth Haigh writes that for 
Bichat (1771-1802) living matter presented a force that was proper to it, seen both in 
its ability to change and in its powers of resilience. A doctor of the Montpellier 
school,^ Bichat saw that the propensity of living matter to change was what made 
iotromechanistic methods unsatisfactory:
 ^In the essay “From Homme Machine to Homme Sensible: Changing Eighteenth-Century Models of 
Man’s Image”, Sergio Moravia records that at the beginning of the eighteenth century, the word 
“iatromechanist” was used interchangeably with the term “medical mechanists , both describing what 
we should now describe as medical doctors, as implied by the etymology of the word. latro , is the 
Greek for “physician”.
 ^In “Vitalism, the Soul, and Sensibility” Elizabeth L. Haigh writes that in the 1730s the medical 
school at the University of Montpellier had become an intellectual home for animists and subsequently 
for many of their vitalist heirs. Vitalists were influenced by animistic philosophy, writes Haigh, 
because Bordeu, who studied under François Boissier de Sauvages (1706-67) introduced Stahlian 
theory to the school after he began to teach there in 1734. The Montpellier school was an important 
centre o f resistance to mechanist thought, as Haigh writes; its “medical faculty seemed consistently to 
disregard the popular mechanistic physiology which had taken hold in most European medical schools” 
(32).
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To calculate the force of a muscle . . .  the velocity of the blood . . . 
the quantity of air which enters into the lung, is to build upon a 
quicksand an edifice solid of itself but necessarily decreed to fall for 
want of foundation.(74)
Haigh records that Bichat further threw the methodology of iatromechanism into 
question, by suggesting that its influence did not result from any objective reason, but, 
rather, was an effect of history:
If physiology had been developed before physics persons might be 
speaking about the physiology of stars rather than the physics of 
animals. They might speak of crystals uniting by the excitement of 
reciprocal sensibility and planets moving because they were 
reciprocally enervated at great distance. (74)
If change was seen to be an intrinsic property of living matter, so was the 
ability to resist change. In “From Mechanism to Vitalism in Eighteenth-Century 
English Phsyiology”, Theodore M. Brown argues that the 1770 experiments into the 
phenomenon of body-heat of the English doctor John Hunter constituted a crucial part 
of vitalism’s interests, for they revealed the ability to produce body-heat as a 
difference between living and non-living matter. Hunter placed a snake and an inert 
object in a cold vessel, and found that the temperature of the former did not decrease 
as rapidly as that of the latter. Some in-lying property of the animal allowed it to resist 
what Brown, transmitting Hunter, describes as “the energy of some external agent or 
disease” (181). Hunter’s experiments proved that the power to preserve body heat 
“does not depend upon the motion of the blood, as some have supposed”, and gave 
evidence instead that the organism possessed a “vital power”, a power of opposition 
and resistance that could be “excited by the energy of some external frigorifie agent, 
or disease” (Brown 182). Hunter’s experiments proved that living things possessed an 
“interiority”, or power of resistance, but also an “exteriority,” in that this power was 
only released when excited by that external agent, in Hunter’s experiment, the cold 
vessel. And so even as vitalism located life force within living matter, it also saw that 
external factors in the environment needed to be taken into consideration in 
accounting for the organism’s behaviour.
The new questions which were being posed in vitalistic science, questions 
which King characterises as those of homeostasis, instinct and aspects of the 
body/mind relationship (122), demanded a new paradigm through which the human 
might be conceptualised. In “From Homme Machine to Homme Sensible: Changing
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Models of Man’s Image”, Sergio Moravia traces the way in which the vitalist model 
of sensitivity gradually replaced the mechanisist model of Vhomme Vhorloge in the 
eighteenth century. Moravia writes that already by the second half of the seventeenth 
century Swammersdam was demonstrating the disquieting capacity of the muscles to 
respond to nervous stimulus even after the severing of every connection with the 
spinal cord (48). The vitalists now saw that this phenomenon proved that the 
organism possessed a power of continuance.
The Nerves of VHomme Sensible
In “Nerves, Spirits Fibres: Towards Defining the Origins of Sensibility”, G.S. 
Rousseau argues that the way in which the nerves were imaged became the central 
question in science. “No topic”, he writes, “between the Restoration and the turn of 
the nineteenth century was more important than the precise workings of the nerves, 
their intricate morphology, historical arrangement, and anatomical function” (145- 
146). For Rousseau, the reason why the nerves were the site of scientists’ all- 
consuming interest is that in 1670 the English doctor Thomas Willis influentially 
contended that it was the brain which was the seat of the soul, and not the pineal 
gland, as Descartes had held. Abruptly then, nerves became of supreme importance, 
for philosophers and “natural philosophers” alike, when it was realised that only these 
could account for knowledge gained through experience, since they were the unique 
structure connecting brain and body.
Interest in the nerves was common to the mechanists and to the vitalists, but it 
also divided them into two camps: those who wanted to prove that the nerves were 
solid (largely the mechanistic faction), and those that wanted to prove that they were 
hollow. Imagining the nerves as hollow was the pre-condition of imagining an 
exquisite liquid that ran through them, a liquid that flowed from brain to body and 
back again. The “hollowists” could then locate the soul in this exquisite fluid. In his 
essay “Going Unconsious”, Jonathan Miller shows the way in which the attempt to 
find a physical substance which could account for metaphysical phenomena, is one
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that has a long history in Western medicine, one which has found different ways at 
different moments to image this substance. Miller writes:
Beginning in ancient times some philosophers associated the 
substance with flame; others assumed that it was indistinguishable 
from air, breath or pneuma—in fact until the middle of the nineteenth 
century psychology was often known as “pneumatology”. Aristotle 
insisted that it was too insubstantial to be associated with any of the 
four elements and that there had to be a fifth, a “quintessence” a 
radiant, impalpable potency which was undetectable apart from the 
changes it brought about. (175-176)
Writing about the same tradition, G.S. Rousseau mentions ancient manifestations of 
this insubstantial substance in "’entelechy”, Paracelus’ ''archeus”, and cites later 
determinations in Stahl’s "'anima sensitiva” as well as in Blake’s “energy” (140). 
Vitalists drew explicitly upon such traditions as they imagined that the hollow nerves 
were the conduits for some ether, essence, or spirit in which the soul resided.
However, vitalistic metaphors invaded even the explanations forwarded by the 
“solidists”. Although they hypothesised that communication between the body and 
the brain took place through mechanical means, such as traction or impact, they also 
envisaged the possibility that communication between the two could exist as 
vibration. The nerve theory of Descartes which contributed to the ongoing debate on 
the nerves contained both “insubstantial” and mechanical elements, for he conceived 
the nerves as functioning in the body in terms of a musical instrument, an organ. 
Descartes imagined there were valves in the brain, which could be opened and shut by 
the traction exerted on them by the rope-like nerves. A motion in the rope opened a 
corresponding valve in the brain. In turn, the brain opened and shut other valves to 
initiate movements (Carlson 105). Yet in this purely mechanical model Descartes 
inserts a return to Aristotelian science in that the nerves themselves contained a 
gaseous fluid. Hermann Boerhaave (1668-1738) also contributed a mechanistic 
theory, this time depending upon impact. The nerves were supposed to transmit 
signals in the manner of billiard balls, which, being struck, relayed their motion to the 
ball they strike in their turn. Yet, here again, vitalistic assumptions were present.
 ^“Organ” is from the Greek, meaning “that with which one works, tool, instrument . It was the 
musical instrument which provided the metaphor by which to understand the inner-workings of the 
body. For The Compact Edition o f the Oxford Dictionary lists the first anatomical use o f the word in 
the sixteenth century, whereas the same work dates its use to designate a musical instrument two 
centuries earlier (2007-2008).
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which can be seen in the metaphors Boerhaave employed: for the billiard balls were 
imagined as the particles in the superfine fluid which the nerves contained. Vitalistic 
metaphors were present even in Newton’s nerve theory. For Newton, the nerves were 
a solid cord, but one penetrated with ether which filled the spaces between its 
constituant particles. Stimuli set the ether into motion throughout the length of the 
nerve, but the motion of the particles was oscillatory, and they returned to their 
original positions (Carlson 109). Borrowing took place in the other direction as well, 
with “hollowists” using mechanical metaphors, for example in conceiving the motion 
of the spirit or essence within the hollow nerves in terms of hydraulics, which owed a 
debt to William Harvey’s theorisation of the heart as a mechanical pump.
Nerve theories abounded, accumulating from the end of the seventeenth 
century to the end of the eighteenth century, firstly because of their metaphysical 
implications, but most importantly because a vacuum in human knowledge meant that 
no theory could be definitely proved or disproved. This gap in knowledge existed 
because the phenomenon of electricity, which was discovered in the mid-eighteenth 
century, was not yet well understood. But the gap also existed because scientists were 
unwilling or unable to recognise what they observed, or consider conclusive what 
they did not see. In “Models of the Nervous System in Eighteenth-Century 
Psychiatry”, Eric T. Carlson and Meribeth M. Simpson remark that nerves had been 
cut through, and looked at through microscopes, and that no fluid, however superfine, 
had been seen by the experimenters. Yet failing to see this fluid still did not convince 
hollowists, write Carlson and Simpson:
because most of those who believed in the nervous channels did not 
really expect them to see them with the microscope; a fluid so fine 
that it was an appropriate agent of perception and sensation was not 
likely to be gross enough to be visible, nor were the fine channels 
suitable for its conveyance likely to be visible either. (107)
Organs and Glands: Sex and Death
If nerves represented a primary focus of interest of eighteenth-century science, 
the body’s glands and organs were the site where the nerves functioning could be
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studied. Yet in the process of studying the properties of organisms which allowed 
them to continue in life, scientists were also led into a study when these properties 
failed, and death took hold over the body. The laboratory of life was full of death, as 
can be seen in Haigh's consideration of Bichat’s findings. For Bichat, it was:
significant that the muscular faculty of movement is extinguished 
soon after the nervous or vascular connections to it are severed, 
while intestinal movements continue for hours after death, and the 
heart removed from an animal retains a strong irritability. (76)
The continued irritability of organs made them a favoured locus of vitalist interest. In 
1720, Boerhaave had already observed the glands to have more nerves in proportion 
to their bulk than any other part of the body. In “Vitalism, the Soul, and Sensibility: 
The Physiology of Théophile Bordeu”, Elizabeth Haigh recounts how in his 
Recherche anatomique sur la position des glandes et leur action (1752) Théophile 
Bordeu (1722-1776) refuted the theories of mechanistic science, which had conceived 
of the glands as sieves. Mechanisists believed that it was solely the morphology of 
the gland, its size, shape, and the placement of its putative holes, that allowed the 
gland to refine the blood, restraining some elements while allowing some others to 
pass through it, which process produced the liquid the gland secreted. Bordeu argued 
instead that the glands were the site of a much more complex process which involved 
a sequence of stages of nervous action. Bordeu had observed, importantly, that the 
nerves were not only connected at the brain centre, but also in the ganglions situated 
in the peripheral organs, and this placement led him to a new conceptualisation of 
how a body was organised.
Here the metaphors which Bordeu turned to in the conceptualisation of the 
organism and its organisation show the way in which the ghost-body-as-marionette is 
always seeking relation. Bordeu’s metaphors were taken essentially from two 
separate lexicons. The first of these sought to conceptualise the human in relation to 
what was external to the organism, and was political. Bordeu wrote that body was not 
a “unitary-monarchic being” (unitarily and uniformly subject to the action of the soul) 
but rather was a decentralised being, a “federation” of organs (Moravia 65). Each 
organ possessed a certain basic tension which was imparted to it by means of a tonic 
motion communicated from the brain through the nerves. But each organ enjoyed a 
relative autonomy, for though each was connected to the brain (the controlling organ), 
it executed a whole series of independent functions with its nerve ganglions. These
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varied finomm leactioiis to external stimuli to the accomplishment of certain internal 
phfisiologïcal operations in respect to which the conscious brain centre seemed 
completeJy alien (Moravia 57).
If Borden chose one kind of metaphor which related the organism to the 
outside world, another of his metaphors related the organism to its unknown depths. 
In Ms Recherches, Bordeu described the series of stages of the gland’s action in the 
folowimg way:
Kist, when an erection is required there is a spasmodic action of the 
gland or some other irritation or erection; secondly there is a shaking 
or some other form of irritation; thirdly the disposition of the 
excretory organ alters so as to facilitate humoral flow; and finally 
there are some necessary changes in the vessels.
The vitalistic preoccupation to discover the source of the powers of resistance and 
continuance of the living organism drew its scientists into a close consideration of 
death, but also into an investigation of sex. In Perilous Enlightenment, G. S. 
Rousseau asserts that the evolution of European ideas in the eighteenth century cannot 
be understood without reference to sex. He writes, “sex was the hinge on which the 
door of sensibility depended”. For Rousseau the eighteenth century was a moment 
when a science of the erotic began to be elaborated, a neurological explanation, which 
had not previously existed in Western culture for basic drives and urges (44, 53). As 
evidence of the way in which the eighteenth century was sexualised in general 
through the metaphors of its new science of the erotic, one can consider Bordeu’s 
description of the pariotide gland. For Bordeu had developed his general theory of 
glands from the study of the mammary glands and the testes. The metaphors Bordeu 
used to describe these glands were extended to all glands. He wrote “of a kind of 
tickling” around the organ when one began to eat, which caused it to undergo a kind 
of awakening or “erection” (Haigh, 34).
In “The Perpetual Crisis of Modernism and the Tradition of Enlightenment 
Vitalism”, Rousseau argues that the vitalistic metaphors which burgeoned in science 
between the years 1650 and 1750, thereafter began to creep into other disciplines. 
Rousseau understands vitalism as informing Blake’s “energy” in the 1770s, but also 
as re-emerging much later in G.B. Shaw’s “life force”. For Rousseau, there is a lag of 
time (the exact expanse of which will ever remain indeterminable and thus an 
interminable sport for academics) before the preoccupations of science come to
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concern imaginative literature; or, as G.S. Rousseau puts it , before a particular 
scientific theory will “demand the muse” (Nerves 141). Yet, as an attention to 
Romantic and Gothic literature will reveal, certain topoi seem to have been 
appropriated rather early, and straight from the vitalistic science. Vitalism 
conceptualised the difference between living and inert matter as being that living 
things changed; but Stahl, in 1737, saw “change” in very a particular light. As King 
records, Stahl’s description of the changes in living matter employed the terms: 
“dissolution”, and “putrid corruption”(121); terms which seem to prefigure the Gothic 
novel’s fascination for decaying bodies, which would emerge in an exemplary 
determination in Matthew Lewis’s The Monk (1794). Hunter’s body-heat 
experiments, in which an animal is kept in a cold vessel while the scientist measures 
how long it takes for it to die, perhaps are what prompted a favoured Gothic situation, 
one in which an innocent maiden is interred in a freezing crypt or dungeon and 
abandoned to a lingering death. Vitalistic science conceptualised the life force, 
somewhat tautologically, as the ensemble of systems in the organism which resisted 
death, a negative formulation which would find its literary correlative in Bram 
Stoker’s Dracula (1894) where it appears as the negative description of the vampire 
as “undead”. In the next chapter I consider the ways in which these works of 
literature figure vitalist concerns and image the ghost-body-as-marionette, and shall 
compare them both to the Romantic ballet, to post-modem dance, and to film of the 
present moment.
For Bordeu, part of the organism’s curious power to resist death, the eternal 
sleep, was perceived to reside in those parts of the organism which did not require 
sleep. Bichat’s medical system divided the body along the distinction between those 
parts which remained at work and those which required rest; he identified the former 
with a "force motrice vitale”, and the latter with a "force motrice animale” (Haigh, 
“Bichat” 77). The body’s animal force was concerned with the external world and the 
voluntary actions of the organism, whereas its “vital force” regulated internal and 
involuntary functions. These involuntary functions, which included the processes of 
blood circulation, nutrition, respiration, reproduction and glandular secretion, and the 
nerves and the question of their irritability, meant that science was now less interested 
in the locomotion of a body than in the body’s homeostasis. These concerns can be 
seen informing both the literature and the ballet of Romanticism. Yet while Rousseau
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writes of the way in which the concerns of science are taken up by literature, as 
though ideas moved directly from the former to the latter discipline, I argue that in the 
case of vitalist ideas, there was an intermediate stage. Before vitalist concerns 
emerged in the artistic production of the Romantic period, in its literature and dance, 
they first passed into popular culture through the medium of the Mesmerist 
movement.
Mesmerism: Science as Performance
In Mesmerism and the End of the Enlightenment in France (1968), historian 
Robert Damton writes that, extravagant as it seems today. Mesmerism did not seem 
far-fetched to literate Frenchmen in the 1780s, for it fell upon a well-prepared public. 
Damton writes:
Science had captivated Mesmer’s contemporaries by revealing to 
them that they were surrounded by wonderful, invisible forces:
Newton’s gravity, made intelligible by Voltaire; Franklin’s 
electricity, popularized by a fad for lightning rods . . . and the 
miraculous gases of the Charlières and Montgolfières that astonished 
Europe by lifing man into the air for the first time in 1783. (10)
In the atmosphere of the time, Damton writes, Mesmer’s “imponderable fluid” 
seemed far from miraculous, for there were “enough fluids, sponsored by enough 
philosophers, to make any eighteenth-century reader’s head swim” (11). Who could 
say that Mesmer’s fluid was less real, writes Damton, than:
the phlogiston that Lavoisier was attempting to banish from the 
universe, or the caloric he was apparently substituting for it, or the 
ether, the “animal heat,” the “inner mold,” the “organic molecules,” 
the fire soul, and the other fictitious powers that one meets like 
ghosts inhabiting the dead treatises of such respectable eighteenth- 
century scientists as Bailly, Buffon, Euler, La Place, and Macquer.
(10- 11)
Above all, Damton stresses that most of the fabulous theories elaborated in the 
eighteenth century have not discredited their authors: they are still part of the official 
history of science, despite the now obvious flaws in their contributions. By contrast, 
the name of Mesmer is excluded from many histories of science, and his name has 
become almost synonymous with quackery; even as, ambiguously, the adjective
130
“mesmeric”, remains positive. Damton’s analysis, which traces how Mesmer’s 
eighteenth-century medical theories became an important part of eighteenth- and 
nineteenth-century popular culture, suggests that medical history excises Mesmer 
from its pages because the spectacular way in which he “performed” medicine made it 
anathema to traditional medical science.
Anton Franz Mesmer was bom near Constance in Germany in 1734. He 
practised medicine in Vienna, where he had studied and written a doctoral thesis in 
1766. To contemporary sensibilities, Mesmer’s thesis, entitled De Planetarium 
Influx, clearly exceeded the boundaries of traditional medicine. Yet Damton argues 
that for Mesmer’s time the thesis was not extraordinary, for even as it was informed 
by astrology it was also following on from Newtonian science. Mesmer’s thesis, that 
the gravitational pull of planets has an effect on human health, just as it does on the 
tides, is typical of his time in another respect, for it reflects a vitalistic urge to go 
beyond a local level of analysis, and to relate the organism to ever more inclusive 
wholes.
The particularity presented by Mesmer’s invisible fluid, which he conceived 
of as penetrating and surrounding all bodies, was that it was conceptualised as a force 
extemal to the body in question. For the most part, vitalist scientists were concemed 
with the discovery of a micro-level of involuntary processes within the body, of which 
the controlling mind was largely unaware. By contrast, Mesmer’s theory wanted to 
make observations applicable to the larger level of the organism, and he situated the 
driving force for the body’s movements, not within the self at a micro-level, but in a 
force outside it: that of gravity. For Mesmer, the body was a conduit of an 
imponderable fluid which linked the body and the world. Ill health resulted when the 
free-flowing circulation of this fluid was impeded by an obstacle in the body; it could 
be restored by re-establishing this flow.
In overcoming the obstacles which impeded the flow of the imponderable 
fluid, Mesmer first used magnets and magnetised metal rods, with which he seemed to 
draw the fluid past the blocked passages within the body. Holding the magnets or 
staff, Mesmer performed “passes” over the body in specific choreographed gestures, 
“passes” which historian Alan Gauld describes in A History of Hypnotism (11). The 
passes were a highly codified technique in which Mesmer trained his followers. 
According to Gauld, the direction of the gesture was important, and so was the hand
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which the mesmerist employed, the distance of the hand from the body, or 
alternatively the degree of pressure exerted on it, as well as the movement’s quality. 
Each gesture was thought to affect the body of the sufferer in a precise way (43). And 
Mesmer’s programme for healing did not stop with gesture. Soon he realised that the 
body of the mesmerist was as important as the choreographed movements, for 
Mesmer found that he was able to move the imponderable fluid in a patient even 
without the use of magnets. The reason for this, he theorised, was that bodies 
themselves were more or less magnetic according to their health and power. Mesmer 
believed that his own imposing presence, due to the good circulation of imponderable 
fluid in his own body, enabled his own body to perform like a magnet: allowed him to 
move that fluid in other bodies. Yet at the moment that Mesmer relinquished the use 
of an outside agent and used his own unmediated body to effect his cures, he opened 
himself up wide to the attacks of the scientific community. For his treatment of 
patients provoked unruly and seemingly uncontrollable behaviour in them.
The Strange Case of Mademoiselle P. (1992) is Brain O’Doherty’s 
fictionalised version of Mesmer’s patient Maria Theresa Paradis, with whom Mesmer 
pursued an unconventional doctor-patient relationship which became the origin of the 
scandal which forced him to leave Vienna. O’Doherty, adapting freely from 
Mesmerism by Mesmer himself, (an English translation of Mesmer’s Mémoire sur la 
découverte du Magnétisme Animal (1948)), recounts that Maria Theresa was a blind 
pianist, and the daughter of a functionary at the court of the Empress Maria Theresa, 
after whom she was named in a courtier’s gesture, and from whom she received a 
generous annual pension on account of her affliction. Damton reminds us that 
Mesmer had not only to cure his patients, but to deal with other doctors to whom his 
methods posed a threat, in part because of their contrast to those of the conventional 
medicine of the time, which were often formidable if not downright lethal. The 
conventional arsenal of remedies, writes Damton, included: “purgatives, cauteries, 
resolutives, évacuants, humectants, vesicatories, and derivative, revulsive, and 
spoliative bleeding” (15). Since Mesmer’s treatment involved none of these 
disagreeable processes, should it prove successful with Maria Theresa, the authority 
and methods of traditional medicine stood to be placed in doubt. For that reason, a 
powerful faction within the medical community wanted to see Mesmer s treatment of 
Maria Theresa fail.
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O’Doherty’s novel tells how Mesmer’s highly controversial method involved 
removing the girl from the home of her mother and father and into the comfortable 
villa belonging to his wealthy wife where the Mesmer’s lived. His methods at first 
obtained good results: the girl’s vision seemed to be improving; but the partial 
recovery of her vision seemed also to have a negative influence on her piano playing. 
In From Mesmer to Freud: Magnetic Sleep and the Roots o f Psychological Healing, 
Adam Crabtree writes that these treatments involved the use of both music and 
mirrors. In a way that adumbrated V.S. Ramachandran’s research (2001) with the 
effect of mirrors on body schema, which Ramachandran found allowed him to relieve 
patients of the sensation of having a phantom limb, Mesmer’s methods made use of 
illusions created by mirrors in the attempt to restore Maria Theresa’s vision.
Mesmer was not given time to consolidate his patient’s improvements. Maria 
Theresa’s father demanded that she return home, and when she refused to do so, her 
defiance of paternal authority became another proof for her father that Mesmer was a 
bad influence on her. He intervened swiftly to remove her from Mesmer’s care, in 
doing so accusing Mesmer of immorality. Though Mesmer’s methods were strange, 
the motives of Maria Theresa’s father were also dubious, because if his daughter 
stood to regain her eyesight, she was also poised to lose her livelihood. Maria 
Theresa received offers of recitals in part because of the sensation she created as a 
blind musician; the annuity she received from her namesake was also given her 
because she was blind.
Once Mesmer stood accused of immorality by such a well-connected person 
as Maria Theresa’s father he could no longer practice in Vienna, and he left that city 
for Paris in 1778. But Mesmer’s methods, the reason why he left Vienna behind, 
continued to be controversial in his new place of work, and I am suggesting that they 
are the reason why Mesmer’s name has been all but struck from the history of 
medicine. These methods offended on two accounts. The first reason Mesmer’s 
methods could not be accepted within the scientific community of the time, as can be 
seen in the case of Maria Theresa Paradis, was that they adumbrated the question of 
transference, which would only be discovered and theorised by Freud and Breuer a 
century later.^ They suggested that medicine did not work through the medicines the
 ^The history is more complex that this, for Mesmer’s use of his own body posed a second difficulty. 
As Didier Anzieu remarks in U  Moi-Peau, once the phenomenon of transference had been recognised,
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doctor prescribes. Rather, cure was, as it were, in the hands of the ghost-body-as- 
marionette: it was a matter of relation, dependant upon the “rapport” the doctor could 
or could not establish with a patient, an ability that moreover was seen to be 
dependent upon the physical and moral health of the would-be mesmerist. The 
second reason, connected to the first, had to do with the way in which Mesmer 
performed, rather than practiced medicine. It required a certain bodily presence to be 
a mesmerist, Gauld writes. This was related to morphology, but also to the body’s 
degree of “vital force”, or magnetism (23). The medical community’s rejection of 
mesmerism may have been due to the fact that the bodily presence which mesmerism 
required to work seemed to exclude them for various reasons: it was immeasurable 
and, indeed, incommunicable. Damton writes that it was clear that Mesmer himself, 
though promising to reveal the secrets of his technique to those who studied with him, 
was in fact reluctant to do so.
In short, Mesmer’s medicine transformed doctors into dancers: the doctor’s 
own physical and moral stance influenced whether the gestures they made in space 
were powerful or ineffective. Conceptualising the doctor as a performer is one 
paradigm shift that continues to shock today, as can be seen in the vocabulary that 
both Damton and Jonathan Miller employ to write about Mesmer. Of mesmerism’s 
methods Damton writes: “Mesmer and his followers put on fascinating performances: 
they sat with their patient’s knees enclosed between their own and ran their fingers all 
over the patient’s body” (4). The mesmeric “passes” are not the only thing which 
comes under criticism for having been choreographed. For Damton, Mesmerists 
carefully staged the space in which their performances appeared. He writes:
Everything in Mesmer’s indoor clinic was designed to produce a 
crisis in the patient. Heavy carpets, weird, astrological wall 
decorations, and drawn curtains shut him off from the outside world 
and muffled the occasional words, screams, and bursts of hysterical 
laughter that broke the habitual heavy silence. (8 )
In his essay entitled “Going Unconscious”, Miller comments on Mesmer’s 
dress and demeanour in the same theatrical terms. For Miller, it seems clear that 
Mesmer was happy to project the image of a magus. He writes:
Freud stopped touching his patients, as though one could either touch the mind or the body, but not 
both at once.
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Clothed in a robe embroidered with Rosicrucian alchemical symbols, 
he stalked the darkened rooms to the accompaniment of a glass 
harmonica and actively encouraged his clients to luxuriate in their 
convulsive crises. By 1785 the whole enterprise had become 
melodramatically inconsistent with scientific professionalism and the 
scientific community did what it could to close him down. (7)
The second way that Mesmer’s methods offended was in producing 
unseemliness in the patient. For the most favourable outcome of the passes which the 
mesmerisist performed was when the patient reacted by falling into a convulsive 
trance. But not all crises took violent form, writes Damton:
Some developed into deep sleeps, and some sleeps provided 
communication with dead or distant spirits who sent messages by 
way of the fluid directly to the somnambulist’s intemal sixth sense.
(8)
What the state of somnambulism made apparent was that the subject had an interiority 
which it did not normally let appear, and that some considered indecent to show; or 
even that the subject forfeited subject-hood in the showing of this interiority. Miller 
writes that an important vector for the popularisation of mesmerism in England was 
John Elliotson, a close friend of Charles Dickens and of Wilkie Collins. Miller writes 
that Elliotson used his post as Chair of Medicine at University College, London, to 
allow mesmeric demonstrations to be conducted in his own wards at the College, an 
arrangement of which Miller writes, “it is difficult to imagine a more inappropriate 
setting” (9). In order to champion mesmerism, Elliotson needed to make his 
experiments in mesmerism public, allowing witnesses to substantiate his testimony. 
But the public nature of these events was also the unmaking of mesmerisms’ public 
credit. To the extent that Elliotson’s demonstations convinced a public of 
mesmerism’s curative powers, it also constituted a threat to current medical authority, 
which then sought to discredit the movement.
Again, it was the specular and spectacular nature of these demonstrations 
which provided the alibi for Elliotson’s critics. Under Elliotson’s care were the Okey 
sisters, who had been admitted to the hospital as convulsive hysterics, and who were 
particularly remarkable in their mesmeric demonstrations. When writing of the 
Okeys, Miller borrows the vocabulary of the theatre, characterising them as “the stars 
of the mesmeric cabaret” and notes that they acquired a “legendary reputation as 
spectacular trance subjects” (10). For Miller, the “scandalous high jinks” of the
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Okeys cannot have been genuine, precisely for the reason that their source was not 
their inner selves but rather the outer world. Miller writes that, before being admitted 
to the hospital, the sisters were already performers of sorts. They:
had already achieved considerable notoriety in a Pentacostal 
congregation in a nearby church where their glossolalic interventions 
had attracted admiring attention. The career of thee two women 
neatly illustrates the way in which the symptoms of serious 
personality disorder can be shaped and reshaped, depending on the 
social institution in which they manifest themselves. In a 
congregation which recognized and valued the notion of “speaking in 
tongues” the sisters modulated their conduct until they were 
recognizable as Pentacostal prophets, whereas in the wars of the 
newly converted professor of medicine their repertoire changed 
under the influence of Elliotson’s positive conditioning and they re- 
emerged as mesmeric shamans.(10-11)
Here, the fact that the world imposes first one shape and then another on a subjectivity 
is seen as proof positive of pathology in that subject. But one might equally describe 
this ability as a talent, albeit one extremely honed in the case of the Okey sisters, a 
talent by which the self adapts itself to its surroundings; whereas what is informing 
Miller’s censorious writing, and that of Damton, is the traditional cultural alignment 
by which depth equals tmth and surface equals lie. Such an alignment is put in 
question by the figure of the somnambulist, as it is by that of the dancer, for in both 
cases the actions of these figures seem to make present a deeper layer of their 
interiority and desires, while at the same time leaving the suspicion that those actions 
are perhaps not being taken through their own initiative.
Damton points out that the phenomenon of somnambulism was immensely 
popular despite, or perhaps because, it brought to the fore questions conceming 
human volition and its loss: these questions tumed into the sexual fantasies in the 
public. One of these fantasies was patently voyeuristic. The somnambulist was 
perceived to be in an intermediary state, in which he or she was dead to inhibition, yet 
simultaneously alive to desires which were about to be enacted—an intelligence of 
which the observer of the somnambulist was placed to know. The movement of the 
somnambulist seemed to appertain to, and emerge from, a deep self, which through 
the artificial paralysis of the will, was now made visible through its actions. Another 
theory refused to see the evidence of a deep self revealed by the phenomenon of 
somnambulism; its adherents were simultaneously prey to a more sadistic sexual
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fantasy. Those who held this theory contended that it was not the real will of the 
sleep-walker which was being spied, but rather that of the mesmerisist which was 
being projected on to the sleep-walker’s defenceless body. Here, indecency did not 
lie in the potentially improper desires that the sleep-walker would now not be able to 
dissimulate. Rather it sprang from unlimited power which the mesmerist putatively 
enjoyed over the sleep-walker. Hypnosis weakened the sleep-walker’s will, which 
allowed his or her automatic apparatus to be controlled by an extemal operator. The 
dangerous, corrupting power that the operator possessed, was an ability to command 
actions in the sleep-walker which he or she would not consent to in a waking state.
In Body Criticism: Imaging the Unseen in Enlightenment Medicine, Barbara 
Maria Stafford critiques eighteenth-century and nineteenth-century images which 
show the continuities between the innermost corporeal layers of the body, the body’s 
nervous anatomy, and the extemal forces which traverse the body’s many layers to act 
on its interiority. Stafford’s argument is that medical ideas emerging in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries about the body’s function attained prominence and 
legitimacy in part through the images produced by contemporary artists. These 
images both provided support for medical imagination and concretised findings. 
Stafford’s book includes such illustrations as Jacques Gautier Dagoty’s Nervous 
System (Plate 8) (402). What the beholder sees is a network of nerves in which the 
body’s contours are transparent, an imaging which perhaps suggests that sensation 
traverses the body’s boundaries, with the same ease as the beholder’s eye here 
penetrates to the interior body. Another image Stafford reproduces is Jean-Jacques 
Paulet’s Satire on Animal Magnetism (Plate 9) (452). What is depicted in Paulet’s 
painting is Mesmer treating a lady, and though the intent of the artist was satirical, 
what is striking is the way in which the artist images Mesmer’s imponderable fluid. 
Here what is imaged is the physician as marionettist: the fluid does not appear as a 
change in colour which might signal a gaseous substance or a liquid, but rather 
appears as strings which are capable of producing a tension in, and a traction on, the 
patient’s body. If mesmerism traversed the layers of the body’s physical boundaries 
and brought them into a moment of totalising coordination, it also traversed the 
body’s mental states and synthesised them. Stafford writes that for Mesmer the sleep­
walking of somnambulism:
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was not a negative condition, but far surpassed mundane 
wakefulness. It was the claivoyant and nervy state in which our 
intellectual faculties were not dormant but most keenly alert. The 
somnambulist was the paradigm of Kleist’s marionette, able to 
perform perfectly. (450)
The jump which Stafford makes between Mesmerism and Kleist’s marionette is 
rendered an appropriate one by the number of ways in which Kleist’s life was touched 
on by the somnambulism which was immensely popular at the time he was writing, 
and by the way in which somnambulism was reflected in the different forms of his 
literary production. In A History of Hypnotism, Gauld writes that mesmerism and 
somnambulism found a lineage in Germany in the philosophy of the time, known as 
"Naturphilosophie”, whose greatest exponent was Fredrich Wilhelm Schelling (1775- 
1854). Gauld writes that one of Schelling’s disciples was G.S. Schubert, who was a 
direct influence upon Kleist’s work and upon that of E.T.A. Hoffmann as well.
Kleist’s Imaging of the Vitalist Bodv: Somnambulist and Marionette
Kleist’s work equates the loss of individual volition and resignation with the 
moment of spiritual grace, and he figures this moment in his work in two ways. In his 
1811 drama. Prince Friedrich of Homburg, this loss of volition is manifested by the 
presentation of its eponymous protagonist as a sleep-walker. The curtain on Act One 
opens to reveal what is virtually a ballet. On the eve of a battle deciding the fate of 
the Prussian State, the hero is seen sleep-walking in a garden before the Imperial 
Court. His somnambulic form is watched in silence by the supreme authority of the 
State, the Elector, who is accompanied by his wife and their niece. Gestures reveal the 
secret ambitions of the prince’s inner-life, ambitions that are almost treasonous in 
their inflation. He mimes accepting a laurel wreath, signalling his desire for glory; he 
picks up a glove belonging to the princess and holds it to his lips, signalling that he 
contemplates marriage with her, a status that would also effectively make him the 
elector’s successor. At the end of the play the prince is seen in prison, where he has 
been incarcerated for disobeying the Elector’s orders, even though that disobedience 
has led to a victory on field of battle. At first, the prince rails against the Elector, but 
finally he accepts that it is not his own judgement that should govern his life; rather.
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that the rules which govern the polity should without obstruction traverse and regulate 
his own local actions.
A way Kleist’s drama has been read sees the plot as conceming the processes 
of teaching and learning. The Elector is a wise old man who places the prince in a 
situation in which he will come to learn how to bring his particular body in alignment 
with the social body. Kleist’s correspondence also suggests that he imagined the 
process of coming into identity as one in which the individual is linked into social 
stmctures. In a letter written in 1809 Kleist argued:
The world, the whole conglomeration of objects that stimulate the 
senses, holds and controls on myriad strings each new youngster 
starting out on life’s journey. Of these strings attached to his soul, 
his education is of course, perhaps even the most important and 
strongest. (Allan, 45)
Kleist here pictures direct fibres mnning from the outside world to the inner-most self, 
strings that are contiguous with the senses.
My concept of the ghost-body-as-marionette takes the body imagined in 
Heinrich von Kleist’s “Über das Marionettentheater” (“On the Marionette Theatre”) 
(1810) as its paradigm. Kleist’s essay imagines the Human as a passive body 
controlled from beyond its boundaries by a higher force, one that does not create the 
alienation of the self, but rather offers it its grace. The marionette-strings serve both 
to connect the body as an ensemble of moving parts and to keep it suspended in space.
I want to suggest that the strings represent the way in which Kleist images the nerves 
of the human body. For the nerves, just like the strings of the marionette, are what 
both create the wholeness of the body and demonstrate the body’s permeability—the 
body’s receptivity to forces which, along the conduits of the nerves, are able to 
traverse the body completely.
The nerves are the bodily structure which traverse all the layers of the human 
body, from depth to surface. Vitalistic science believed the intelligence of the body to 
reside in these nerves, in the complexity of their minute and multifarious pathways, 
which literally innervated the body’s deepest tissue, its “vital” organs. Yet vitalism 
also connected the surface of the body, and even what lay outside and beyond it, to 
the nerves, for the nerves were appreciated as regulating the sensitivity of the organs 
of perception to the outside world. Outside stimuli seemed to work upon the body’s 
very depths, and, vice versa, the body’s depths seemed to govern the irritability of
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its sense organs. Since nervous flow went in both directions, from outside in and from 
inside out, the locus of the body’s intelligence could not be isolated, nor could its 
effects be verified or made predictable. Kleist’s text figures the unknowability of the 
body’s complex workings as the “grace” which comes both to mean the Human’s 
harmonious involvement with a metaphysical world, with the divine forces which are 
outside the self; and, contradictorily, the self’s inner focus. I would like to suggest 
that what Kleist terms “grace” is the dancer’s acute awareness of all the factors, 
physical, material, or affective, which suspend him or herself in place and time and 
constitute his or her subjectivity, and, simultaneously, an ability to remain unalienated 
by these factors, but on the contrary, to exploit these factors in the creation of 
effortless movement.
“On the Marionette Theatre” is structured as a dialogue between a star dancer 
at a municipal theatre in an unnamed town in Germany, and an enthusiastic dance- 
goer who is surprised to find, by chance, in a park, the dancer whom he has admired 
onstage in a temple to high art, enjoying a performance of popular street theatre. 
When the balletomane addresses the dancer, and prepares to chide him gently for his 
low tastes, the dancer defends himself by averring that even the best dancers could 
take a lesson from the grace of these puppets. The narrator writes that the dancer:
emphatically remarked that a dancer who wished to develop himself 
could learn a number of things from them. (415)
The dancer continued to explain that the advantage the marionette had over living 
dancers was negative one, that its movement can never be mannered, or affected:
for affectation appears, as you know, when the soul (vis motrix) is 
found at any point other than the movement’s center of gravity. (417)
The dancer illustrates his theory that grace is constituted by an abandonment of 
control to outside forces with three examples, each of which figures grace 
paradoxically as the integrity of the self which is under threat from the outside world 
of experience and knowledge. The first concerns physical affliction: an old man who 
has lost a limb. Bodily deformity need not imply spiritual atrophy, for despite his 
handicap the old man dances in a sprightly fashion with his prosthesis. The second 
(negative) example concerns the threat of worldliness. A beautiful and graceful 
young man loses his innocence and agility, becomes stiff and wooden, in the moment 
that he becomes aware that his perfectly-proportioned body resembles a famous
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classical statue. The third example exemplifies the pitfalls of human intellect and 
intentionality. The dancer recounts that he was out-fenced by a captive bear, for this 
bear knew intuitively when the dancer’s lunges were in earnest and when they were 
feints. Kleist invents three examples which argue that grace resides in the spiritual 
wholeness of the subject, a wholeness which is imparted to it by those qualities which 
are least affiliated with the very art and intellection which are generally considered to 
constitute man’s humanity. The one-legged man is a figure of grace because he is 
simple and possesses a stout heart; the beautiful youth would be graceful had he more 
humility and less cleverness; the bear is graceful because his animal instincts have not 
been superseded by the higher cortical functions of human intelligence. At the same 
time, for Kleist, the wholeness of the subject, his bodily cohesion and self- 
consistency, is a metaphor for the oneness of Man and his Creator. For in naming 
awareness as that which takes grace away, Kleist is also rehearsing the Biblical myth 
of Man’s expulsion from the garden of Eden after eating fruit from the Tree of 
Knowledge.
From Popular Culture to Artistic Production
The figure of the ghost-body-as-marionette glided from the domains of 
medicine and popular culture and into artistic production with increasing frequency in 
the Romantic period. The ghost-body-as-clockwork embodies a relation of perfect 
harmony between form and content, in which the content is the form, a relationship 
which in literature has been implicated with the word “classical”. By contrast, the 
ghost-body-as-marionette stands for a relation of struggle between form and content 
in which form can never fully be adequate, will never do justice to content which is 
always somehow in excess, spilling over the boundaries of form and demanding new 
forms in which to express itself, a relation which has been implied by the term 
“Romantic”. In the analysis which I develop in the chapter which follows, I tease out 
certain of the themes contained in some of the works of literature, film, and dance that 
set themselves against the classicism of their different times, in order to show the way 
in which the ghost-body-as-manonette is alive in artistic creation in the late-twentieth 
and early-twenty-first centuries.
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Chapter 7 
The Vitalistic Marionette Body 
Goes Gothic, Romantic, and Post-Modern
By giving the vitalistic body form in Kleist’s marionette, I am arguing for the 
paradigmatic status of the body state he imagined. Yet Kleist’s imaging is merely one 
instantiation of a body that appeared in different forms in a long-lived movement in 
literature and art, one defined by its antithetical relationship to Western Culture’s 
dominant mechanistic understanding of the Human. While Kleist’s text stresses the 
way that human perception and psychology, here essentially metaphysical forces, 
work on it as powerfully as the undeniably physical force of gravity, other artistic 
instantiations of the vitalistic body, occurring within the Romantic and Gothic 
movements, within the genre of melodrama, and within the nineteenth century ‘novel 
of sensation’, give further and more emphatic attention to the body’s vital functions. 
In these instantiations the involuntary body has appeared in essentially negative 
stagings. Their plots devise situations in which the body loses its voluntary function, 
in order to highlight the continued and residual functioning of its involuntary ones; 
they abound in moments in which its heroes and heroines lose consciousness, so 
dramatising the life of the unconscious. Such plots make bodies suffer the 
abandonment of bodily (and especially inhibitory) control, in order to reveal the inner 
life of desire and the subtending drive of instinct. They scheme to place bodies in 
situations of claustration in cold crypts, or, in less extreme versions, seclusion in 
unhappy domestic settings or public institutions, both of which dramatise the vital 
energy that remains in these bodies, like ebbing blood, lingering heat, inextinguished 
light or hope.
Three Guises of the Ghost-Bodv-as-Marionette: Somnambulist. Fugitive. Still-FBut- 
A1 Live Body
What I am describing as vitalistically inspired artistic production, alternate 
incarnations of the ghost-body-as-marionette, assumes three main guises, each of 
which is characterised by a different movement quality. One guise of the ghost-body- 
as-marionette is that of the Somnambulist, a figure which is imagined moving in a 
slow continuous glide. Another guise of the marionette ghost is the Fugitive, a figure 
finally delivered to its instincts to fight or flight. The last of the three guises is one I 
call the “Still-[but-A] Live” body. Here the body does not move at all. This body, 
conceived of as perfectly beautiful in its immobility, brings the questions of what 
constitutes life and death into a fine focus, and trains the spectator to attend to a 
different scale of movement. Movement in the Still-[but-A] Live body does not 
consist in locomotion, but rather in homeostatic operations. The flow of blood in the 
body’s veins may be glimpsed through the flush or pallor, and heat or chill, of the 
skin. All three of these guises focus the attention of the reader or spectator on the 
effect of emotion on the body’s autonomic, vegetative, and reflex systems. The three 
guises of the ghost-body-as-marionette may be portioned out between different 
characters within a work; more often, however, it is the same character who 
successively inhabits these different body states, passing from one to another like 
notes in a scale.
The three guises of the ghost-body-as-marionette constitute different phases of 
a body’s reactions to an excessive event. The body becomes a Fugitive in the struggle 
to flee the excessive sensation, or give vent to unbearable emotion; it becomes a 
Somnambulist when it has not been able to flee these sensations, and has been 
rendered numb by its strength; is left a Still-[But-A] Live body when the functioning 
of its systems have been overwhelmed by paroxysms or convulsions. These events 
are the stock-in-trade of the genres of the Gothic novel, melodrama, and the Victorian 
sensation novel. In The Gothic Fred Dotting defines the genre as the writing of excess, 
whose features include “mysterious incidents, horrible images and life-threatening 
pursuits ”, and in which the imagination and emotional effects exceed reason and 
produce emotional effects on its readers (2). In The Melodramatic Imagination Peter
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Brooks writes of the genre of melodrama as always reaching towards the too much, 
the extremes of pain and anguish, in a desire to “express all” (34-35). In D.A. 
Miller’s essay ''Cage aux folks: Sensation and Gender in Wilkie Collins’s The 
Woman in White” the author prefaces his critique of Collins’s novel with some 
general comments about the Victorian sensation novel. He writes that it:
Address [es] itself primarily to the sympathetic nervous system, 
where it grounds its characteristic adrenalin effects: accelerated
heart rate and respiration, increased blood-pressure, the pallor 
resulting from vasoconstriction, etc. (107)
For Miller, the sensation novel “renders our reading bodies, neither fighting nor 
fleeing, theatres of neurasthenia” (107). These genres, which are extreme forms of 
the larger movement of Romanticism, share another characteristic: the way in which 
they create binary opposites out of the relationship between the body and language. 
As Miller puts it: “sensation is felt to occupy a natural site entirely outside of 
meaning, as though in the breathless body signification expired” (108).
The appearance of the ghost-body-as-marionette in its different guises both 
anticipates Kleist’s 1814 text and continues to manifest itself today. Perhaps the first 
appearance of the ghost-body-as-marionette forms part of the role of Lady Macbeth in 
William Shakespeare’s “Scottish play” (1606). In “Shakespeare’s Use of Verse and 
Prose” Walter Morris Hart argues that in Act 5, scene 1, where the sleepwalking 
figure of Lady Macbeth appears, Shakespeare’s juxtaposition of the two kinds of 
language creates an effect of incoherence. Yet 1 would like to stress that here there 
are more than just the forms of expression, prose and verse, which Hart underlines. 
For Lady Macbeth’s body-state and gestures are two further signifying practices. In 
The Playerk Passion Joseph Roach notes that, for Denis Diderot, Lady Macbeth’s 
body seemed so eloquent as she slowly traversed the stage and mimed the washing of 
her hands that he celebrated the scene as “one of those sublime moments in which 
gesture triumphs over discourse” (145). Roach speculates that Diderot’s comments on 
the power of “tableaux” which appear in his Entretiens sur le fils naturel (1748) were 
sparked by watching French actresses, perhaps Marie Dorval, around the time of the 
essay’s writing. Later in England, Sheridan Knowles left testimony about what it was 
like to be in the audience watching Mrs. Siddons s 1785 interpretation of the 
sleepwalking scene. He writes:
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Though pit, gallery and boxes were crowded to suffocation, the chill 
of the grave seemed about you while you looked on her; there was 
the hush and damp of the charnel house at midnight, you had a 
feeling as if you and the medical doctor, and lady-in-waiting, were 
alone with her; your flesh crept and your breathing became wheasy.
(cited in Bartholomeusz 120)
What could be described as Siddons’s “Gothic” Lady Macbeth represented a clear 
departure from previous conventions. According to her biographer Yvonne French, 
Siddons had done research for the sleepwalking scene, observing somnambulists in 
real life (222). Theatre scholar Dennis Bartholomeusz implies that Siddons’ departure 
from convention in this scene lay in the tonicity of her body, which displayed unusual 
energy and vigour, stressing the “hideous realities of the dream” more than the fact of 
dreaming (119). French also writes that Siddons was at the origin of changes in Lady 
Macbeth’s costume. Before her interpretation Lady Macbeth had been richly dressed 
in colours when she appeared in the sleepwalking scene; Siddons dressed herself in 
simple white satin that suggested madness to contemporary audiences, which was 
then further modified to “shroud-like” white (38-39). Later, another famous actress, 
Sarah Bernhardt, made further innovations which brought her interpretation into 
alignment with her own times. Bartholomeusz qualifies her 1884 performance of the 
sleepwalking scene, occurring at the moment when Charcot’s hysterics were making 
sensation in the medical theatres of Paris’s la Salpêtrière, as “violent and hysterical”. 
Meanwhile, what was sensational on the Châtelet stage was Bernhardt’s playing of 
the scene with bare feet, a detail at once titillating for the time and one which insisted 
on Lady Macbeth’s madness (120).
It is important to consider the role which the figure of the sleepwalking Lady 
Macbeth plays in the plot of Shakespeare’s play. Before the scene, Macbeth is 
energetic, scheming and sanguine about the future. But the sleepwalker appears to the 
audience as proof that what is now being witnessed are the actions of a hidden, 
deeper, truer, and more powerful force. Shakespeare leaves it ambiguous whether her 
state is caused by internal forces or external ones, though this very distinction is one 
that the seventeenth century imagination would not yet have made in quite those 
terms. Yet it is through the stage action of the sleepwalking scene that Shakespeare 
shows the failure of the ideal of human agency. The scene reveals the self as 
powerless to shape its destiny. In her sleeping state Lady Macbeth is delivered into a
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realm where the past—in the form of her memories of her evil deeds—undoes the 
future, renders void the decisive actions she has taken to realise her ambitions. 
Moreover, her passage sets the stage for Macbeth’s most famous lines, and which 
show his loss of faith in human striving (which occur three scenes later):
MACBETH
And all our yesterdays have lighted fools 
The way to dusty death. Out, out brief candle.
Life’s but a walking shadow, a poor player 
That struts and frets his hour upon the stage.
And then is heard no more. It is a tale 
Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury 
Signifying nothing. (5.5.20-29)
The Ghost-Bodv-as-Marionette in the Gothic
The supernatural figure of the Somnambulist foreshadows the return of natural
order in Macbeth', in the Romantic and Gothic periods, which are of more immediate
relevance to the present inquiry, the figure is the harbinger of a return to man-made
law. In Matthew Lewis’s The Monk (1794), the somnambulist is imagined, not as a
living woman, but as a ghost which walks the night in her white habits. As if through
the very textuality of his novel, Lewis attempts to create the layering of the human
body, of which the vital functions are the deepest; here the story of the “Bleeding
Nun” (as the ghost is called) is embedded deep within the narrative, as a “tale within
the tale” in the novel’s subplot, and situated historically far anterior to the novel’s
main time of action. Neither does the nun appear straight away in her own body.
Rather, one hundred years after her death, Agnes, a direct descendant who has been
occupying herself with sketching in the fashion of accomplished eighteenth-century
young ladies, draws a picture of the ghost. Her admirer, Don Raymond, sifting
through the sketches she has completed, is struck by this particular one. Layers of
testimony and time-past veil the ghost for the reader too, for the glimpse he or she
gets of it is filtered through Don Raymond’s eyes, as he recounts his story long
afterwards. Don Raymond remembers the ghost as:
A Female of more that human stature, clothed in the habit of some 
religious order. Her face was veiled; on her arm hung a chaplet of
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beads; Her dress was in several places stained with the blood which 
trickled from a wound upon her bosom. In one hand She held a 
Lamp, in the other a large Knife, and she seemed advancing towards 
the iron gates of the Hall. (139)
Stunned by this figure, Don Raymond asks Agnes what has inspired it. She assures 
him that it is not a product of her own imagination: she has merely illustrated a 
popular legend. When Don Raymond is still curious, Agnes tells him that although 
she does not believe in such superstition, her elders are convinced there is a ghost 
which appears on the fifth of May of every fifth year, which emerges out of a room in 
the castle that has always been shut up, descends the staircase, crosses the hall, and 
leaves the castle.
The same superstition which makes her guardians believe in the ghost, keeps 
Don Raymond and Agnes from marrying, for as payment for a prayer granted before 
her birth, Agnes has been promised to a convent. And so when Agnes is brought to 
remember that, out of respect for the apparition, the porter leaves the castle gates open 
on that date, she sees how this door left open can be the device through which she can 
elope. Agnes plans to dress herself in the habit of a nun, to exit from the castle under 
this disguise, and to meet Don Raymond on the other side of its portal. On the fifth of 
May, Don Raymond is accordingly waiting at the castle portal, where he greets his 
ladylove, a veiled female figure who glides silently towards him with a lamp in her 
hand.
When Don Raymond realises that the somnambulist is not Agnes but the
Ghost herself, he is turned into a Still-[But-A] Live Body. Transported beyond the
jurisdiction of language, filled “with horror too great to be described” (160), Don
Raymond is simultaneously delivered into a realm where he becomes sensible of the
vital workings of his body:
My blood was frozen in my veins. 1 would have called for aid, but 
the sound expired ere it could pass my lips. My nerves were bound 
up in impotence, and 1 remained in the same attitude as inanimate as 
a Statue . . . breathless with fear. (160)
The Monk celebrates not only the successful re-emergence of the ghost, but 
also the multiple ways in which human art conveys that re-emergence. In The Monk, 
legend stands for ways of knowing that are ancient and popular, ones which stand in 
opposition to Enlightenment science, and which science disparages with the
147
appellation “superstition”. Lewis’s novel describes and enacts the power of legend, 
story, and artistic representation in order to bring the past into the present once again.
Yet even as the spirits of old stories arouse Lewis’s imagination and inspire 
his tale. The Monk also punishes the indefatigable ability of these spirits to arise from 
the legends which feature them; or, seen negatively, their inability to be permanently 
contained by them. For in The Monk roaming spirits (as seen in the figure not only of 
the Bleeding Nun but also in that of the Wandering Jew) are dangerous as well as 
fascinating. Lewis shows the simultaneous fascination and danger of the free-moving 
spirit, by making Agnes the double of the Bleeding Nun. Agnes, like her ancestor, is 
a spirit reluctant to stay in her destined place. Just as her ancestor’s spirit wanders 
from her unsatisfactory grave, so Agnes’s spirit wanders from her sequestered 
domesticity. Through her imaginative activity of drawing, Agnes visits other times 
and places, roaming the world in fantasy. The processes of imagination, desiring 
fantasy and ambition, are conflated and seen as sexual desire in The Monk, where Don 
Raymond’s desire for Agnes is roundly punished by his virtual rape by the ghost who 
takes Agnes’s place. The doubling of the figure of Agnes with the Bleeding Nun is 
made evident when Don Raymond embraces the one for the other on the occasion of 
her failed elopement, and again during his nightmare, as he is accosted horrifically by 
one and the other in turn. Thus Lewis shows the dangerous perfidy of the desiring 
fantasy, for the desire which has led Don Raymond to attempt winning the heart of 
Agnes, involves him in a violent reversal. Suddenly it is he who has become the 
impotent object of an engulfing vampiric love, as manifested in the Bleeding Nun’s 
blood-stained habit.
The Monk, though celebrating the Somnambulist, the Fugitive, and the Still 
[But-A-] Live Body, believes that the end of these dangerous free spirits is to be 
firmly fixed in their bodies through violent means. In the sub-plot, the spirit belonging 
to Agnes’s living body stops being able to roam when the severity of the punishment 
she endures, imprisoned in a cloister, makes her lose her mind. The spirit of the 
Bleeding Nun is brought to final rest in her dead body, through the efforts of an 
exorcist and the ritual of burial. In the main plot, the spiritual pride and ambition of 
Ambrosio, the eponymous monk, entails his fall into lechery, a separation of body and 
mind from the righteous path; which is repaired at the end of the novel only by his
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death-as-transfixion, a horrible event which involves his impalement upon a 
mountain-top.
The Ghost-Bodv-as-Marionette in the Romantic Ballet
The nocturnal walker of legend that appears in Lewis’s novel presents several 
characteristics that continue to feed into the Victorian Sensation novel, such as Wilkie 
Collins’s The Woman in White (1860) and the Victorian Gothic novel, such as Bram 
Stoker’s Dracula (1897) as well as the Romantic ballet Giselle (1841). Yet Giselle is 
hardly ever critiqued in relation to such works of literature. In The Ballet Called 
Giselle, Cyril W. Beaumount traces the lineage of Giselle to Meyerbeer’s five-act 
opera Robert le Diable (1831) by remarking on the similarities between their 
scenarios and props. In Robert le Diable, Duke Robert visits the ruined abbey of St. 
Rosalie and by means of a mystic branch acquired through a pact with the devil 
summons the ghosts of the debauched nuns from their tombs. Beaumount suggests 
that Myrta’s mystic branch, and the scene in which she uses it to awaken the souls of 
the wills in the forest clearing, are the ballet’s heritage from the Meyerbeer’s Opera 
(albeit one that has passed through an intermediary stage, the ballet La Sylphide 
(1832)).^ Yet the branch, the pact, and the scene in the tomb, and indeed debauched 
nuns—all appear in Lewis’s The Monk (1794), about which Beaumount either is silent 
or ignorant.
The ancestry which Beaumount prefers for Giselle is Heinrich Heine’s poem 
De U Allemagne, which Théophile Gautier claims as his inspiration for the ballet. But 
Beaumount also suggests that the picture of the female group of wills, all prettiness in 
Heine’s poem and in Gautier’s idea for Giselle, had a more sinister representation in 
its ancestor of Slavonic legend, in which the vili were a species of vampire. 
Significantly, the dangerous sexuality that is suggested in the Slavonic legend and 
which is explicit in Lewis’s late-eighteenth-century Gothic literary text is evacuated 
from the fabric of the mid-nineteenth century romantic ballet.
*Marie Taglioni, who had her first success dancing the role of the ghostly Abbess in the Opera, 
apparently made a great impression on the tenor, Adolphe Nourrit, present onstage with her during the 
scene, for not long afterwards he wrote the scenario for the ballet for which she is best 
known.(Beaumount 13)
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The evacuation of sexuality’s danger takes form as an embedding of the image 
of the Somnambulist within a palliative plot, as Sally Banes briefly suggests in 
Dancing Women (29). Beaumount recounts that Gautier originally had thought of 
making it a one-act ballet. He imagined: a “beautiful ballroom belonging to some 
prince” to which the wilis are attracted by the joy of dancing in a room “glittering 
with crystal and gliding”. The queen of the wilis would enchant the floor to fill the 
dancers’ feet with an insatiable desire to dance. A young girl, Giselle, who would 
have danced the whole evening, would, at dawn, be surprised when the queen of the 
wilis, “invisible to all, would have laid her icy hand upon her heart” (20). Banes 
reminds us that the theme of “dancing is often a metaphor for libidinous sexuality” 
(33). And it seems that for Gautier, his original imagined dramatic structure did not 
adequately frame its theme. Rather, Beaumount recounts, it had to be developed into 
an “ordered drama, with its introduction, plot, and climax”(20). An alibi for the 
spectacle of gloriously free movement needed to be found, and that alibi that was 
indeed found three days later by the librettist Vemoy de Saint-George, whose aid 
Gautier has enlisted. Beaumount recounts that in the notice of Giselle's première, 
Gautier concludes his account of the first act with the words: “There my dear Heine, 
that is the story invented by M. de Saint-Georges to bring about the pretty death we 
needed” (21).
If we reflect that in the twentieth century, George Balanchine’s La Valse 
would feature just such a one-act scenario as Gautier had outlined, involving a 
ballroom and the death of the principal female dancer at its end, one can see that the 
“ordered drama” in which Gautier thought it necessary to embed his idea was not 
required. Rather, I am suggesting, the ordered drama served to domesticate the vital 
energies embodied in the ghost-body-as-marionette, a domestication indeed 
emblematic of nineteenth-century literature featuring the Somnambulist, which can 
also trace its lineage to The Monk. The late eighteenth-century Gothic novel 
celebrated both the powerful eroticism and the violent death of the protagonist. By 
contrast, nineteenth-century works, in which examples of the ghost appear, are keen 
to create strategies in which life-promoting erotic acts and life-threatening deathly 
ones do not happen to the same bodies. A favoured ploy by which this was achieved 
was through the doubling of its female heroine. This doubling permits the plot to 
divide good from bad, and to mete them out accordingly to its two heroines. Positive,
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life-serving attributes collect in the figure of one heroine, whom the plot saves; 
negative, destructive, but fascinating attributes condense in the figure of her alter-ego, 
whom it kills. This doubling, which occurs in The Woman in White and in Dracula, 
as well as in Giselle, nevertheless follows a different grammar in the works of 
literature than in the ballet, and therefore I analyse the way that doubling appears in 
each.
The Deadening of Death: The Bodv’s Paler. Fainter Shadow. Copv. or Double in The 
Woman in White. Dracula, and Giselle
Fred Kaplan remarks that by the middle of the nineteenth century “an 
avalanche of claims, discussions, and accusations . . . created a public consciousness 
about the phenomenon that made the phenomenon and terminology of mesmerism 
part of the air that Victorians breathed” (25). Published in 1860, Wilkie Collins’s The 
Woman in White was both caught up in public perceptions and contributes to them, 
for it is generally held to be autographically inspired by Collins’s fascination for a 
mesmerised woman. In the introduction to the Penguin Classics edition of The 
Woman in White, Julian Symons quotes from a story that the painter Sir John Everett 
Millais told to his son, and was recorded in his biography. Millais, who had been to 
dinner at the Collins’ family home, was walked back to his own house by Wilkie and 
his brother. Just off the Finchley Road, their party heard a scream emanate from the 
garden of a nearby villa. Symons quotes:
The iron gate leading to the garden was dashed open, and from it 
came the figure of a young and very beautiful woman dressed in 
flowing white robes that shone in the moonlight. She seemed to float 
rather than to run in their direction, and, on coming up to the three 
men, she paused for a moment in an attitude of supplication and 
terror. (11)
Powerfully intrigued, Collins ran after the woman, Caroline Graves, who later 
became his mistress. Symons quotes from another authority to account for Graves s 
presence, according to which she had been kept a prisoner in the villa for several 
months, “by a captor who employed both threats of violence and mesmeric powers
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(11). Symons makes a point of telling this story, as I am doing here, because Collins 
recreates it almost exactly at the beginning of The Woman in White. In the novel, the 
painting master Walter Hartright, is walking home late at night, when in the middle of 
the lonely high road the unexpected occurs. Walter avers that “every drop of blood in 
my body was brought to a stop by the touch of a hand laid lightly and suddenly on my 
shoulder from behind me” (47). He turns and sees “the figure of a solitary Woman, 
dressed from head to foot in white garments”; a damsel in distress who extracts his 
promise to help her (47). Walter helps the eerie Fugitive escape, but even as he does 
so he wonders whether his actions are justifiable:
What had I done? Assisted the victim of the most horrible of false 
imprisonments to escape; or cast loose on the wide world of London 
an unfortunate creature, whose actions it was my duty, and every 
man’s duty, mercifully to control? (55)
Walter’s action, which aims to aid the Fugitive to glide away into the night, to vanish, 
and to elude her pursuers, is the primal scene of the novel, in that here occurs the 
wrong which it takes the rest of the story to right. For the novel is about making sure 
that its white gliding women, who gain their evocative power only in so far as they 
appear as the last free moments of spirit before it is contained in a restraining social 
body, can no longer move freely.
As if to prove this, a few days later Walter sees again the figure of the woman 
in white, but without being moved by the sight, for she appears within the cosseted 
identity of his pupil Laura Fairlie, the young Lady of Limmeridge House, where he 
now has a new and well-paid situation as her drawing instructor. Walter looks out of 
the window into the garden, at the white-clad Laura, and only then realises that she 
and Anne are look-alikes.^ Here Walter is not fascinated by Laura, for the comfortable 
circumstances of her life imply there is something lacking about her. The novel is 
required to turn her into a Fugitive in earnest, by marrying her off to the wicked Sir 
Percival Clyde, before Walter will find Laura truly arresting.
Laura Fairlie becomes Lady Clyde, but the single position is also attributed to 
two other women. If the ritual of matrimony avers that Laura is Clyde s woman.
Symons records that this authority was Dickens’ daughter, Kate Perugini, in Dickens and Daughter, 
y Gladys Storey.
The girls are actually half-sisters, for Anne 
'atherick, and the novel does not fail to refli 
of the father being visited upon the children.
b  r - • u
 ^ he girls are actually half-sisters, for nne is the illegitimate child bom to Mr. Fairlie by Mrs 
Catherick, and the novel does not fail to reflect (575) that the afflictions both girls endure are the sms
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common gossip has coupled him with Mrs. Catherick; while, later, the world-at-large 
refers to Anne as Lady Clyde (in accordance with the plot to substitute her for Laura, 
by which Clyde hopes to gain control over the latter’s money). But Percival’s ladies 
are prevented from moving: the first by her false confinement in an Asylum, the 
second by her self-immurement in respectability, the third by interment in a falsely 
marked grave. What arrests the body, making it no-longer glide/Clyde, is writing. 
Letters, testimony, certificates, and engravings, proclaim that the real Lady Clyde is 
dead, and this documentation has more weight than Laura’s living body, for even 
when Laura’s uncle sees her he refuses to believe she is not Anne. And Collins re­
emphasises the power of the word over the body, by re-constructing Laura’s identity 
by the same method, making it possible only through the written confession of Fosco, 
the late Sir Clyde’s conspirator. Yet all of this writing on paper is necessary because, 
with a stroke of his pen, Collins has erased the trace that is integral to and proper to 
the body. As Miller points out, “an English translation from a French translation of 
the novel might be entitled, precisely. The Woman as Blank” (124). If Laura cannot 
convince her uncle she is herself, this is because Collins wipes her memory, making it 
a hXdiVklblanc as a result of her traumatic experiences. Walter exclaims: “examine her 
privately, or examine her publicly, she is utterly incapable of assisting the assertion of 
her own case” (580).
The strategy of doubling the woman in white permits Collins to distinguish 
between harmful and benign qualities of the feminine and to concentrate one quality 
in each of two different women. The character of Anne is allotted the fascinating and 
disturbing attributes, yet the novel may hope to destroy these when it kills her off, just 
as Giselle is killed off—significantly—of a weak heart. Meanwhile, positive 
feminine characteristics are trained in the character of Laura through the novel s hard 
schooling. It takes brutalisation in an unhappy marriage, and sequestration in an 
asylum, before Laura’s “Heart [is] right”, is fit, now that she is a far paler version of
herself, to become Walter’s wife.
The strategy of doubling the female heroine, which makes it possible to kill 
off the bad and preserve the good, is an important one in Bram Stoker s Dracula 
(1894), a novel which makes doubles of its two somnambulic heroines. Described as 
sisters, Lucy and Mina are more closely identified with one another because they are 
also loved in turn by the same group of men. As Stoker imagines the character of
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Lucy, the problem with woman is that she represents the dangerous fluidity of desire. 
Lucy, in love with Arthur, is made so beautiful by her feeling for him, that his two 
best friends fall in love with her too, and each asks for her hand, making her receive 
three proposals of marriage on the same day. Her heart made tender by her love for 
Arthur, Lucy is simultaneously made sympathetic to the feeling of the suitors whose 
hopes she must disappoint. Recognising the truth of their hearts, Lucy writes a letter 
to Mina, in which she asks: “Why can’t they let a girl marry three men, or as many as 
want her?” (59). Given that in Victorian England a prostitute was the only kind of 
woman who (openly) had men in the plural. Stoker here imagines a scenario in which 
warm affection is dangerously corruptive, in that with chilling ease it turns virgin into 
whore.
The first half of Stoker’s novel concentrates upon Lucy’s ultra-feminine body, 
which is finally killed ritually by the same men who proposed marriage to her. Its 
second half, in one way is a repetition of the first, in that it involves the same men in 
collective devotion to and an attempt to save Lucy’s friend Mina. But if Mina is 
saved while Lucy dies, this is because of their different relations to somnambulism, to 
gender and to writing. Both women walk to Dracula in their sleep, but whereas Lucy’s 
somnambulism is something to which she is naturally susceptible, conveying her 
burgeoning and irrepressible sexuality, the novel insists that the somnambulic state 
needs to be induced in Mina by the expert hypnotist that Dracula is, implying that 
Mina’s sexual desire is responsive rather than originary. The paling of female desire 
is part of the process by which the novel androgynises Mina. Whereas Lucy is 
celebrated as archetypically feminine; Mina, Van Helsing’s proclaims, is “that so 
good combination” who has a “man’s brain—a brain that a man should have were he 
much gifted—and woman’s heart” (234-235).
The principal way in which the novel androgynises Mina is through her 
metonymic and imitative relationships to mechanised, masculine writing. On the one 
hand, Mina is presented as a carbon-copy of Lucy, upon whose body passion is 
printed less clearly. Her body blots the marks of passion, whereas they come down as 
the death sentence upon Lucy’s accommodating flesh. On the other hand, Mina s 
masculine identification through her activity of scientific recording allows her to 
create a carbon-copy of Dracula’s movements, but one which functions in the 
narrative as though it were a second version of herself. The body of writing Mina
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produces is what stands in the place of her own fleshly body, which allows it to 
escape the erotic vengeance meted out by the narrative. For if in the first half of the 
narrative Lucy’s fleshly body provides the site where the novel’s three men will 
engage in acts of eroticism and violence, in the second half it is Mina’s manuscript 
which reveals an inner logic in Dracula’s movements which allows them to be 
predicted, and for the plot’s pattern of eroticism and violence to be out-plotted.
In the Gothic, death is horrible if powerful, whereas in Giselle it is weakened 
because it is aetheticised. This is not the only reason why this ballet is not often 
considered a vampire story."^  The doubling in the ballet further obscures the 
connections between the danced tale and the legend. In The Woman in White and in 
Dracula the female heroine is doubled, in the respective duos of Anne and Laura, and 
Lucy and Mina, but in terms of the energy of the narrative it is the former of the 
names within these pairs which remain the most powerful. In The Woman in White, 
Anne Catherick remains enigmatically attractive, while Laura, with the same features, 
is considered by Walter to be lacking this attraction; in Dracula, Lucy, who dies and 
returns as a vampire only to be ritually killed again, is thrillingly feminine, while 
Mina who survives in the novel is seen as having muted sexual appeal.
In the doubling that occurs in Giselle, the vampiric qualities are collected in 
one of the respective pair of female doubles, but the seductive qualities are given to 
another. Giselle’s character is re-doubled by that of Myrta (and further multiplied in 
the homogeneity of the corps de ballet), but Myrta is cold and imposing rather than 
fascinatingly vulnerable as were Anne Catherick in The Woman in White and Lucy in 
Dracula. These twists in the plot are the way in which the ballet hopes to lessen, and 
thus keep in proportion, the powerful appeal of the Somnambulist s movement, the 
floating apparitions of the female corps de ballet which the second act glorifies, and 
the whole ballet exists to stage.
'  By contrast, one could categorise Jerome Robbins’s The Cage (1951 ) as an instantiation o f GrieUe, 
one that brings back its originai vampiric connotations by re-casting the corps de ballet o f wills as
insects who feed upon their mates after coitus.
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Repetition in the Nineteenth-Centurv Works
A further way in which the romantic ballet Giselle and the nineteenth-century 
novel sought through their plots to palliate their subject matter, was through the 
device of repetition. Indeed, the doubling of the female heroine is connected to 
repetition in that the action that leads to one heroine’s death, in The Woman in White 
and Dracula, is the ground that is gone over again to arrive at its other heroine’s new 
incarnation as a tamed spirit. As Peter Brooks argues in Reading For the Plot, 
narrative repetition or “going over” is part of the process of mourning, of “getting 
over”. With this in mind one can see that the second act of Giselle is both repetition 
and inversion of its first act, both the way in which Albrecht relives his love for 
Giselle, but also, that which enables him to move past her death. In the first act, 
Albrecht arrives on scene and calls Giselle forth from her house. Giselle’s mother, a 
female figure of authority, fails in an attempt to avert death brought about by frenzied 
dancing. Giselle dies in an access of emotion. In the second act, Albrecht’s arrival 
onstage again brings Giselle from her abode to dance with him. Again the strenuous 
physical activity of dancing is a danger to life, although importantly it is now the male 
characters, Albrecht and his double Hilarion, who are forced to dance frenziedly. One 
more female authority, in the figure of Myrta, Giselle’s ghostly mother (since it is 
through the power of her magic myrtle branch, inherited from The Monk via Robert 
Le Diable, that Giselle is reborn in death) is thwarted. For Albrecht lives on, having 
expiated part of his crime in repeating the moves of his dance with Giselle.
If there is repetition at the level of the plot in Giselle, this also occurs at the 
level of its danced movement, where it structures another kind of getting over , this 
time for the audience. Realising that she has been betrayed by Albrecht, Giselle 
attempts to understand what has gone wrong by rehearsing their story both in her head 
and with her body. Reliving the stages of their love, Giselle literally re-members it: 
repeats the exact steps of the choreography she once danced arm and arm with 
Albrecht. But that process of mourning fails. For when Albrecht sees her moving in 
the steps of their dance, he attempts to join her, offering her the arm through which 
she only recently interlaced her own. Giselle, however, continues her dance unseeing 
without him. Yet the failure of Giselle’s repetition to allow her to get over Albrecht s
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betrayal structures a successful acceptance at another level, that of the spectator. The 
choreography that the audience can recognise as unsuccessful mourning allows the 
audience to perceive that Giselle has lost her mind and spirit, and this is what prepares 
them to accept the probability—indeed the suitability—of her death.
Late Twentieth-Centurv Incarnations
The same fascination with the passive body-of-abandon that I am calling the 
‘ghost-body-as-marionette’ has appeared in late-twentieth-century art, cinema, 
literature, theatre, and dance. Yet when it has done so, it has not always been 
governed by the same narrative strategies as accompanied it in the nineteenth-century 
novel. The ghost-body-as-marionette could be seen par excellence, in its guise as the 
Still-[But-A] Live Body, in the joint exhibition of Cornelia Parker and Tilda Swinton 
that appeared in London’s Serpentine Gallery in 1995. Called The Maybe, this 
performance piece presented a series of objects exposed in glass cases. Among other 
interesting artefacts, such as one of Winston Churchill’s half-smoked cigars, and 
Charles Dickens’s last pen, was the sleeping body of Swinton herself, which as one 
critic remarked, was “Snow White, Sleeping Beauty, museum exhibit and specimen in 
one” (Gale).
In the cinema the ghost-body-as-marionette has been present in Crouching 
Tiger, Hidden Dragon (2000), where the strong will and ambition of the young 
female warrior is contrasted with the relaxed and seemingly passive movement of the 
mature master. Bodies bound impossibly up walls, fly and hover in air balanced on 
the slender branches of swaying trees. Yet helped by invisible strings they do so in a 
seemingly effortless way that allows the audience mimetically to entertain a similar 
abandonment of effort. In literature, as I have analysed in Chapter 1, Manuel Puig s 
Kiss o f the Spider Woman (1976) re-figures the marionette’s strings that keep the self 
suspended in the world, by casting them horrifically as the fibres that the self weaves 
out of his or her own monstrous, spider-like body. In the theatre, in 1999 Ariane 
Mnouchkine’s Théâtre du Soleil mounted Hélène Cixous Tambours sur la digue, sous 
forme de pièce ancienne pour marionettes jouées par des acteurs. Cixous s piece was 
inspired by the practices of Japanese Bunraku, in which the puppet-masters are
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present onstage as they manipulate their marionettes; but, clad in black which blends 
in with the back-drop, they are also simultaneously effaced form view. Mnouchkine’s 
staging adapted this tradition by using real actors in the place of marionettes. Here 
each character was in fact a duo created by two actors: one who incorporated the face 
that was given to the audience, and remained perfectly passive, the other who was 
hidden exactly behind the other, from where he or she moved the other’s limbs as 
though the other were a marionette.
In dance, the ballet Giselle has continued to be performed in its traditional 
version in ballet theatres around the world, and has inspired Mats Eks 1982 revision 
of the ballet. Yet Ek’s version radically changes the body-state of the Somnambulist, 
the one element which inspired Gautier to create the ballet and to commission the plot 
to justify it. It is because Ek’s Giselle discards the somnambulic body (even as he re­
uses the ballet’s title, plot and music) that I am not considering it as a current of 
“revisionist” dance criticism would, as a version of Giselle; while by contrast I am 
arguing that Pina Bausch’s Café Müller can be seen as a contemporary version of 
Giselle because it preserves the body-state of somnambulism.
Choreographed in 1978, Café Müller was created at a moment when Bausch 
was struggling to gain acceptance for her new hybrid form of dance and theatre.^ 
Bausch was encountering resistance not only from the theatre’s management but also 
from many of the dancers: this is the reason why the cast of Café Müller is atypically 
small and may account for why Bausch cast herself as one of the piece’s six dancers. 
This was also a moment when Bausch was interested in the sleepwalking figure: April 
saw the première of Er nimmt sie an der Hand und fUrht sie in das Schloss, die 
anderen folgen (1978) (He takes her by the hand and leads her into the castle, the 
others follow) a piece billed as “after Shakespeare’s Macbeth”; while Café Müller 
premièred in May. Café Müller features Bausch herself as one of the two 
sleepwalking figures wandering with closed eyes in the space of a fictional café—a
 ^According to Odette Oslan, Bausch’s popularity was made in France, and began in 1977. Her pieces 
before 1976 had just been tolerated by the Wupperthal audience. But this date was a turning point for 
Bausch, the moment when she abandoned dance for dance-theatre. The season ticket holders in 
Wupperthal reacted violently to Bausch’s new works. Oslan speculates she would have lost her 
directorship there, had there not been the “triomphe remporté [from the Nancy International Festival in 
1977], puis I’accueil permanent du Théâtre de la Ville depuis, générateur de consacration de tournées 
dans le monde entier” (24) ( The triumph won from the Nancy International Festival in 1977, and, 
afterwards, the Théâtre de la Ville’s permanent welcome, which itself opened the golden doors of 
world touring.)
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powerfully evocative image. The reception of this piece when the company danced it 
at the International Festival in Nancy generated such positive reaction, that Bausch 
was invited to the prestigious Avignon Festival the following year, and from there 
was programmed at the Théâtre de la Ville in Paris, where she has since appeared 
almost every year. As for Café Müller itself, not only does it continue to be 
demanded by audiences twenty-five years after its première, but it has also seemed to 
move other artists to create instantiations of the ghost-body-as-marionette. The piece 
so impressed Federico Fellini that he called the work Bausch’s 8V2, and her 
performance in it was what made him cast her in the role of the blind princess in his 
film And the Ship Sails On (Et la nave Via; 1984) (Fellini 5). Café Müller has more 
recently inspired another film: Pedro Almodovar’s Talk to Her (Hable Con Ella; 
2002), which begins and ends with footage of performances of Bausch’s 
Wupperthaler Tanztheater, and which contains exemplary instances of the Still-[but- 
A]-Live body, in its staging of its central female character as a body in a coma.
I have argued that what characterised the narrative strategies of the nineteenth- 
century work was a plot which reconciled the desire for abandonment with a need for 
control. The plots of The Woman in White, Dracula and Giselle initially allow their 
audience to entertain the excessive energies that are glorified in The Monk, yet they 
are careful to contrive at their endings to re-place the energies which have escaped 
firmly back into containment. By contrast, Bausch’s Café Müller and Almodovar’s 
Talk With Her can be seen as a return to the Gothic mode of excess. These works 
celebrate uncertainty, lack of control, and avoid containing the vital energies which 
they present. The refusal to contain, control, and establish certainties, can be seen 
reflected in the critical reaction to these works.
While I have described the enormously positive European critical reaction to 
Bausch’s work in the 1970s and 1980s, the American reception to Bausch was 
ambiguous at best, when Bausch toured America, performing at the Brooklyn 
Academy of Art in 1985. While the company was performing there, Bausch’s work 
was discussed by a panel of dance critics at a symposium called German and 
American Dance,” hosted by the Goethe Institute. It was chaired by dance scholar 
Ann Daly, then an editor of The Drama Review, which later published the minutes of 
the symposium and other articles on Tanztheater in its 1986 Summer issue. The issue 
featured an anonymous article formed by the juxtaposition of responses to Bausch by
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various American critics. Entitled “What the Critics Say About Tanztheater”, the 
article revealed that most critics found Bausch to be immoral and anti-feminist, in that 
her work depicted violence which was usually directed at women. One of these 
critics was Anna Kisselgoff, whose article, which was originally written for the The 
New York Times, asserted that Bausch “revels in depicting violence” and accused her 
of “work[ing] up the audience so that they are thrilled, and it’s the thrill of the lynch 
mob in watching people bang their heads against the wall or each other” (81). Daly, 
in the postscript to the second half of symposium, entitled “Tanztheater: The Thrill of 
the Lynch Mob or the Rage of a Woman?” wrote that this immorality stemmed from 
unsatisfactory closure, and she compared Bausch’s structuring practices unfavourably 
with those of American television. Daly wrote:
On American television, violence is undeniably a main attraction.
But the violence is always presented within a mediating ideology 
which espouses that “violence is immoral and legal. Violators must 
be caught and punished”. Most cop and adventure shows (A-Team, 
for example) are virtual morality plays. Good guys win; bad guys 
lose. In Bausch, what’s the mediating ideology? There is none. (56)
While this was Daly’s synthetic criticism of Bausch, as she wrote up her article for
publication in the summer issue, Bausch was also being hotly discussed in the Spring
issue of Theater, where Gitta Honnegger criticised the same problem in different
terms. In an article entitled “Form as Torture: Found Meanings Between Bausch and
Kantor”, Honegger suggested that Bausch’s problem was one of authorial voice. For
Honegger, Bausch refused to make clear her own stand in relation to what she
showed. She wrote:
We never know whether [Bausch] is inside that mass of bodies 
hurling themselves against the walls or each other, or whether she is 
outside manipulating them. (58 ) [my emphasis]
Sally Banes had pointed to the same ambiguity as she wondered is she criticizing or 
enjoying the byproducts of the harsh world and the daily anguish she describes? 
(Daly 83). These responses imply that the public was not only trying to determine 
where Bausch was in relation to what she showed, but also, how the dancers were
positioned in relation to what they danced.
According to the convention of modem dance, such as that of Martha 
Graham, movement is supposed to emanate from a deep self (even as the audience
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knows it is choreography); according to the conventions of formalist dance, the
dancers are supposed to be the instruments executing the choreographer’s design
(even though the dancer’s ability to appropriate the movement means this design has
become a part of his or her being). While in each of these kinds of dance the audience
sees everything, their gaze also is directed by each of these conventions which aim to
keep from view the ambiguity of transmission between bodies. In Bausch, however,
this ambiguity was not effaced from the public but rather staged to be seen. The
theatricality of Bausch’s mise-en-scène suggested that the dancers were expressing
something autobiographical, with dancers often announcing themselves as (or calling
each other by) their real first names; yet while in the midst of telling something about
themselves they held their bodies and faces in a strict frontal relation to the audience,
an orientation which flattens the body and suggests a lack of depth or interiority. In
this orientation they performed highly evocative gestures of the arms and hands, yet
the studied neutrality of their faces placed a distance between themselves and the
signs they emitted. Another way in which the origin of movement was rendered
ambiguous was how Bausch stressed bodies both as moving and as being moved.
Especially the women appeared as objects to be manipulated. In Bausch’s
choreography the female dancers are often carried, and placed in position. A well-
known example of this comes in a famous sequence in her Kontacthof which
premiered in December 1978, only eight months after Café Müller. The sequence
seems to have particularly irritated Daly who wrote:
A group of men surround a woman; their initial caresses turn into 
tweaks and pulls and tugs. She offers no protest. They literally pick 
at her for what seems a very long time. (54)
Café Müller
What Honegger saw as an ambiguity of interiority and exteriority in Bausch’s 
work may be attributed to her presentation of a particular body-state, the laboratory 
for which is Café Müller, a piece which indeed can be considered emblematic of this 
ambiguity. This is not an unproblematic suggestion in that Café Müller does not 
contain several of the hallmarks most associated with Tanztheater, a genre which 
Bausch is generally credited with developing if not inventing. These hallmarks are
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formal ones. The first concerns the length of her pieces, which often last over three 
hours. This duration, monolithic in character, is in tension with the heterogeneity and 
fragmentation of the material that makes it up. The Bausch work appears as a giant 
collage of discrete sketches. The device of collage is what governs the musical 
scenario too, often a juxtaposition of different short songs which have been culled as 
if indiscriminently from myriad genres, from popular music from the twentieth 
century and diverse traditions of folk music more often than from the classical music 
repertoire from the nineteenth century or before. The Bausch work also typically 
contains scenes where the dancers speak, breaking inherited dance conventions in so 
doing. Speaking, however, is merely one of the ways by which the dancers break the 
normal mode of dance’s visuality, one which constructs a division between the space 
of the watching public and the dancing “object”. For Bausch’s dancers confront their 
audiences in many ways. Besides addressing them in monologues, they leave the 
stage to interact with individual audience members; they fix the public with a direct 
gaze that is more akin to the conventions of the music hall than it is to those of 
theatre dance. This is also a reason why the dancers maintain a frontal orientation to 
the audience, one which becomes more strange and remarkable when the direction in 
which the dancers move their bodies is, sideways, diagonally, or backwards, 
contrasting with their fixed forward gaze.
Café Müller contains none of these hallmarks. It lasts for under an hour, and 
this duration seems to be dictated to it by the authority of the homogenous musical 
scenario comprised of songs by a single composer, Henry Purcell. The dancers remain 
silent. Moreover, what the choreography emphatically forecloses is the possibility 
that the dancers address the public with their gaze or body orientation. For the mode 
of visuality that Café Muller sets up has nothing to do with the music-hall but, rather, 
seems to exaggerate the conventions of theatre. As in the theatre, the stage space is 
given to the public as a room in which a fourth wall divides performers from audience 
and maintains them in separate spaces. But what is more extreme is that the fourth 
wall in Café Müller seems not only to be transparent for the public, but to exist 
normally for the performers, as if it had the properties of the one-way mirrors used in 
police interrogation rooms and hospital psychiatric wards. The spectators look at the 
dancers who seem unaware that they could be watched.
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Yet what is typical of Bausch in Café Müller is the scenography which 
changes the stage from an abstract to a realist space. What the audience sees in Café 
Müller is a realistic representation of a café. The three walls which enclose the space 
all have a door: in the back wall this is a revolving transparent glass one. In the 
middle of the room is a multitude of chairs and tables, haphazardly placed as though 
for cleaning after closing time. The concrete space of the set is not only meant to be 
looked at. Rather, it provides the concrete spatiality which acts upon the dancer’s 
movements and modifies them. The dancers are restrained by the walls against whose 
surfaces they lean, which they also hit, and slide down. Their entrance and exit is 
channelled by the doors in the side walls of the stage, and is challenged by the 
revolutions of the door in the stage’s back wall, in which a dancer will be caught 
spinning like a hamster on a treadmill. However, it was the chairs and tables that 
bestrewed the stage which most caught the attention of Bausch’s American critics, 
and for good reason.
The café furniture which is onstage in Café Müller limits what might have 
seemed to American critics in 1985 to have been the condition of the dance work, that 
is to say the trajectories that are available to the dancing body. By setting her piece in 
an obstacle-bestrewn space Bausch minimised the pure dance possibilities of her 
choreography, and here showed her distance from the aesthetics then current in 
twentieth-century American dance, whose choreographers were interested in creating 
distinctive movement, what the critics called “movement vocabularies”. The 
sensibilities and critical apparatuses of American critics had developed in relation to 
the work they had seen, and the concerns this work embodied. American 
choreographers after the 1930s were for the most part resolutely formalist: their art 
evacuated the political and the referential. Their move towards abstraction could be 
seen in their baring of the stage, which chased out references to the real world. The 
evacuation of literal context fostered an abstract reading of the movement. 
Cunningham’s dancers in particular seemed almost like planetary bodies orbiting in 
time and space. For American dance critics, dance was for dance s sake, as Daly 
wrote, and this meant that it was about how bodies moved.
By contrast, Bausch asserted that she was less interested in how bodies moved 
than in what moved them, and created a scenographical context for her piece which 
made it difficult for spectators not to see movement as having a meaning beyond the
163
geometry and texture it made visible. Its familiar scene called forth associations and 
speculation from the viewer, while the strange happenings which occurred there 
puzzled the spectator, involving him or her in a hermeneutical process. In “The 
Politics of the Body: Pina Bausch’s Tanztheater”, David Price, then a PhD student in 
Comparative Literature at Emory University, testified to the way in which Bausch’s 
work gained a wider exposure for dance, by making dance a matter of interest to 
scholars in other disciplines. In his 1990 article which appeared in Theater Journal, 
Price can be seen as grappling with Café Müller's hermeneutical imperative:
In Café Müller the tables and chairs onstage serve as a metonymic 
expression of all public spaces in which men and women meet. But.
. . metonymy can be metaphorised. When a woman . . . skips 
nervously about the furniture, the audience begins to see the chairs as 
a type of maze, and when the ‘waiter’ charges onto the scene and 
literally clears tables the audience understands that social structures 
hinder individual freedom of movement and obstruct the 
development of human contact. (329)
Price here shows the way in which Café Müller gives rise to different levels of 
interpretation, for the movement that appears to view is shown arising in a concrete 
context and resonating out of a specific emotional body-state. Movement is shown as 
the link or relational thread which connects context and subjectivity, which are 
simultaneously both its ends and its origins. It is shown as both arising in relation to 
an external physical context, and as resonating in and emerging from the internal 
emotional body.
For, just as Bausch gives her piece a specific recognisable external context, so 
equally does she people her piece with recognisable subjectivities that cannot fail to 
evoke the cultural memory of its audience. The most important of these figures is that 
of the somnambulist. Neither music nor lighting has signalled that Café Müller will 
begin, when a woman enters by the stage-right door, the image of whose frail body 
clad a white shift can hardly fail to remind audiences of the heroines of Dracula. This 
is Bausch herself, who in silence falls back upon the door to shut it. From her 
inclined posture against the door, the figure sways to her feet and with closed eyes 
begins to wander unstably upstage by dint of staggering, shuffling, faltering steps, 
keeping her body almost touching the side wall. The motion of her vulnerable body 
seems to imply a forceful inward concentration, yet her arms are also out-stretched 
like hyper-sensitive antennae which can sense the obstacles in her way. This strange
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movement, the audience recognises, emerges from the altered state of sleepwalking. 
Thus in the first moments of the piece, Bausch’s choreographic design creates a 
tension between the space and the figures that people it. In the public setting of the 
café, and the even more public setting of the theatre stage, the body that Café Müller 
shows is out of place, for the somnambulist that Bausch incarnates is a solitary, 
private body. It challenges dance convention, in which the dancer’s body shapes the 
dance space; for Bausch stages the figure she incarnates, not as the mistress of the 
scene she enters, but rather, as at its mercy.
In its next moments, the choreography sets up a contrast between its 
somnambulistic characters and those who are not inward-looking but who seem 
exclusively focused on the outside world. Bausch, after shuffling her way upstage 
hugging the wall, turns her back to it and slumps against it as if from exhaustion. 
However, something inside her seems to fight that exhaustion before succumbing to it 
again. Using the firm resistance which the wall affords, the somnambulist pushes off 
from it, gently undulating through her spine to replace her weight over her feet, from 
where, unsteady, she again falls back against its surface. Bausch is only a few 
centimetres from the wall, and so it is not the movement’s trajectory which is 
underlined, as she falls and recovers from its surface. Rather, what the sequence 
emphasises is the way in which leaning against the wall’s surface enables the body to 
abandon muscular tension; it also heightens the audience’s sensitivity to the slight 
adjustments which the body may make to negotiate its relation to gravity. Just after 
Bausch turns and sinks against the wall, a second character (Merle Tankard at the 
première, but Nazareth Panadero in the 1985 filmed version) can be spied entering the 
café, turning in the revolving door in the set’s back wall. In contrast to Bausch s 
character, who is dressed for a space of intimacy and privacy, Panadero is dressed to 
go outside, in the street-clothes of caricatural femininity: a red wig, a big fur coat, and 
high heels. The outer layer of Panadero’s persona, the way in which she is shod and 
clad, seems to determine her inner life. Her high heels make her hop, her thick coat 
seems to keep her torso rigid; her tight skirt allows her to advance only by dint of tiny 
strides. The external world determines how she moves and also where she goes. 
Panadero zig-zags through the maze of chairs that encumbers the stage, glancing 
nervously from side to side in the effort to avoid them. Watching Bausch s 
movement sensitises the viewer to the play of gravity in a stationary body, in
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watching Panadero the viewer is trained to see the trajectory of movement rather than 
the body itself. The choreography for the somnambulist gives the viewer the illusion 
he or she is watching original expression of a deep self; that devised for the red-haired 
woman gives the illusion of being the repetition of learned and culturally inscribed 
behaviour.
The contrast between an originary expression and conventional behaviour is 
heightened when Bausch’s character is doubled by the arrival of a second 
somnambulist, and in turn paired with a second street-clothed character, often 
described in criticism as “the Waiter”, who wears a three-piece suit, street shoes and 
glasses. The door downstage right opens again and a second female figure enters the 
stage. This figure is danced by Airaudo, whose closed eyes, unsteady shuffling gait, 
unbound hair, and white sleeping shift mark her as a sleepwalker. Airaudo does not 
turn upstage to follow Bausch, but rather stays in the corridor of space downstage in 
which she begins her hesitant sleep-walk across to stage left. When Bausch has made 
her way gingerly across the floor, she stops and begins slowly smoothing her body, 
pressing it as she runs her hands over its surface as if to bring it into connection with 
the lines of energy which lie in the body’s other deeper layers. All this action has 
been accomplished in silence, but now the music begins, and since it consists in a solo 
female voice, the music first seems to be the transcription of the movement in 
auditory terms, as if the music were illustrating the dancing rather than the dancer 
dancing to the music. Bausch’s choreographic design shows the music and the 
movement to exist as separate strands of the piece, as if the music were an external 
temporal plot against which an internal temporal plot—the energies proper to the 
dancing body—can more clearly be seen.
This effect is heightened shortly afterwards, when the movement-strand of the 
two somnambulists lifts further away from the temporal-strand of the music. In a 
backstage corridor of stage space, her body facing diagonally downstage, and without 
moving from her place, Bausch begins a sequence of slow continuous arm 
movements, as though moving through water. Her arms, elbows, wrists and hands 
unfold in space and lift her torso upwards with them, to a height where her whole 
body waves as a single thin length. Once there, these limbs wrap and twist in space 
high around her head. Later they fold in again, and as they do so they descend, sink 
slowly through space, all the while drawing the torso to curve inwards so that it
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envelops itself. This sequence of arm movements happens while the music develops 
its own legato theme, but suddenly, while the music continues gently and quietly, 
Bausch’s body begins accelerating in staccato movements of the torso. As her arms 
unfold, Bausch s sternum is first lifted passively by her arms and then left to sink with 
them: the body s extremity (and in a sense its periphery) moves its centre. But now 
the sternum, the part of the body which links the arms to the torso, is the source of the 
movement which we apprehend. It emits staccato impulses which emerge as though 
without volition, which gradually increase in strength and size, until their force shakes 
her whole body. These impulses finally succeed in unbalancing Bausch, in 
transmitting their force to her feet until the movements of her chest impel her forward 
in space. The way in which Bausch’s choreography first constructs an accord 
between the dance and the music—during the port de bras sequence—and then stages 
its rupture—during the sternum impulses—makes the movement that is seen being 
inscribed in space seem like the link the inner body and its subjectivity are creating 
with the outside world. The disparity between the external rhythm of the music and 
the movement the audience sees, impels the audience to become aware of another 
rhythm, the one internal to the living feeling body. The disparity makes the audience 
perceive the movement which appears as the way that the body is spanning it, creating 
a link between itself and the world.
The choreography creates a similar disparity which may be spanned at the 
level of the audience: the disparity between the two somnambulists’s movements. 
While Airaudo’s figure almost doubles Bausch’s, the two women do not dance 
“together” in the way that a dance audience might be used to seeing. The movement 
which each performs echoes that of the other, and yet the similarities and differences 
are less important in themselves than as the proof that they are inhabiting the same 
inward-looking body-state, which in each generates different original motion. While 
Bausch’s energy remains that of the figure I have named the Somnambulist, and is 
expressed predominantly by slow continuous movements, Airaudo s is the more 
driven and desperate energy of what I have named the Fugitive, which impels her to 
race across the stage as though hurled by invisible forces. The impetuousness of 
Airaudo’s movements are dramatised by the fact that the chairs and tables which 
betrew her path make her passage an imminently painful one. But before the Fugitive 
can hurt herself by crashing into one of these articles of furniture, the Waiter is
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suddenly there, and he shoves or drags the obstacle from her path. His attentions 
initially seem like a blessing; yet as the piece continues and the action repeats, they 
grow in ambiguity. The Waiter s posture and hurried movements show fear, but 
whether fear for  the Fugitive or fear of her becomes increasingly uncertain. Is he 
removing the chairs lest she should be hurt, or is he doing so to protect them from 
damage? For, clearing the chairs for the Fugitive helps her to avoid them, but it also 
enables her to gain speed on her trajectory, a trajectory which now ends with her 
crashing face-first into the wall. Yet, again, the audience perceives that the contact 
with these same walls momentarily seems to calm the Fugitive’s frenzy. Perhaps the 
most merciful thing to do, the audience may muse, might paradoxically be for him to 
take her in his arms and stifle the movement which keeps her hurtling from one place 
to another. Bausch creates a scene which grows in ambiguity as the action repeats 
and the audience has time to consider it from different angles. In contrast to the 
artistic forms of the nineteenth century, in which repetition worked to resolve 
mysteries and towards a definitive interpretation, Bausch creates a context in which 
repetition refuses to condense into a single meaning.
The contrast between characters moving from their deep selves, and those who 
move through the inscription of worldly convention, is drawn again as Airaudo 
traverses the space once more, coming into contact this time, not with a wall but with 
a body, that of a male sleepwalker and soul-mate, danced by Dominique Mercy. She 
embraces him, pinning his arms to his sides inside her grasp. In this position their 
couple is observed by the piece’s final character to enter, the very tall and strongly 
built man, performed by Jan Minirk. Jan approaches the couple and, moving behind 
Airaudo’s body, gently disent wines their bodies. First removing one arm from its 
hold on the body, and then another, Jan then re-arranges their arms, and re-places 
their heads, to create another embrace, substituting, in place of the one in which the 
two were clasped together like book-ends, one more stereotypically romantic, in 
which Mercy holds Airaudo s reclining body in his two arms. Mercy and Airaudo 
remain perfectly passive through all of this, and once he finishes, Jan turns and walks 
away. The audience has witnessed a stronger and more powerful man imposing a
pattern of behaviour on a couple of ingénus.
As soon as Jan is no longer there to oversee the position, Airaudo s body 
slides like a heavy fish out of Mercy’s arms, slides down his body, to the floor, from
168
which she immediately rebounds up in shock and desperately grabs Mercy in her 
original hug. Jan turns when he observes this, and after coming back to the couple, 
takes them through the same movements again, but just one shade faster. Again the 
couple is placed in the lift where Mercy carries Airaudo; and again, as Jan is about to 
leave the scene, Airaudo slips from his arms, drops to the floor, and bounds up to 
embrace him. The sequence happens again and again, but faster and faster. Soon the 
movements are happening so fast that Jan’s placement of the arms, hands and heads 
of Airaudo and Mercy, that were at first respectful and tender, become brutal slapping 
movements. Airaudo’s gentle slide to the floor, broken by the slow friction against 
Mercy’s body, has now become a dangerous free-fall from a chest-height position. 
The escalating tempo directly implicates the spectator in an effort to interpret the 
sequence’s meaning.
The sequence in which Jan re-arranges the couple’s embrace does not initially 
appear aggressive. Although Jan is bent on re-forming the pair, he is respectful of 
their underlying desire to be together. Jan’s touch makes neither body stiffen in 
opposition, and the precision with which he takes the couple through the movements 
leading to the new embrace, when he does so slowly, seems grave but solicitous. But 
his abrupt re-appearance and the repetition of the same sequence changes the span of 
meanings that the movements can connote. When the repetition happens for a third 
time, the now brisk tempo makes Airaudo’s spring back to grasp Mercy seem like the 
jump a caught fish takes to return itself to water—or, in the context of the present 
argument, the rebellion of the original self against cultural inscription. The rapidity 
with which Jan returns to the couple and instructs them again in the sequence seems 
progressively more and more aggressive. He no longer seems to be teaching them 
something they do not know, but instead to be imposing his vision of intimacy upon 
them. The speed accrues until the sequence of discrete positions has become a 
continuous blur of movement, at which point Jan’s training is no longer needed. He 
leaves the stage, but Airaudo and Mercy continue to go senselessly faster and faster, 
through the motions in which their bodies have been trained.
French choreographer and dance writer Daniel Dobbels remarks that a 
programme note presented Café Müller as a “place for hesitation . Hesitation is one 
of the responses appropriate to a situation that is unclear. It is a state of inaction, of
Café Müller est un lieu pour hésiter.
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waiting with heightened attention that is both suspended and diffused. Café Müller 
both presents this quality of attention in its two somnambulic figures and enjoins it in 
its public. For it creates the same relationship with its viewer as the one that is shown 
between external situation (of the café) and internal subjectivity (of the 
somnambulists). Café Müller evokes another act of sleepwalking at the level of its 
reception, the piece is the context in relation to which its viewer is the Somnambulist. 
The viewer is taken passively, vicariously, through the maze of motion of Café 
Müller, one which exists as the text to which he or she, like a somnambulist, must 
establish a relation through movement, the creative movement of interpretation. Yet, 
through the act of interpretation, the terms of internal and external are confused.
At the beginning of the piece, as the viewer watches Pina’s sternum shaking 
and transmitting its impulses to her feet, impelling her forward in space, he or she 
may be tempted to cast this in language as “sobs literally overtake her body”, just as 
Price was moved to write, “he literally clears tables” and Daly wrote, “They literally 
pick at her for what seems a long time”. At another moment in the choreography, 
Airaudo sits in a chair near one of the sides of the stage, and, sliding down so that the 
small of her back is supported by its seat, lifts her legs vertically and treads her feet 
gently up and down the wall’s surface. One could write, “she literally climbs the 
walls” because this would accurately describe the movement we have just seen, and 
also, it would impart a sense of the emotional desperation present in the scenes that 
just preceded it. The Oxford English Dictionary gives three main senses of the word 
“literal”: 1. “Of or pertaining to letters of the alphabet . . . expressed by letters,
written”; 2. [of a translation] “Representing the very words of the original; verbally 
exact”; 3. [theological] “Pertaining to the letter (of Scripture); the distinctive epithet 
of that sense of interpretation (of a text) which is obtained by taking words in their 
natural or customary meaning, and applying the ordinary rules of grammar (1638). 
Put simply, the use of the word “literally” protests that language knows the first 
meaning of movement. It ascribes an ontological superiority to language, as if 
language existed before that which it “objectively describes, that it decides what is 
natural or customary. Yet here, the moment of the viewer s recognition (that this is 
what is “literally” happening) is also the moment that erodes language s pretence of 
and claim to authority and objectivity. The barriers between what is inside and what is 
outside no longer hold; the possibility of deciding what is original and what is learned
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evaporates. For if the metaphor of ‘climbing the walls” sprang to the viewer’s mind 
this could only happen if he or she had already heard these words and learned the 
sense of them. The viewer of the piece must accept the creative role of interpreting 
the piece, of being a somnambulist; the writer about Bausch must resign the fantasy of 
getting to the bottom of her work, and even must resign the aspiration to write 
objectively about it. Part of the violence of the critics’ reactions against Bausch may 
have derived from the recognition that such objectivity was eluding their grasp, and 
from their discomfiture at the lack of mastery this implied.
When the Somnambulist arises in the Gothic and Romantic tradition, it does 
so within a context in which the body represents truth, and is clearly opposed to the 
code of language which usually is seen as rationality and repressive law. In The 
Monk, the repressive law of language is, severally: the mass, or God’s law which 
makes crimes of the body’s desires; the law of the elders which represses choice in 
marriage; educational discourse; and progressive Enlightenment ideals. In The 
Woman in White, language and the codes of recording are what permit the truth of one 
body to be buried in a falsely inscribed grave, and another to be unjustly interred in an 
insane asylum; while at the end of the novel it is Fosco’s manuscript and a letter from 
Laura’s dead husband, which have the power to bring her identity to life again. In 
Dracula, Mina’s mechanised recording of events which reveals the logic of the 
Count’s bodily habits, combined with her knowledge of train schedules, whose time­
tables are set down in writing, are what allow him to be brought to death. In the 
Romantic ballet, passion is punished by language as Giselle dies from dancing too 
much, as if through one action she would make good two different pronouncements : 
one, her mother’s warning that she will die; the other, Albrecht’s promise of mam age 
to Bathtilde. Flesh and word are seen in tension and in opposition, an opposition 
which is paradoxically staged as the spirit’s evasion of its local habitation, and
embodied in the figure of the Somnambulist.
Bausch’s Café Müller uses the figure of the Somnambulist to suggest such a 
clear opposition, which it progressively makes ambiguous, by showing how the 
context is part of how we look at content, and that language is already at work in the 
body that we use to create and see dance. When Mercy and Airaudo furiously 
reproduce the embrace that Jan has trained them in, what is clear is the violence of 
that inscription as the two, seemingly insensibly, go through the motions. But later in
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the work, during a further section in which Mercy and Airaudo are again dancing
together, these movements—which the audience also has been trained to recognise__
emerge again, when they suggest tenderness itself. The very same sequence now 
seems really to be lived from the inside of their bodies and to be expressive of their 
true selves.
Café Müller is the necessary precursor of Bausch’s later work, for it undoes 
the clear distinctions to be found in Romanticism, where language and body are 
separate and opposed. In it Bausch shows the way in which the body is inextricably 
caught in language, but also, how language too is of and in the body. At the moment 
when language no longer seems outside the body, it no longer can pretend to the 
status of objectivity. It becomes just another code which attempts to convey 
expression, one that may either succeed or fail. It is this desacralisation of language 
which is necessary before Bausch can use it in her subsequent work. In the pieces that 
follow speech is present, but it does not have authority over the body. It is not given a 
superogatory role which interprets the other strands of action, interaction, mime, and 
dance which make up the piece. Rather, it is one another strand of expression which 
may both succeed and fail in communicating something to the audience.
Talk to Her
The success and failure of speech can be clearly seen in Almodovar’s Talk to 
Her which begins significantly with a close up of Airaudo in her opening porT de bras 
in Café Müller. Talk to Her abounds in codes, different media and bodily ritual, 
which pack and unpack meaning in various ways, in which it often seems that the 
form of expression is more important than what is conveyed. Expression is verbal or 
non-verbal, but whether it is one or other it is often pre-codified, belonging to the 
order of fashion, ritual, or art. The protagonists all are shown following the rules of 
these different orders: Benigno re-produces the bedroom of his dreams, seen in a 
design magazine; Lydia is dressed in her bull-fighting costume according to strict 
procedure and protocol; and Lydia’s relatives genuflect and cross themselves before 
the bull-fight. The photographic art is seen to condense meanings in the photo of 
Bausch (taken in a moment of Café Müller) which Benigno buys for Alicia, has
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autographed, and hangs in her hospital bedroom. Music is represented as Alicia’s 
dance teacher makes her listen to the symphony she will shortly choreograph, and as a 
group of people at a party enjoy the performance of a folk-singer. Dance is seen as 
conveying meanings when Marco and Beningo attend Café Müller, and as a highly 
codified practice as Benigno watches a ballet class. Bullfighting too is a code that 
Lydia s spectators read ; while Lydia appreciates the moving ceremony of a 
wedding. Verbal expression is sub-divided into as many different categories as the 
non-verbal, where they appear as specific codified modes or as jargon. Featured in 
the film are: politically correct speech (when Alicia’s father asks Benigno in contorted 
fashion if he is gay); sensationalist coverage (during Lydia’s television interview); 
psychoanalytical vocabulary (which when it describes his own personality alienates 
Benigno); gossip (scatological, explicitly sexual, or just plain nasty which usually 
occurs between persons of the same sex); formulaic bureaucratic speech (the jingles in 
which receptionists revel); professional consultation manner (of doctors and lawyers); 
and euphemism (the language of grief). While Almodovar draws his spectator’s 
attention to these forms of speech and rituals of action and art, he also suggests that 
there is something that exceeds form, and that it is this excessive something to which 
humans respond. For these occurrences exist as the many possibilities by which 
humans may exchange feeling, in which quest they often fail even as they respect the 
rules of form. Benigno lies to Alicia’s father about his sexuality because he feels the 
pyschoanalyst’s oblique wording allows him to be dishonest about his real motive in 
asking; Lydia flees the television set when she realises her interviewer’s sympathy has 
been a pretext. But any of these different arts of condensing and displacing human 
feeling may also succeed in their aim. Talk To Her suggests, it is just that success 
cannot be ensured or programmed.
Almodovar structures his film so that it has a perfectly ambiguous ending, one 
that dramatises the unknowable in human experience. Talk To Her tells the story of 
Alicia, a young dancer-in-training, and Benigno, whose apartment overlooks the 
dance studio where he sees Alicia at her daily class. Kept at home, caring for his 
ailing mother, Benigno escapes in fantasy to other worlds by looking through the 
window at the young dancers who, in contrast to his house-bound self, seem 
incredibly light and free as they turn and bend. One day when Benigno is watching 
from his window, Alicia drops her wallet, and Benigno seizes the chance to meet her.
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He follows her, returns the wallet, and walks her home. Finding, by reading the 
interphone, that her father is a psychologist who practices from home, Benigno makes 
an appointment as a ploy to meet Alicia again. When, after his session, the 
receptionist is nowhere in sight, instead of leaving the flat, he trespasses into Alicia’s 
room, surveying its décor as if committing to memory the fashions, rituals, and art 
that order her life. On his way out, however, he encounters the towel-wrapped Alicia 
coming back from the shower, who begins shaking with fear to find him violating her 
intimacy.
Alicia subsequently becomes the victim of a car-accident, falling into a coma 
from which science says there is no hope she will return. Alicia’s concerned father 
hires the most-respected team of nurses to provide Alicia’s Still-[But-A] Live body 
with constant care, and Benigno (whose mother is now dead) is one of them. The 
film’s many shots of Benigno washing and dressing Alicia (as well as its sequences in 
which the toreador Lydia is dressed and adorned ritually for the bull-ring) insist upon 
the activity of grooming as constitutive of personhood, stressing that identity involves 
an ongoing process of making through constant effort (which here, importantly, is 
received from the outside). Rather than cutting her hair short (which would make it 
easier for his team to manage) Benigno trims it to keep it at the length it was at her 
accident—lest, waking from her coma, she should not know herself. But the 
grooming that is taking place all the time around Alicia’s body is only one kind of 
stream of attention that envelops her and works to repair her subjectivity. As the 
movie’s title underlines, Benigno talks to her.
For, Benigno does not only massage Alicia’s body to keep her muscles in 
tone, but also keeps up a constant stream of words to her, as though conversation were 
another kind of friction that will stimulate the muscle of her mind. Benigno talks to 
Alicia about what she likes, for the short space of time during which Benigno 
accompanies Alicia home has been enough for him to discover her interest in dance, 
silent movies, and travel. In order to talk to Alicia about what interests her, he attends 
a performance of Pina Bausch’s Café Müller, and brings her back a signed photograph 
of the choreographer to decorate her hospital bedroom. It also takes him to the silent 
cinema where, in The Shrinking Lover, a film within the film, Almodovar revisits 
Gothic and melodramatic themes, inverting some of their terms while burlesquing 
others. In a décor reminiscent of filmed renditions of Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein, a
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scientist, but now a female one named Amparo, is working on a potion that she hopes 
will save humanity. Her lover, jealous that her attention is claimed by her work, grabs 
the beaker and despite all her warnings, swallows it. In stock desperation Amparo 
gesticulates wildly, attempts frantically to invent the potion’s antidote, but to no avail. 
Alfredo begins shrinking in size, and later, correspondingly diminished in his self­
esteem, leaves Amparo under cover of darkness. Constant search reveals his hiding 
place to Amparo and she goes to collect him there in a taxi. On the back seat of that 
conveyance she opens her handbag in which Alfredo, now no taller than a pencil, is 
comfortably ensconced. In this shot, of Alfredo happy inside an object which 
stereotypically represents the female genitals, Almodovar invents a way to 
foreshadow Alfredo’s permanent abode, with which The Shrinking Lover will end.
In his essay on The Woman in White, D.A. Miller argues that Fosco’s reading 
of Marion’s diary is a kind of rape, in that the rapist’s fantasy could be articulated as 
the right of free entrance and egress to and from the female genitals: the right to 
“come and go” as he puts it (128). By contrast, the vows of marriage—“to have and 
to hold”— are ones which precisely limit egress. In the closing sequences of The 
Shrinking Lover, Almodovar figures the fantasy of marriage in a passive mode, not as 
“having and holding”, but rather of “having and being held”. Amparo and Alfredo 
take refuge in a hotel where Amparo lies down on the bed after placing Alfredo down 
next to her pillow. For fear of rolling over in sleep and smothering his now tiny 
figure, Amparo at first does not want to slumber, but Alfredo reassures her he will be 
fine. After her eyes close, however, he struggles to pull the sheet which covers 
Amparo, now gigantic for him, from her sleeping form. Her breasts are exposed like 
twin mountain peaks over which Alfredo scrambles, and from whose summits he rolls 
down in delight. Alfredo walks the length of her body from her stomach to her pubis, 
like an archeologist marvelling in the discovery of long-buried treasure. He jumps 
down, as if into a canyon, onto the bed between her parted thighs, from where her sex 
appears as a great, turf-covered door. It is the entrance to a tunnel which he first tests 
by inserting an arm. Then, removing all his clothing, he sets off upon the journey to 
the place inside her where, wishing to remain part of her eternally, he has now
decided to make his home.
As Benigno recounts the story of The Shrinking Lover to Alicia—a fantasy 
which I have suggested is one of marriage (and death)—her body suddenly becomes
175
an erotic object for him. Throughout the three years of his care for her, he has 
undressed and touched her with no sexual charge. Now, however, Benigno shields 
her body from his own vision, and Almodovar simultaneously brings the curtain down 
on the scene, as a way of telling the audience that Benigno has sex with her 
unconscious body. The fantasy that is staged in the film within the film, as Alfredo 
goes willingly to his death in Amparo’s womb, thus paradoxically generates its 
opposite in the film proper: an unwilled act of sex which leads to life. For the rape 
that Benigno commits on an insensate body also generates, in the strong sense of the 
word: Alicia becomes pregnant. This is discovered, and evidence points to Benigno 
who is subsequently jailed. But the pregnancy which jails Benigno releases Alicia, for 
she is brought to full life, waking from her coma during the labour which delivers her 
of a child mort né. It is this development which, according to the critic Judith 
Flanders, constitutes Almodovar’s unambiguous presentation of Benigno as Alicia’s 
saviour. Complaining that she has always distrusted Almodovar’s views on women, 
Flanders writes:
Tie Me Up depicts the abduction of a woman who is abused and 
raped and, guess what, who loves it after all. In Talk To Her 
Benigno (note the name) is presented as Alicia’s saviour, despite the 
fact that he has not only raped her, but, before her accident, stalked 
her. Almodovar has said “For there to be a loving relationship it is
only necessary for one person to love”. He is as confused as
Benigno. (19)
For Flanders, it is this last twist in the plot, the fact that it could be Alicia’s labour that 
brings her out of her coma, which means that Almodovar’s movie is insufficiently 
moral and potentially harmful to women. But the film intimates other possibilities. 
What grew inside Alicia and brought her back to life could have been Benigno s 
words, or Marco’s, or her dance teacher’s music.
At the end of Talk To Her, Benigno’s friend Marco goes again to see Pina 
Bausch’s Wupperthaler Tanztheater, this time in a performance of Mascura Fogo, 
where he meets Alicia and her dance teacher Katerina, both of whom are also 
members of the audience. The curtain opens, and, from the safety of a wing, one
couple after another emerges at regular intervals, and forms a line with regular
spacings. Each couple faces the same way, man upstage, woman downstage, and 
each is dancing in a close embrace, traversing the stage in a thin comdor of space by 
means of tiny sideways steps, which are punctuated every third count with a small
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upward twitch of the hips. A single thread seems to be attached to each dancer’s 
upper outer iliac crest, and all these threads seem to be held in the hands of a single 
marionettist. But also, alternatively, each hip may be twitching upwards as a result of 
the body s deep animal instincts, proper to each but common to them all.
The other moment in the piece which Almodovar chooses to film is a 
sequence in which six men in tuxedoes partner a sole woman in a long evening dress 
who is carrying a microphone, whose electric cord trails behind her. She seems 
gripped by an emotion the promise of whose expression has them all hanging in 
attendance on her. Hoping she will utter, they one by one hold the microphone to her 
lips to catch what she will say, but each time she only breathes out heavily. This 
(eternally) imminently expressive body seems to float through space, for such is the 
uniformity of their black tuxedos that these multiple partners seem both present and 
absent at the same time. The men are conspicuously present in their exaggerated 
solicitude for their lady, but again, that solicitude makes them so smooth that they 
also disappear from the picture, leaving the illusion that the female figure is 
suspended in air by unseen forces. The woman’s body floats, plunges, and is caught 
by her multiple partners. It curves in fish-like bends as she rises again. Judith 
Flanders, writing of the same moment describes it thus:
The film ends with a return to Pina Bausch, this time with her tedious 
Mascura Fogo, a tourists’-eye view of Portugal, a picture-postcard 
land of happy peasants and quaint traditions, every bit as false a 
portrait of place as Almodovar’s portrait of these women [Alicia and 
Lydia]. On stage a row of men lift a motionless woman who holds a 
microphone to her lips but never speaks, only her gasping breath 
echoing around the auditorium, (my emphasis, 19)
For Flanders, Almodovar chooses to show this moment of Bausch s choreography 
because it is analogous with the way in which his pair of comatose heroines, Alicia 
and Lydia, are also silent throughout his film. “Their mouths are stopped writes 
Flanders. Yet as her writing reveals, Flanders’s prejudice — that speech is the unique 
condition of expressivity — is so powerful that she fails to appreciate how the 
characters of Alicia and Lydia are expressive despite, or perhaps through their silence. 
Flanders’s prejudice also impedes her from appreciating the partnered woman in 
Bausch’s Mascura Fogo. By abstaining from utterance, this dancer forfeits all 
expressivity, for Flanders, who can thus write that the body of Bausch s lifted dancer, 
who suavely bends, sways, plunges, and arches is a motionless one.
177
Like the dancer she shows, Bausch the choreographer refrains from making 
any neat pronouncement; and this may be what makes her work polemical for some. 
Flanders’s complaint that Mascura Fogo provides a “false” portrait presupposes that 
somewhere there exits a single, true, deep, and authentic portrait, that is asking to be 
painted and enshrined in an appropriate gallery. Bausch’s Wupperthaler Tanztheater, 
an invited guest in first one city and then in another, now makes art out of her 
dancer’s multiple and immediate interpretations, the skin-deep reactions of their 
bodies to what they see and feel about their host cities. Through the figure of the 
Somnambulist in Café Müller, Bausch explored one of Romanticism’s favoured 
fantasies, one which ostensibly celebrates the body as beyond language—but one 
which uses that celebration as the pretext to disenfranchise the body’s claim to be 
itself in language. The Romantic Somnambulist is either the blank woman whose 
body resists inscription, or her inversion, the woman whose identity is engraved upon 
her by the world at large. In failing to show her Somnambulists in either of these clear 
roles, Bausch resists the imperative to show the body as ineffable, yet by the same 
token she undermines the authority of language. Café Müller is Bausch’s last 
“choreography”; her work after Café Müller goes further in the direction she had 
begun to move a year earlier in Blaubert and Komm Tanz Mit Mir (both created in 
1977), in which speech is one of the media through which the dancers address the 
audience. It may be that Bausch’s refraining from pronouncing in Café Müller is at 
the source of her liberty to speak as a dance artist.
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Chapter 8 
The Ghost-Body-as-Marionette in Practice
In Chapter 7 ,1 explored the heated discussion around the site of the nerves in 
eighteenth-century science. This discussion recognised that the nerves were the single 
locus whose exact way of functioning was capable of justifying the scientific theories, 
severally, of mechanists, vitalists, hollowists, and solidists. The chapter suggested 
that the heat of this discussion arose from the way in which science’s divergent 
theories themselves served to uphold overarching ideologies, whether these were held 
consciously or unconsciously. If the various ways in which the nerves were 
conceptualised as functioning were seen as springing from earlier knowledge and 
belief systems, the chapter also showed how these divergent conceptualisations 
subsequently shaped the ways in which scientific theory could and did evolve. As the 
title of G.S. Rousseau’s essay “Nerves, Spirits, and Fibres: Towards Defining the 
Origins of Sensibility” emblematically argues, each theory relied on—or even was 
contained in—the particular metaphor it employed to image the nerves’ workings.
The metaphors through which scientists conceptualised the workings of the 
nerves shaped the practice of science; I have argued that vitalistic metaphors, which 
encode particular ways of conceptualising processes, infiltrated popular culture 
though the mesmerist movement, there to influence how the population at large lived 
in their bodies. As far back as Chapter 2, I discussed the means by which metaphors 
structure experience, through an analysis of George Lakoff s Metaphors We Live By. 
In The Player’s Passion, theatre historian Joseph Roach traces the spread of the 
scientific discoveries of an era from their inception in a restricted scientific 
community and their entrance into the mainstream of a less erudite population, that 
made up by actors. Roach’s book compares the scientific discoveries of an era with 
the innovations in the science of acting of the same time, arguing that the changing 
way in which the body was conceptualised, influenced how the actor lived, and, more
crucially, worked in his body.
For Roach, approaches to acting, in one period after another, reflect the 
science of their time. Thus, Roach’s chapter on vitalist science, a movement that was
elaborated between 1690 and 1770, investigates how the theories of vitalism 
influenced the theories of acting of Denis Diderot, who lived almost exactly 
contemporaneously (1713-1784). But Roach’s assumption that science influences 
contemporaneous artistic production is not shared by G.S. Rousseau, who, in “The 
Perpetual Crises of Modernism and the Traditions of Enlightenment Vitalism”, argues 
that there is a lapse of time before the theories of science enter the artistic 
imagination; as Rousseau has it; before they “demand the muse” (141). The 
overarching historical thesis of the present study may perhaps be conceived of as a 
combination of the ostensibly incompatible theories of practice and history implied in 
the writings of Roach and Rousseau. Borrowing from Roach, I wish to argue that 
science influences practice, in that it provides new models through which performing 
artists approach the instrument of their body; borrowing from Rousseau, I believe that 
the migration of theory into practice cannot be forced into a strict chronological 
frame. The present study’s concept of “Ghost-Bodies” implies that particular patterns 
of investment can emerge sporadically and intermittently in time, as demonstrated in 
Chapters 5 and 7, where I have argued that two different ghost-bodies have emerged 
in various determinations over the last two centuries in dance performance, and are 
still continuing to emerge in new guises in the beginning of the twenty-first century. 
In what follows, in the current chapter on dance practice, I do not wish to follow 
Roach’s lead, which would lead me to attempt to indicate how vitalist science 
influenced dance practice and theories of dance practice in the same period (1690- 
1770). Rather, it is my aim to show here how the questions that concerned vitalist 
science re-emerge in various guises in the context of contemporary practice in France 
beginning in the 1980s, and to demonstrate how these constitute a “neo-vitalist” 
movement which in the year 2004 is still continuing to gather momentum.
Altered States and the Ghost-Body-as-Marionette
In Chapter 7 ,1 traced the figure of the ghost-body-as-manonette, in the figures 
of the Somnambulist, the Fugitive and the Still-[But-A]-Live body, as these appeared 
in the divers artistic media of the novel, film, and dance. In these artistic productions, 
the three bodies appear as the sign that the self has b e e n  liberated from conscious,
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rational, processes, and as having been delivered into an altered state of being. 
Watching the somnambulating figure of their mistress in the sleep-walking scene in 
Shakespeare’s 1606 Macbeth, the two characters present share what may seem the 
ironic lines: You see her eyes are open/Ay, but their sense is shut” (Act V. Sc. 1. 21- 
22). For while their sense/reason, may be asleep, their sensitivity is awake. In 1978, 
Pina Bausch revisited Shakespeare’s Macbeth: explicitly in Er Nimmt Sie an Der 
Hand, implicitly in her creation of Lady Macbeth-avatars in her pair of 
sonmambulists in Café Müller. For what is dramatised in Café Muller, through its two 
sleepwalkers’ shutting of their eyes, is precisely their opening themselves to a state in 
which they possess an uncommon inner-vision. As the two somnambulists steer 
themselves through the maze of furniture onstage, the audience becomes aware of the 
dancers’ finely tuned ability to orient themselves through internal, proprioceptive 
information, rather than in relation to external references. As 1 argued in Chapter 6, 
for Mesmer, the altered state of sleepwalking did not constitute a loss of sense, but 
rather involved an excursion to an otherwise inaccessible realm of clairvoyance. 
Similarly, I have argued that in the Gothic novel and the novel of sensation, the 
altered state of the Somnambulist is seen as one in which the rich realms of intuition 
and instinct offer important intelligence to the self. At the end of Wilkie Collins’s 
The Woman in White, its arch-villain Count Fosco (forced by the hero Hartwright to 
deliver a confession) remarks that it was the super-fine intuition of one of the story’s 
two somnambulist-heroines, Anne Catherick, which succeeded in foiling his scheme 
to disinherit her double, Laura Fairlie. For when Anne enters Fosco’s house and 
discovers that her companion is not there as Fosco has promised she will be, her 
intuition tells her the truth, that evil is afoot, and this in turn prevents her from giving 
credence to Fosco’s polished and reasonable lies. Enormously distressed, though how 
appropriately so she can not consciously know, Anne falls into a fit, dies, and, more 
importantly for the purposes of the plot, is registered as dead, such that Fosco can no 
longer make the substitution of the two women happen in perfect simultaneity. The 
discrepancy in timing means his scheme now has a weak point that will later allow 
Hartwright to restore Laura’s identity. As Fosco reflects that he has underestimated 
the acuity of intuition that can sometimes be present in the absence of reason, Collins 
pays tribute through him to the unconscious processes of the vitalist body.
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The Matter o f  Timing
In The Mediterranean, Fernand Braudel theorises history as the whole that is 
formed by different timings of processes. For Braudel, differently timed processes are 
imaged through the metaphor of geology, as layerings of cultural inscription, all of 
which are simultaneously present, but which nevertheless are characterised by the 
different speeds of their elaboration. Braudel argues that traditional histories concern 
themselves only with the most rapid level of history, the history he designates as the 
“L’histoire de l’événement”, the “history of the event”. Braudel insists that this layer 
of historical event was underpinned and supported by deeper and slower layers of 
sedimented custom, a history whose measure of time is not that of the rise and fall of 
different government bodies, but that of the elaboration of a body of civilisation itself.
I extrapolate from Braudel’s model, which scrutinises and theorises the different 
timings of processes within a whole, and apply my extended version of his theory to 
the human body. I suggest that mechanistic science is a way of looking at the body at 
the level of its local event, for such science concerns itself with action, and with 
locomotion. I seek to understand vitalistic science as one which sees the body as a 
site of sedimentation rather than the site of event, and one which asks questions about 
the slower, more constant (and involuntary) processes which underpin and support 
locomotion. As G.S. Rousseau reminds us, the mechanistic and vitalistic sciences 
emerge from traditions which are engaged in a dialectic relationship. Here, 1 argue 
that a neo-vitalistic body, which had been dormant within the dominant mechanistic 
body, began to re-emerge in force in dance practice beginning in the 1980s. Using 
Braudel’s categorisation, the practice of dance in France, particularly the pedagogy of 
dance training, has traditionally been one designed exclusively to address the body, 
mechanistically, as “event”. However, beginning in 1990s, a movement in dance 
teaching gathered momentum and influence, one that was beginning to see the body 
as sedimentation: to take into account the underlying processes which support the 
body-of-action. This pedagogy is one which I shall argue can be meaningftilly
characterised as vitalistic, or even neo-vitalistic.
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The Terrain o f Practice in France. 1990-20QQ
When I arrived in France in 1990, the presence of the neo-vitalistic body in 
practice was beginning to emerge, as if summoned by the presence of the Ghost- 
Body-as-Marionette Avithin the aesthetic realm. And as it began to emerge more 
clearly in the dance scene in France, the Ghost-Body-as-Marionette brought with it its 
own kind of diffuse and distributed affiliations. By contrast with the Ghost-Body-as- 
Clockwork, according to which transmission from one generation passed to a student 
from a single teacher or school, the Ghost-Body-as-Marionette created bodies that 
each were traversed by diverse and multiple influences. Onstage, the Ghost-Body-As- 
Marionette, that was characterised by altered states of being, dear to vitalism, 
appeared in two particular dancing bodies, which shook the perceptions of the 
watching public. One of these was the neo-Expressionistic body seen in Pina 
Bausch’s Tanztheater, the other was a body cultivated by release technique, which 
found its most exemplary determination in the the company of Trisha Brown. Not 
only was Pina Bausch’s Tanztheater so popular with the general public that tickets for 
her performances at Paris’s Théâtre de la Ville were almost impossible to come by, 
but French choreographers and dancers had been profoundly influenced by her 
aesthetic.
The story of the development of the Ghost-Body-As-Marionette can be traced 
through my own involvement in dance in France. Upon my arrival in France, after a 
ten-year career, during which I danced a wide span of classical and neo-classical 
repertoire, including Marius Petipa, George Balanchine, William Forsythe, Jiri 
Kylian, and Christopher Bruce, I searched for a dance studio at which to tram while 
completing a Bachelor of Arts in Comparative Literature at the Amencan University 
of Paris. I found two excellent classes: one a classical ballet class taught by 
Emmanuelle Lyon (with whom in 2000 I taught a teacher-training course on 
Balanchine that 1 describe in Chapter 4) and held at the Ménagerie de Verre; the other 
a contemporary training with Peter Goss at his own school, which had been 
recommended to me by a fellow dancer in the Grand Théâtre de Genève, Stephanie 
White, who had previously danced for Goss, and who is now a contemporary teacher 
at Rosalia Hightower’s school in Cannes. At the latter class 1 met Connne Barbara, a
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dancer who has danced with Maguy Marin, Charles Cré-ange, Catherine Berbesscou, 
as well as with Peter Goss. When I interviewed Barbara in June 2000, she recounted 
that the event that had most marked her as an artist, and marked her generation of 
dancers, was seeing Pina Bausch when she first arrived in Paris in 1978. The French 
public in the late 1970s had been used to looking at the formal lines and the 
disciplined bodies of the largely Cunningham-influenced technique. Barbara 
remembers:
I think that if  one asked each dancer what had been his or her first 
truly great jolt, that they would all answer: Pina Bausch. The day 
when Pina arrived in Paris for the first time in 1978, at the Théâtre de 
la Ville with Barbe Bleue, something changed. We were all there, all 
the dancers, many of whom have since become choreographers.
That piece obviously overturned everything for all of us. The 
changes that Bausch provoked in our heads in some cases took a 
certain time to show: ten years for some... But without doubt her 
performances sowed the seeds of change.
Bausch’s influence was felt internally, in her own body, by Barbara in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s; in the interview she gave me in 2000, she remarked that she saw 
Bausch’s influence externalised in the world, imitated by other dancing bodies, in the 
late 1980s, when she returned to France in 1988 after working for four years in the 
United States with choreographer Elisa Monte. For Barbara, Angelin Prejlocaj’s Les 
Noces, Jean-Claude Gallotta’s Docteur Labus and Mammane, Bouvier/Obadia’s 
Compagnie Esquisse, and even Maguy Marin’s May B., the French choreography that 
was then touring nationally and internationally, clearly manifested Bausch’s 
influence. For Barbara, the memory of Bausch remains active on her own movement 
fantasy, for she acknowledges: “in any case, when 1 improvise today, I feel that what 
influences me is Pina”.
The second vitalistic body which shook perceptions in France and exerted a 
palpable influence on dance practice—the “Brownian body or the body formed by 
release technique—I wish to trace indirectly, through the way in which it inhabited 
the imagination of kinesiologist Hubert Godard. Godard can be thought of as the 
quintessential Ghost-Body-as-Marionette, because several strains of influence were 
already converging in his own body. Godard was a kinesiologist who had a clinical 
practice with recuperating cancer patients, but he was also a teacher-tramer in 
Rolfing, a practitioner of the Alexander technique, as well a dancer, and a wnter on
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inmovement. He also directed a teacher-training course for dance teachers 
kinesiology, of which he was the principal teacher, and lectured in the Dance 
Department of Paris VIII, of which he later took over the directorship. I met Godard 
in 1992, through Emannuelle Lyon, when Lyon suggested I might be interested in 
integrating Godard’s kinesiology teacher-training (which Lyon and I completed 
together), over the course of which I became familiar with his thought. This 
familiarity grew when, after completing my BA degree at the American University of 
Paris, I enrolled in a Master of Arts programme in the Dance Department of the 
Université de Paris VIII, where Godard supervised my Master’s thesis, and part of my 
course work consisted in translating his articles into English.
Godard’s articles are haunted by the Brownian body, in that the fascinating 
sight of Brown’s dance, as reported by Godard, repeatedly serves him as the emblem 
which exemplifies the vitalistic paradigm towards which Godard wishes to shift. An 
English reader may approach Godard’s thought most conveniently by reading the 
articles collected and translated from French into English in a special French issue 
(Winter 1996) of the Australian dance publication Writings On Dance. The collected 
articles of this issue, which contain interviews of Godard, whose interlocutors are 
Laurence Louppe and Daniel Dobbels, at the same time permit anglophones to 
approach the writing of those who are surely France’s two foremost dance scholars. 
In “Corporeal Sources; A Journey Through the Work of Trisha Brown”, Louppe 
remarks on Brown’s “miraculous abandon”, an abandon which she cites Godard as 
posing in terms which may recall the Somnambulist and the Still-[But-A]-Live body: 
Godard describes Brown as “disarmed to the point of disappearance 
(évanouissement)” (8). Since a more literal translation for “évanoiussement is the 
act of fainting, here Godard is characterising Brown’s body in terms of an acute 
passivity that leads onto a realm where consciousness is lost. In the same journal, in 
“Singular Moving Geographies”, Louppe’s questions to Godard expose how he 
envisages the dancing body. Rather than seeing the body as an agent who acts on the 
world according to the Ghost-Body-as-Clockwork; for Godard, the body is a site 
where a plurality of inscriptions and tendencies cross and mark it: “a multi-directional 
geography of relations with oneself, and with the world (14). Later in the same 
interview, Godard explains that these inscriptions on and in the dancer are muscular
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and emotive ones. As Godard explains what he means, he also shows the body of 
knowledge that is shaping his point of view:
One can talk of a plastic corporeal memory, a “geography” that is 
shaped by everything that is lived. This memory is not inscribed by 
neural circuits, its in the plastic modelling of the tissues that generate 
the tensional organisation of our bodies. Obviously I’m thinking of 
the role of the fascia, the muscle sheaths rich in collagenic fibers 
(and not innervated), and which produce memory (16).
Here, the way Godard images the body shows the influence of his practice as a Roller, 
a massage technique which addresses the fascia, or the body’s connective tissue. For 
Godard, the body is a tensegrity structure, as he shows more obviously in his article 
“C’est le mouvement qui donne corps au geste” (“Movement is What Gives Form to 
Gesture”) which appeared in Marsyas in June 1994. Godard writes:
To simplify in the extreme, it is possible to classify the materials that 
are responsible for corporeal mechanics like those of a camping tent.
The masts are the bone structure, the elastic bands are the muscles, 
and the canvas is the ensemble of non-muscular tissue (ligaments, 
tendons, fascia, etc.). When an elastic pulls exaggeratedly on a 
single side for a certain time, it ends by orienting the crossing of 
fibres in the canvas in its direction and in this way inscribes, by a 
plastic deformation of the weave, a mark which remains. One may 
try to re-balance the elastics to no avail, for the canvas will remain 
twisted. (74)
Godard the Rolfer and Rolfer Teacher-trainer, is also Godard the Alexander 
practitioner, who was moved by Brown’s body because the influences in her body had 
also traversed his own. In Daniel Dobbel’s interview with Godard, “The Missing 
Gesture” (in the same issue of Writings on Dance), Godard stresses the empathy that 
makes the watcher of dance into a marionette and the dancer into a marionette master:
Cunningham has repeatedly said that it is not the dancer that one 
watches, but the trace of the dancer’s gesture. Consequently, at no 
moment am I able to ‘go into’ the sphere of the dancer; whereas with 
Trisha I literally enter this sphere. In her work there is a kinesthetic 
empathy, whereas Cunningham compels abstraction, obliges the 
spectator to cut the umbilical cord of kinesthetic empathy, in order to 
look at something else, his discourse. (44)
For Godard, the ‘umbilical cord’ of kinetic empathy works on the body of the 
spectator, making him or her dance, as though physically moved by strings which 
connect his or her body to the dancer:
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I am sure that one could measure, with electromyographical 
equipment, the difference of flow in the nervous systems of a 
Cunningham spectator and a Trisha Brown spectator. In Trisha’s 
work, the spectator remakes the dancer’s gesture but without 
sufficient intensity to realise it; whereas Cunningham forbids, cuts, 
prevents, any rapport of this kind. (44)
Yet the strings that connect Godard’s body to Brown’s and allow him to be so moved 
by it, were already present in his own body, waiting to be accessed: his own bodily 
knowledge of the Alexander method. For in the development of his argument Godard 
says:
Cunningham never provides any indications as to the proprioceptive 
origin of the movement; it’s that or it’s not that; whereas with Trisha 
Brown, all of the research into the skeleton, the Alexander work, 
entails a journey into an interior geography which in turn provokes 
the spectator. (44)
In Brown’s body, Godard recognised a body which created a sublime aesthetic form 
out of a practice in which his own body was deeply invested, thus justifying that 
practice.
Godard’s personal convictions about body practice are important because they 
influenced a large population of dancers, dance teachers and dance theorists through 
his key positions in two French institutions. In 1990 the Ministry of Culture passed a 
law requiring dance teachers to hold a State Diploma, the Diplôme D’État, commonly 
abbreviated as the “D.E.”, in order to teach dance. In order to provide the training for 
prospective dance teachers, the Ministry also supported the teaching institutions 
which would prepare candidates for the State-controlled examinations. The state- 
regulated training centres thus became the platform from which a certain theorisation 
of the body, largely Godard’s, was rapidly transmitted to a large population of 
teachers, and, through them, to their students.
At the time the flagship institution of the D.E. was the CND', at the head of 
which was the nationally recognised pedagogue and dancer Françoise Dupuy. Dupuy 
had responsibility to the training programme as a whole, which included several 
disciplines: the physical mastery of the technique in question, teaching methods, child 
psychology, dance history, and music. Yet the essential part of the D.E. curriculum
' Centre National de la Danse, one o f  whose four departments concerns pedagogy. Up until 1997 this 
department was known by a different name: IFEDEM, or die Institut Français d’Enseigneraent de la 
danse et de la musique.
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was the discipline of kinesiology, for it was concern to ensure the health of young 
dance students which had motivated the Ministry of Culture to create the diploma in 
the first place. At its inception, this discipline was under the joint direction of the two 
movement analysts most renowned in France: Odile Rouquet, who soon left to take up 
a prestigious post at the CNSM (Conservatoire National Superior de la Musique et de 
la Danse), and Godard. Working in concert, Rouquet and Godard designed its 
curriculum, whose particular approach to the body was emphatically signalled by its 
somewhat unwieldy title: ‘Tanalyse fonctionnelle du corps dans le mouvement 
dansé”.
The name of the discipline, which literally translated reads, “the functional 
analysis of the body in danced movement”, requires some comment here (even 
though, hereafter, I shall abbreviate the name in translation as the “analysis of the 
dancing body”). “L’analyse fonctionnel^  stressed that the discipline was constituted 
by the scientific observation of the body rather than by an aesthetic evaluation. The 
discipline was thus placing itself beyond or above the divisions between the particular 
aesthetics of the three specificities to be taught in the training centres: ballet, 
contemporary dance, and jazz, thus making claims to be a superogatory discipline, or 
meta-discipline, that could address each dance technique with equal relevance. The 
name further stressed that the discipline was an analysis of the body, “l’analyse du 
corps’\  rather than an analysis of movement, perhaps because it was feared that 
“movement analysis” could all too easily become an analysis of the movement 
onstage: an analysis that interested itself in choreographic design, the movement of 
groups of bodies, rather than one that read the patterns of individual bodily usage in 
practice or performance. The emphatic re-centring of this new discipline upon the 
body, a re-centring which saw the isolated moment of performance as bearing the 
mark of the body’s quotidian activities, was a reaction against the prevailing way in 
which kinesiology had at the time been applied to dance.
In Louppe’s “Singular Moving Geographies”, Godard specifically critiques 
the bio-mechanical science that has typically been applied to the dancing body. 
Godard contested the pertinence of bio-mechanical discourse that is interested in 
measuring and quantifying movement, while dance, for Godard, “is based on the idea 
of quality, and not at all on what could be quantifiable, or directly identifiable in 
spatial or morphological terms”(16). For Godard, science should be used to trace
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investments of intensities in the body which found the body’s poetic expressive 
charge, rather than to define virtuosity. In the article Louppe recapitulates Godard’s 
critique, writing that science and medical discourse have usually been used to 
overlook and deny the imaginary in the body (16). By contrast, the discipline of the 
“Analysis of the Dancing Body” aimed precisely to give spirit a recognised place in 
the body, to show the connections between the body and the mind. This can be seen 
both in what it included in its curriculum and in what it left out.
The curriculum of the discipline of the Analysis of the Dancing Body 
comprised several sub-disciplines. The so-called “exact sciences” were important 
subjects of study: anatomy; physiology; chemistry; and physics; but so too were the 
“human sciences”: psychology; psychoanalysis; child development; and
phenomenology. Particular stress was placed on neurology, both as the discipline 
which linked the mental and the physical bodies, and as the subject which could 
provide the knowledge required to enable the dance teacher to be aware of the deeper 
and slower physical and mental processes at work in his or her students of dance 
during learning. The curriculum also studied different somatic techniques, such as 
those elaborated by Mosche Feldenkrais, Mattias Alexander, and Bonnie Bainbridge- 
Cohen. At the same time, the curriculum gave very little time to the study of 
biomechanics and the subjects it leads logically onto: morphology and pathology. 
The particularity of this can be seen if we consider how science has typically been 
applied to dance: as the method by which the body can become a more performative 
instrument, a more efficient executor of physical feats. This viewpoint on the dancing 
body is a mechanistic one.
Exemplary of the mechanist, Ghost-Body-as-Clockwork approach to the 
dancing body is Deborah Bull’s recent three-part BBC television series. The Dancer’s 
Body (2002). In the first part of the series, entitled A Machine That Dances, Bull asks 
herself the question: “What does the ballet dancer do?”, and answers: the dancer 
turns, jumps, and lifts one leg (high) in the air while standing on the other, and with 
these specific tours de force in mind, she investigates the science which explains the 
details of the physical processes at work which enable the dancer to spot, generate 
elevation, and develop extension. But an analysis such a Bull’s, which allows a 
definition of how a body performs such moves, also provides the criteria which show 
why some bodies can perform them better than others. During the analysis of a jump.
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Bull’s programme revealed that it was an unusually long Achilles’ tendon relative to 
the thigh bone, and to her weight, which allows the gymnast she chose to film, to 
jump higher than her competitors; Bull compared her own développé à la seconde 
with that of another dancer from the Royal Ballet, whose leg lifted far higher than her 
own. Bull’s analysis stressed that extension is not determined only by muscular 
factors, of stretch and strength, but also by morphological ones’, it was the tiny 
differences in the exact convex and concave forms of the two women’s respective ball 
and socket articulation of the hip that limited Bull’s extension while it permitted the 
h i^ e r  extension of the other female dancer. In contrast to Bull’s positivist approach, 
which tends to a selection of the bodies most ‘apt’ to perform cWain moves, for 
Godard, there are no good bodies and bad bodies, only gestures which me expressive 
in different ways.
The Vitalistic Body of Thought of Hubert Godard
The CND, supported by the French Government, but under the jurisdiction of 
the French Ministry of Culture, constituted one site in which the vitalistic body 
emerged as a presence; the French National Education system provided another such 
site. This it did in the University of Paris VIII, within its department. Arts du 
spectacle. For here, the same Hubert Godard who co-directed the discipline of the 
Analysis of the Dancing Body at its inception, was also given a post as Director of 
Dance Studies, and this at one of only two universities in France where dance was 
studied within its own discipline and through its own methodology. Godard was thus 
a doubly powerful and influential vector of thought during the period from 1990- 
1999, being central to both institutions of higher learning, as can be seen in the recent 
writing of Godard’s colleagues at the University of Paris VIII, dance scholars Isabelle 
Ginot, Isabelle Launay, and especially that of Dominique Fraud, who, besides holding 
an MA in dance from the same institution, also completed her teacher-training 
diploma in the Analysis of the Dancing Body in 1997 under Godard’s direction.
In the two institutions where Godard held directorships he earnestly defended 
ftie point of view of the dancer, and promoted the dancer’s institutional and socio­
economic position. His involvement with the D.E. was motivated in part to bolster 
that position and support that point of view. The higher diploma as Formateur was 
designed to provide dancers with the scientific knowledge that would allow dance
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artists, rather than academics, to teach anatomy and physiology within D.E. training 
programmes, in effect making these “theoretical” (and thus better-paid) posts 
available to dancers. For Godard’s central assumption was that dancers have a 
particular perception of the body, and that this perception should constitute and 
interpret its own body of knowledge.
Godard’s activity at the University of Paris VIII, was consistent with that at 
the CND, according practice-based research in dance a more dominant place. Godard 
entered a dance department where the dominant methodologies were those of art 
history, anthropology and history, which determined that the theorisation of dance 
involved the application of criteria elaborated in other fields to the experience of the 
dancer. In “Le Geste et sa Perception”, the postface to La Danse au XXe siècle 
(1995) by Marcel Michel and Isabelle Ginot, Godard may be implicitly critiquing the 
state of affairs in the Dance department on his arrival in it. He writes that French 
dance writers have looked at dance through every possible lens—historical, 
ethnological, sociological, musicological, and scenographical—except through that 
offered by an appreciation of the dancer’s energetic investment of the movement he or 
she performs, or as Godard writes, “les richesses de la dynamique interne du geste qui 
font sens” (224).^ Godard’s own reading of the dancing body, one which is greatly 
indebted to the phenomenological philosophy of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, argued that 
the theoretical criteria through which dance was to be considered should emerge out 
of practice itself. For Godard, crucially, the experience of dance practice that 
constitutes difference kinds of expressiveness in the dancing body is the same as that 
which generates the perception which can interpret the art the dancing body creates.
Practice in Thought: Scholarly Interest in Process and Pedagogy
Though Godard has now left the Dance department at Paris VIII, his influence 
can be seen in the writing which has emerged recently from its resident dance scholars 
Isabelle Ginot (for whose book Godard wrote the postface), Isabelle Launay, and 
Dominique Praud, who, formed by Godard as a teacher-trainer in kinesiology, is also 
active at the CND. In the co-authored essay “L’école, une fabrique d’anticoips?” 
(2002), Ginot and Launay both manifest and remark the changes in attitude that
‘The riches o f  gesture’s internal dynamics which make sense and meaning
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became visible during the 1990s. In what is clearly a vitalistic metaphor of 
accumulation, they assert that the “terrain” of dance production in France is now 
different, and one that can be seen in the changing perceptions of a population which 
is involved in different capacities in the production of dance. As they write: “many 
choreographers, dancers, teachers, amateurs, and sometimes those in managerial posts 
in dance now have different reflexes”, the vitalistic strain of thought can be seen in 
their metaphor of involuntary action, but it can also be seen, more importantly, 
perhaps, in the inclusive way they link these different populations into a single 
organism. For Ginot and Launay dance is inextricable imbricated into the the fabric 
of society; it does not exist in an ivory tower. It is not an artefact that is produced to 
re-present culture, but rather a means of making it different. True to Gallic fashion, 
the action of that making-different is seen as intellectual activity: dance is a “lieu de 
pensée en écho à celles des politiques de minorités qui tentent de faire de Tart, comme 
de la politique, autrement” (106).
Ginot and Launay set themselves the task of re-marking the ways in which 
attitudes have changed in and towards the production of dance, and of calling for 
further change. The differences they discern in the production of contemporary dance 
today have to do with questions of authority, where authority is seen as a clear binary 
opposition between those in power and those divested of it. The power relations that, 
though now evolving, once most obviously characterised dance, were those between 
the dancer and the choreographer. But Ginot and Launay see that the breakdown of 
these power relations not only keeps the dancing body from being plagued by such 
local questions of authorship, but also extends to the eradication of more global 
questions:
A choreographer today might hesitate to speak of “his” dancers, and 
he might see some of his peers react if he should evoke “his”
National Centre for Choreography; or further, he would not have any 
complexes at launching himself in a film production, to change his 
medium; . . .  a teacher who opposed dancing and thinking might see 
the number of his students decrease; a dance scholar might be 
worried to work only in a library, to ignore the practices of today, 
and never to have crossed the threshold of a dance studio. ( 106)^
Un chorégraphe hésiterait peut-être aujourd’hui à parler de “ses” danseurs, et il verrait aussi certains 
de ses pairs réagir lorsqu’il évoquerait “son” Centre chorégraphique national; ou encore, il n’aurait pas 
de complexe à se lancer dans la production d’un film, à changer de medium . . .  un pedagogue qui 
opposerait danser et penser verrait peut-être le nombre de ses élèves diminuer; un chercheur en danse
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For Ginot and Launay, the same questions of authorship which involved 
choreographer and “his” or “her” dancers in a struggle over the signature of a work, 
and which conspired to restrict that authorship to a specific domain and medium, can 
be seen in the way in which the diverse relationships of dance scholars and dancers to 
the authority of the written word divided theoreticians and practitioners into discrete 
and separate categories. Yet at the same time that Ginot and Launay note that 
perceptions have changed in French dance, they urge their readers to more radical 
movements in the same direction. In the last phrase of the above passage, Ginot and 
Launay address dance theorists who are admonished for not involving their bodies in 
practice; in the rest of the essay these dance writers invert their strategy and accuse 
the practitioners of dance of lack of interest in dance theory. This lack of interest is 
one they diagnose through an analysis of the curricula of the French conservatory 
system, which is criticised for allotting too little time and resources to the “accessory” 
disciplines of art history, dance history, and movement analysis. Ginot and Launay 
ask:
How can one imagine the education of artists in contemporary dance 
when they do not have access to what has been done yesterday and 
what is being done today, when they “are obliged” to see three or 
four performances in a year, and when they have only a few books at 
their disposal in a library when one exists at all. Can artists be 
educated in sites that are deserted of culture and the circulation of 
knowledge? (108/
“L’école, une fabrique d’anticorps?” reveals a neo-vitalist spirit in several ways. It 
can be seen in the fact that Ginot and Launay relate the practice of dance to global 
social and political concerns; in that they consider the dancer as an artist to be 
educated rather than an instrument to be trained. It can be seen in the authors’ 
methodology, which is implied by choosing to focus their inquiry on dance training. 
For in making this their subject they necessarily engage with a slower (vitalist) mode 
of history, one which can contemplate the entire span of that ten-year process, rather
s ’inquiéterait peut-être de ne travailler qu’en bibliothèque, d’ignorer tout des pratiques d’aujourd’hui, 
de ne jamais avoir franchi la porte d’un studio.
Comment imaginer former des artistes en danse contemporaine quand ils n ’ont pas accès à ce qui 
s ’est fait hier et se fait aujourd’hui, quand ils doivent voir “obligatoirement” trois à quatre spectacles 
dans l ’année, et ne disposent que de quelques livres dans une bibliothèque quand elle existe? Des 
artistes peuvent-ils se former dans des lieux désertés de culture et de circulation de savoirs?
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than remaining in the “history of the event”, an approach that might have been 
apposite, say, to a critique of a particular aesthetic.
Thought in Practice: Peter Goss and the “New Pedagoev”
I have argued that Godard was an important vector through which the vitalist 
body grew widespread in the production of dance in France. Yet the changing 
perceptions that Ginot and Launay write about, a current that became palpable and 
visible in the 1990’s, emerged out of a decade of prior practice. Neo-vitalistic thought 
and practice received official recognition through their institutionalisation in the 
conservatory and at university—happening within Braudel’s “layer of event”. Yet the 
terrain of receptivity to vitalistic thought and practice had been prepared by dance 
practitioners whose many years of foundational work has not yet been acknowledged. 
These practitioners, dance teachers, were involved in researching and practicing 
alternative somatic techniques, and in studying the anatomical and physiological 
systems which these exploited. Within this current, one of the most important 
individuals, and one who may serve as emblematic of what I wish to relate, is the 
dance teacher and choreographer Peter Goss.
I have recounted how I met one important marionette-body, Godard, through 
my training with Lyon, and under his aegis pursued my teacher-trainer diploma in the 
Analysis of the Dancing Body and worked toward my MA in Dance. Yet at the same 
time I was also training almost daily with a person who, I will argue, is another 
vitalistically inclined, marionette-inspired and inspiring body, the dance teacher Peter 
Goss. Goss, of whom Les Saisons de la Danse wrote (in its Summer issue of 1997) 
that he is “one of the most determining teachers for contemporary dance in France”  ^
one who has had a widespread influence on generations of French dancers. In “Danse 
Contemporaine et Pratiques Somatiques: L’Enseignement de Peter Goss” (published 
in the issue “Incorporer”, Summer 2001, no 46, of the Belgian dance journal. 
Nouvelles de Danse) Dominique Praud, who I have noted is active both as a dance 
analyst for the Ministry of Culture and a dance scholar at the University of Paris VIIL 
writes that in France, Goss’s class is put into “the category of ‘new pedagogies’ even
‘L’un des pedagogues les» plus détenniiiants pour la danse contemporaine en France , p5.
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though Peter Goss has used somatic techniques in his classes for more than 20 
years”(189). Her article also stresses Goss’s excellent reputation as a teacher in 
France, writing: “Any number of renowned dancers or choreographers have taken his 
classes; no curriculum vitae of value goes without citing his name” (188).
Goss arrived in Paris in 1969, founding the Peter Goss Dance Company in 
1972, and the roster of the dancers who worked for Goss shows just how widespread 
his influence has been ever since that time. Goss is an extremely imaginative and 
creative teacher, opening the minds and bodies of those who work with him, helping 
them to imagine movement in new and surprising ways. His ex-dancers are now 
renowned teachers themselves: such as Emmanuelle Lyon, Corinne Barbara, and 
Stephanie White, whom I have already mentioned, to whom one may add the names 
of Kim Kan and Patrice Valero. They are also choreographers: Sophie Lessard, 
Richild Springer, Bruce Taylor, Serge Ricci, and Mié Coquempot. Some remain 
charismatic performers, the most visible of whom must be Dominique Mercy, who 
joined Pina Bausch’s Wupperthaler Tanztheater in 1977 and who continues to thrill 
audiences in Paris on the Company’s yearly visits to the Théâtre de la Ville.
In 1981 Goss opened his school, the École Peter Goss, where I began training 
in 1990. In 1994 I became part of the teaching team of four teachers at the school, a 
team which includes José Cazeneuve, and Chrystèle Defosse, as well as Goss himself. 
In 1999, Goss was selected by the Ministry of Culture to choreograph a variation for 
use in its D.E. examinations, and Goss delegated to me the responsibility of teaching 
this variation in the D.E. training centres. In my capacity as one of the teaching team 
at Goss’s school, I have often been called upon to analyse and explicate Goss’s 
teaching methods, and those of the school as a whole. For Goss’s class has a specific 
form which comprises the exercises of several techniques, which occur in the class 
more or less in distinct sections. These sections themselves respect a certain 
progression, one which develops over the two hour duration of the class session.
Goss’s contemporary technique class begins with a section Goss calls “Floor 
Work”, which distinguishes itself, both from the floor-work of a Graham technique 
class, which often involves quite strenuous movements with the dancers seated, and 
from the “floor barre”, a training undertaken with dancers lying either supine or 
prone, but whose aim is almost exclusively the construction of the outward rotation of 
the legs. By contrast, Goss’s Floor Work, which begins with the dancers lying
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relaxed on their backs, engages them in small almost effortless movements which are 
inspired largely by the Feldenkrais technique. On a first level these exercises 
primarily solicit the mobilities of the spine, the rib cage, the shoulder girdle, and the 
sacro-iliac region; but on a second level they aim to make the dancer become aware of 
the changing relationships of the different parts of the body one to another during the 
movement as it unfolds. The exercises are not demonstrated to the dancers, but 
rather, the voice of the teacher describes the actions he or she proposes that the 
student make, by naming the precise parts of the body which are to be moved and the 
direction of those movements.
After this section of the class, which lasts for approximately one half-hour, 
Goss begins his second section, which I call “Free-Standing Stationary Work”. In this 
section of the class, as though in a Limon or Cunningham class, the exercises consist 
in preparatory coordinations for the torso and arms while remaining in place in the 
classroom, but they also include yoga stretching exercises. The following section is 
Barre-Work. Here, the feet and leg exercises that come from academic ballet are 
practised, yet these are unlike ballet exercises in that the movements of the lower 
body are not worked in isolation, and with a largely static upper body. Rather, the 
lower-body coordinations are added to the torso movements which were prepared in 
the previous, Free-Standing Stationary Work. The last section of the class is 
Travelling Combinations. Here, the students dance a lengthy variation performed 
across the floor; the class ends with an exercise of travelling jumps.
Some might call Goss’s class a hybrid form, but I prefer to characterise it as a 
class in which the Ghost-Body-as-Marionette is present. For if the class borrows from 
many different traditions, in the somatic techniques and body practices it includes, it 
does not synthesise the different strands of knowledge it offers the dance, but merely 
makes them available for each dancer’s own personal synthesis. When I arrived in 
Goss’s class in 1990, Goss’s classes spoke to me precisely because they were an 
invitation for me to create such a dynamic synthesis; to take new somatic information 
into my body without having to deny or undo the knowledge which my body already 
had acquired, which at that point was largely that of classical ballet. It was just this 
possibility which Goss’s class provided, of integrating new and old bodily experience 
in the present moment.
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There is a synthesis which is worked towards if not inculcated in the body, 
which is implied in the movement quality Goss proposes in the variations which end 
his class, which Goss himself recognises has points in common the gestural world of 
Pina Bausch.^ This movement often begins in the arms, continuous movement which 
affects the body globally, involving first the head, shoulders and torso in inclinations 
which either succumb to the momentum and direction of the arms, or bend the other 
way in smooth resistance to them. From the upper body’s reaction to the arms, the 
body as a whole is moved to change its weight from one leg to another, and either is 
propelled forward in space or more firmly grounded on the spot. If the global 
movement of the arms, and their impetus on the torso, bears a relation to Limon 
technique, the local rotations of wrists, elbows and the role of the hands in Goss’s 
movement show the influence of Tai Chi, while the activity of the shoulders and 
sternum reflects Goss’s yoga practice. In the lower body, the definition and precision 
of Goss’s legwork comes from ballet, but the sophisticated systems of isolation of the 
upper and lower body, and the powerful way in which the legs engage with and resist 
the floor, were acquired by Goss in his early Jazz training.
The ‘hybridity’ of Goss’s technique makes it criticised by of those in the 
terrain of French contemporary dance who are interested in affirming their own 
techniques as pure lineage (and themselves as the recipients of this pure heritage). 
But it has also recently gained support and recognition from dance practitioners who 
are less interested in preserving and monitoring the specificities of each dance 
technique than in searching for ways in which dance training can become the 
laboratory for invention and creation in dance rather than the reproduction of 
established forms. This aspect of Goss’s class is the one which Fraud’s article 
underscores. In the article, which Praud wrote based on an interview with Goss, 
Praud situates herself as a practitioner and improviser as much as a dance analyst, 
describing the subjective body states that Goss’s training evokes and develops.
Fraud writes that the effect on her body of beginning on the floor, with 
exercises inspired from the Feldenkrais technique; “puts the dancer out of the habitual 
field of his or her imagination” and that this fosters a “spirit that is proper to a 
workshop, in which what is sought is to oblige the creative work of the imagination to 
be the first source of movement” (189). Bodies no longer inhabit the confident.
Private conversation between the author and Peter Goss.
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pragmatic and repetitive body-state of “savoir-faire”, states Praud, but rather, enter the 
more fluid, fertile, and explorative one of “pouvoir-être” (189).
In 2000, I conducted an interview with two former Goss dancers who are 
active today as teachers, dancers and choreographers, and who still train with Goss, 
for I wanted to understand in what way their daily bodily training with Goss was 
related to their imaginative activity as interpretive and creative artists. One of these 
former Goss dancers is Corinne Barbara, from whose interview I have already quoted; 
the other is Mié Coquempot, who also worked with Odile Duboc and Daniel Larrieu 
before beginning her own choreography. In these two interviews Barbara and 
Coquempot reflect that the role of the contemporary dancer is a changed one in 
French contemporary dance today: it has had to adapt because the role of the 
choreographer has changed so radically. In Fraud’s article she writes that in France 
“one is always suspicious of teachers who choreograph and of choreographers who 
teach”(194), and a similar observation emerged in the interview I conducted with 
Coquempot. Coquempot began her interview by describing how she was approaching 
her new choreography. Coquempot’s projected piece was improvisation-based. 
There were to be three weeks of rehearsal and the performance was to follow right 
after. For Coquempot, because it was improvisation, she felt that her work consisted 
in creating systems, and in imagining the over all organisation of the improvisation. 
Later in the interview Coquempot remarked:
There are hardly any choreographers who teach any more in France, 
except for Odile Duboc. I think that the creative artist 
[choreographer] today doesn’t place himself as someone who creates 
a vocabulary, but as someone who creates a mise-en-scène, codes, 
threads. He doesn’t create the material; he limits it, arranges it . . .
This means that the status of the dancer-interpreter has changed; but 
the status of the choreographer has changed because he is no longer a 
teacher, [which means that] the status of the teacher has changed too! 
Everything is moving at the moment! We are really in a very 
interesting period.
Barbara too noted the way in which the role of the teacher in France today has been
changed in response to the change in the role of the choreographer. She said that
today in France there are fewer and fewer chorographers who defend their own
movement vocabulary, or even propose one:
I have a friend who dances with Meg Stuart, for example. In her new 
work, Stuart doesn’t impose anything, but may just propose, for
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example, and an architecture, a certain pattern of travelling, or a 
certain rhythm. And because of this it is in her interest that her 
dancers be autonomous. I think that we are in a new generation in 
which dancers have to be good technicians, but also, must be creative 
and autonomous.
For Barbara, the necessity for the dancer to be actively creative, rather than the 
instrument who reproduces the choreographer’s exact movements, is one important 
reason why dancers are now turning to different kinds of movement training:
More and more, dancers also take classes in yoga, Tai-Chi, or 
somatic techniques like Feldenkrais: they’ve obviously realised that 
it wasn’t by only taking classical ballet that they’d be prepared for 
their craft! For a contemporary dancer, Peter’s class seems to me 
ideal because he gives the dancer a consciousness of his or h ^  body.
The Teacher as Marionette and Marionette-Handier
Praud presents Goss as a researcher in dance, one who unceasingly seeks out 
elements from different body practices, with which he animates his own 
understanding of the body and his teaching, thus enlivening the dance practice of his 
students. This implies a new conceptualisation of the body of knowledge which the 
teacher transmits, not as a fixed ensemble of skills, but rather as a living body that 
grows and changes in relation to time, the student and the teacher: for Goss, teaching 
occurs when the enthusiasm of the teacher can engage the student in the knowledge to 
be shared. Fraud’s article contains passages from her interview with Goss which 
prove the relational aspect of his mode of teaching. Goss states that when he first 
began teaching he noticed that many students had problems with alignment, 
coordinating movements as sequences (as opposed to moving the whole body tightly, 
as a block), that they lacked the concentration necessary to make the interior of their 
bodies present to them during a movement; and that that it was in response to these 
problems that he began proposing the proprioceptive exercises at the beginning of 
class (190). It was also in response to the body-state of his students that Goss later 
began to incorporate yoga exercises into his class. He notes:
For certain dancers, having been on the floor during the Feldenkrais 
exercises made them a little floaty when they stood up. their tonic 
system was less present. That’s why I now use yoga at this moment
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in the class. This permits them a certain firmness that is necessary 
later in the class, while still remaining in the idea of extension. (192)
Yet even as Goss is attentive and responsive to the bodies of his students, he insists 
that his own body-of-knowledge must move on and change to be effective. Later in 
the same interview Goss explains:
I hope that I will continue to change and discover things...! don’t 
have a plan, but evolving oneself is the only way of teaching: I can’t 
teach what I already know, its too boring. I transmit what I am in the 
process of discovering, what is new and important for me at the 
moment. And I think that it is important to know that the 
understanding of things is gained, also, through the giving of that 
knowledge to others. (197)
Goss not only teaches at his own school, but is also a senior teacher at the CNSM 
Paris’s prestigious conservatory for dance and music. There, Goss is confironted by 
gifted students who are usually younger and always less experienced that those who 
attend the professional class in his open school. Yet Goss’s pedagogy, which is one 
of relation, allows him to adjust to this different audience.
Perhaps Goss is able to address his pedagogy to each student he faces because 
he is himself a student of many different masters. At different moments in time Goss 
practiced the Feldenkrais method, the Alexander technique, Body-Mind Centering, 
Tai-Chi, and Yoga, and each of these body-practices was explored for its ability to 
create new possibilities for the dancer. He was always interested in kinesiology an 
studied it on his own, but since 1990, when Odile Rouquet took up her post at the 
Conservatoire becoming a colleague of Goss, the two have developed a close working 
relationship. Goss’s kinesiological research allows him to propose exercises, in the 
first sections of his class, which are capable of developing the extensibility of the 
dancing body before it trains that body in the specific coordinations of dance steps, in 
the class’s later sections.
The Marionette Metaphor in Practice
The marionette metaphor not only describes the multiple influences on the 
dancing bodies now in dance, and characterises the diversity and interconnectedness 
of these relations, but it also has become an important metaphor in the practice of
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dance. The metaphor of the marionette may assist the body to implement ideals of 
relation, a global organisation of the body, just as the clockwork metaphor was seen to 
assist the dancer to embody ideals of articulation. The marionette strings can be 
translated into the way in which the dancer thinks of his or her own muscles, tendons, 
and connective tissue, conceiving them now, not as discrete segments, but rather, as 
one continuous fabric, the body’s ‘canvas’, as Godard proposed. The metaphor of the 
marionette can also help the dancer to modulate his or her tonicity. Firstly, through 
incorporation of the marionette metaphor and through the visualisation that the 
movement is happening passively to the body, the body may be able to relax some of 
its excess tension. The body may be able to release still more excess tension because 
the direction in which a body part should move has been made clearer. If the body is 
able to release excess tension, this in turn affords the body greater flexibility. And 
through a sequence of somatic events, this means that less effort (and thereby less 
tension) is involved in any given movement, which finally makes it possible for the 
body to relax yet further.
But the phenomenon of muscular tension is a complex issue. Muscular 
tension is regulated by nervous flow, but nervous flow is also implied in many other 
functions in the body. In Chapter 6, I showed how vitalist discoveries about the 
nerves focused on the homeostatic body, traversing all its layers from the outer layer 
of the senses, to the inner layer of the glands. My discussion of the phenomenon of 
mesmerism indicated how treatment of the nerves could culminate in a suspension of 
the will, whose being put to sleep simultaneously awoke ethical questions centred 
upon seduction and trust. In The Prince o f Homburg, K1 cist’s mimed opening to the 
play dramatised the way in which the nervous body longs for relation, affiliation, and 
recognition from external authority. Yet Kleist’s essay “On the Marionette Theatre” 
shows how the relations the body establishes with the world are linked just as often to 
instinctual, animal, levels of the body as they are to cognitive and spiritual ones. In 
Chapter 7, I stressed the way in which the different guises of the ghost-body-as- 
marionette: the Somnambulist, the Fugative, and the Still-[But-A] Live Body, figure 
the relation of the desirous, imaginative, emotional body to laws which prevent it 
from achieving what it desires, imagines, or cherishes. These laws are, firstly, 
physical laws such as space and time, which pose insuperable limits to what the body 
can do and become.
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One way to understand Romanticism’s recurring “double” and the violent 
death often attendant upon its appearance could be to consider it as a manifestation of 
the way in which humans need to exert violent efforts to rid themselves of the fantasy 
they cannot help themselves from entertaining: that they could have other lives, live in 
two places at the same time. The laws constraining these bodies of desire, 
imagination, and emotion also include social laws which circumscribe behaviour. 
The works of art that I analysed in Chapter 7 recognised these laws even as they 
rebelled against them. In nineteenth-century works: in Lewis’s The Monk, social laws 
determined that Agnes would live her life in a nunnery; in Collins’s The Woman in 
White, social laws governed the way in which Mrs. Catherick took her tea; in Stoker’s 
Dracula, social laws made it impossible that Lucy should sleep openly with three 
men. In the Romantic ballet Giselle, social laws determined that Albrecht would 
marry Bathilde rather than Giselle. Yet those works of art, produced at the turn of the 
twenty-first century, which I analysed in Chapter 7, still turn on showing the ways in 
which social laws of conduct reduce the sphere of possibility of the individual’s 
movement, and their authors are still simultaneously recognising and rebelling against 
this restraint through their art. In Bausch’s post-modern Café Müller social law 
cannot tolerate that the couple of lovers danced by Airaudo and Mercy should 
embrace each other in the way they choose; in Amodovar’s Talk to Her, social laws 
make it unthinkable that Benigno should marry a woman who is in a coma.
The effectiveness of the locomotive body depends on all these other bodies: 
the homeostatic, instinctive, animal, desirous, imaginative, and emotional ones, for 
they are all involved in establishing the base level of nervous tension in the body, 
which in turn influences the degree of relaxation and tension in the body’s muscle. In 
my illustration of the body’s complex simultaneity, I have drawn upon examples from 
media which unfold in time: narrative, film, and dance. In his essay entitled “Gesture 
and its Perception”, Godard describes the same simultaneity through a metaphor taken 
from the plastic arts. Godard depicts this simultaneity as the two layers of material 
involved in a painting. One of these is “la figure” (the figure), or the painterly 
depiction which meets the eye of the beholder; the other is le fond , or the canvas
’ Godard’s metaphor o f  “fond” is particularly felicitous in French because o f  the other plural 
associations o f  the word, which imply depth as well as layering. For example, au fond means at 
bottom; a discussion “du fond” is one that gets to the crux o f  the matter; a “debat de fond” is a debate 
that treats o f  fundamental issues. In literature, “fond” is opposed to forme , and their pair o f
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upon which the figure appears. One advantage which Godard’s formulation offers 
that it allows for an immediate perception of the way in which the two layers of what 
together form the picture we see, have separate moments of creation even though they 
are perceived at the same time, the one through the other. How the canvas is prepared 
both animates and imparts texture to the final figure which meets the eye. A further 
crucial advantage offered by Godard’s formulation is that it allows its author to image 
a simple yet fundamental distinction of the body’s structure. Godard equates the 
“canvas” with the body’s postural muscles, the tonic muscles situated in the posterior 
body which are normally antagonists, or restrictors of movement. He equates the 
“figure” with the body’s phasic muscles, those situated mostly at the front of the 
body, which are normally the agonists, or agents of movement. This equation enables 
Godard to illustrate and make easily memorable a basic difference in the tonicity of 
the front and back bodies; and enables him, also, to move forward through a 
continuous sliding to adjacent metaphors, to a characterisation of another fundamental 
property of the back body. This is, simply, that since the back body is behind us it is 
unseen, unknown, the body of which we are unconscious: the unconscious body. 
Godard calls the degree of tonicity that is present in the body “le pré-mouvement ou 
le langage non-conscient de la posture”,* and insists that it cannot be modified solely 
through the intentionality of the subject (224).
It is indeed the case, as dance practice shows, that the nervous body is only 
rarely susceptible to reason and logical arguments. For the nervous body is more 
intimately implicated in the processes of homeostasis, instinct, desire, imagination 
and emotion. The way to move the Somnambulist is not through reasoned 
articulation. Rather, one must proceed by “talking to her”, that is, by addressing the 
nervous body in the codes to which she/he responds. The fact that the body’s tonic 
musculature is not especially responsive to reason and will, cannot be considered a 
drawback once it has been appreciated that there are many other ways in which the 
flow of information can be conveyed.
opposites corresponds to the difference between the English ‘form and content . In painting fond 
can mean a primary or base coat. I have opted to translate fond as canvas because it contains the 
ideas o f  width and stretch which can relate to the extension o f  the body s muscle tissue, and also 
because canvas insists that its material is fabric, the crossing o f  many miniscule threads, also echoing 
the body’s tissues and its myriad relations. I use the word background interchangeably with canvas, 
because this word insists on the history and social inscription o f  the subject.
* The pre-movement or the postural language o f which one is not conscious.
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The flow of intelligence between bodies, between the bodies of dancers 
onstage, between the bodies of dancers and those of the audience members, and 
between the bodies of dance teachers and those of their students, may be conveyed 
through a multiplicity of media, and may address different levels in the self. Some of 
these ways in which the body is addressed remain unconscious, but this does not 
mean that they are any less consequential. The spectator of a dance performance is 
rarely as finely conscious of the way gravity works on his or her body as are dancers. 
Yet this does not mean that he or she is not moved to delight when the dancer 
manifests his or her own ability to play with the effects which gravity has on the 
body, by either defying or exploiting them. For John Martin, as he famously theorised 
in the seminal essay “Metakinesis” (1933), the spectator is moved by watching dance 
because of “the relation that exists between physical movement and mental—or 
psychical” movement, which for Martin is intention itself (23).
Information can only flow between the bodies if the auditor or spectator can 
relate to what is being communicated, if what it hears ‘strikes a chord’ with that 
person’s history or interests him or her for the future. The experiences the spectator 
encounters may appeal to his or her memory and cultural heritage, by containing loci 
in which rich cultural associations are already condensed; they may appeal to his or 
her desiring fantasy by providing strikingly new images out of the ostensibly familiar. 
This double appeal to the spectator’s past and present is demonstrated exemplarily in 
Bausch’s Café Müller. In the figure of the Somnambulist, Bausch appeals to the 
spectator’s cultural heritage, since as I have argued at length, the Somnambulist 
evokes a host of memories form the Romantic and Gothic traditions, as well as 
associations with the medical history of hysteria and psychoanalysis. In Bausch’s use 
of every-day movement, for the characters of the Waiter and Jan Minirk, she includes 
material with which the spectator can both easily live vicariously as it is performed 
onstage, and, perhaps not always comfortably, rediscover as it is given a radically new 
context in her work. In Talk To Her, Almodovar suggests that culture is made up of 
many strands, becoming denser and more concentrated through bodily investment, in 
his close up of Benigno embroidering his and Alicia s initials together on a linen 
sheet. He suggests the existence of loci in a culture where texture is denser, more 
richly woven, in his close-up of the passe-monterie on the boléro of Lydia s elaborate 
matador costume. In these two close-ups Almodovar is describing the sedimented
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character of cultural memory; in two other scenes in which Benigno grooms Alicia’s 
nude body, the cinematographer is atttempting to pull upon these threads, which form 
part of his spectator’s memory. One of these threads is pulled as Almodovar aims his 
camera through the frame of a door left ajar in Alicia’s hospital bedroom. Here, the 
spectators see a revision of Edouard Manet’s Olympia (1863), albeit one seen from 
right to left, and with its ideal of feminine beauty reclining on a hospital bed rather 
than on a courtesan’s couch. Another thread of cultural memory is pulled as 
Almodovar films Marco taking leave of Alicia after he has broken up with Lydia. 
For while the viewer of the film hears Marco talk, he or she simultaneously sees a 
picture he or she may remember: that of Jean-Dominique Ingres’ La Grande 
Odalisque (1831). The violin-shape of a nude back is revealed to the viewer as the 
sheets of Alicia’s hospital bed fall away from their comatose patient, lying on her 
flank.
As my analysis of the work of Bausch and Almodovar has tried to 
demonstrate, the complex marionette-body of the spectator may be addressed on 
many different levels: the homeostatic, instinctual, desirous, imaginative, or 
emotional. It does not matter whether how the body is addressed becomes conscious. 
Yet what can help the process of addressing the body is the knowledge that a 
multitude of layers in the body and a multiplicity of points of possible convergence 
exist. Even if the way in which it occurs cannot either be programmed or fully 
understood, somehow this flow does sometimes manage to reach the nervous body of 
the Fugitive and calm it, to be heard by the Somnambulist who awakens, to arrive at 
the Still-[But-A]-Live body and enliven it.
The Marionette in the Classroom
In contrast to the ghost-body-as-clockwork in the dance classroom, which 
approaches the body through the articulation of its segments, the ghost-body-as- 
marionette’s approach to the dancing body is a global one, which addresses itself first 
to the level of tension in the body as a whole. As I showed in Chapter 6, one way in 
which to categorise the body is to distinguish, as did the vitalists, between those parts 
of the body that require rest, and those which do not. Those which do not require rest 
are involved in homeostasis, but also, are involved in the regulation of posture, in the
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production of deep reflexes such as those of fight and flight, in the emotions that 
attend such reflexes, and in the memory which subsequently allows a body to avoid 
the situations in which these reflexes are likely to be needed.
It is often the case that the general level of tonicity in the student’s body is too 
high, or is poorly (that is to say, unequally) distributed within the body. In this case, 
the dance teacher must intervene to lower or redistribute the level of tonicity, and in 
doing so, it is helpful to realise that one can proceed in as many ways as there are 
ways in which the body as a global entity always already overlaps upon the body’s 
tonic system. Were the teacher to proceed by addressing the homeostatic body, this 
might give rise to a breathing exercise; were the teacher to proceed through the body’s 
postural system, the class might begin with an exercise in which students are 
instructed to lie on their backs, which will allow the postural muscles to relax. While 
such kinds of exercises may be highly efficient, it is important to note that neither of 
these “purely physical” strategies is mandatory, as 1 may be able to indicate by calling 
on first-hand experience. In the professional companies of which I was a member,^ I 
often observed dancers stumble from bed and into the daily morning class, their 
bodies tired and sore from the performance of the preceding night. As they arranged 
themselves in the room, often with imploded postures and stiff gaits, these bodies 
seemed ill-disposed to lengthen and bend. Yet after the teacher had set the first 
exercise, as the music began, their bodies abruptly became smooth and centred and 
their faces serene and focused. This effect does not happen merely because of the 
pleasure of hearing the pianist begin playing. Rather, this works like an incantation, 
or prayer. That is to say, it is also the strong ritual of the dancer’s daily training, 
which, working through memory and emotion, is able to reach the body’s fibres and 
modulate them.
Once the general tonicity in the body has been regulated to a level where the 
dance training can appropriately commence, the dance class can begin working on the 
redistribution of muscle tension. In this context, the Ghost-Body-as-Marionette finds 
its helpfulness through recollection of Godard’s pictoral paradigm of “the figure” and 
“the canvas”. For, the tonicity of the back body is consistantly higher than it is in the 
front body, and this determines that the body cannot engage in movements globally. 
To t ^ e  Godard’s paradigm and make it more dynamic, one can understand why this
The Pennsylvania Ballet; the Zürich Ballet: the Grand Ballet de Genève.
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State of affairs limits movement, by imagining the body as a garment formed by two 
lengths of elasticated fabric which have been sewn together: the front piece of 
material corresponds to Godard’s “figure”, the back piece of material corresponds to 
Godard’s “canvas”. The important thing to visualise is that the “canvas” contains 
stronger elastic than the front piece; and this means that the whole garment will resist 
the pull exerted on it to the degree offered by its stiffer side. Hence, a second 
preparatory stage of exercises in a dance class is often devoted to lengthening and 
stretching the back body, particularly the spine and the hamstrings, such as are 
proposed in the Free-Standing Stationary Work of Goss’s class.
The aim of such preparatory exercises as I have adduced above is to 
harmonise the body by regulating and redistributing tension, thereby creating more 
uniformity between the homeostatic “sleeping” and “non-sleeping” bodies, which 
largely correspond to the postural “front” and “back” bodies. Yet this is not the only 
way in which the metaphor of the Ghost-Body-as-Marionette can be present in the 
dance class. It can further be present in the dance class in strategies which attempt to 
exploit, rather than minimising the differences between the two different levels of 
tensions which are innate in the body’s muscular tissue. If the non-sleeping body is 
constantly at work, it also works more slowly than the body that sleeps, and many 
different dance techniques and somatic body practices have developed strategies 
which capitalise on this discrepancy between the two timings. In my discussion of the 
Romantic and Gothic novel in Chapter 7 ,1 suggested that one of the meanings of the 
recurring figure of the Somnambulist in these literatures was as a representation of the 
way in which the mind can leave the body to roam in fantasy and imagination. In a 
somewhat analogous fashion, the strategies that have developed in dance and somatic 
techniques exploit the way in which the speed of the brain allows it to take a voyage 
in imagination in which the site of that voyage is the body itself.
In his essay, “Gesture and its Perception”, Godard refers directly to Kleist’s 
marionette because this allows him to explain the indirect way in which conscious 
knowledge, which I have argued does not “speak to” the vitalist body, nevertheless 
can influence it in an indirect way. While I have suggested that the dancing body 
does not need to be conscious of the factors underlying his or her muscle tonus, it is 
also true that any rendering conscious of these factors and their mechanisms will have
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an influence on the body, one which can be enormously beneficial for the dance 
student.
Turning the mind’s attention to focus inwards on the body, may at first seem 
to pervert the normal function of perception, which is to regulate how the self 
integrates with the outside world. This may be one way a dancer may helpfully read 
Kleist’s “On the Marionette Theater”. For Kleist imagines a similar circularity of 
focus as the path a body must travel to attain grace. For Kleist, knowledge and the 
voluntary spirit intervene to make innocent, instinctual bodies clumsy and affected. 
Yet, the cure for clumsiness is the wilful pursuit of still more knowledge, for when 
perfect knowledge has been attained ungraceful striving and posturing will cease 
(420).
Kleist’s insistence that the Human has to attain greater knowledge to return to 
a state of blessed effortlessness, provides one of the reasons why Godard takes Kleist 
as his paradigm. Godard sees here a correlative of the Alexander Technique’s 
fundamental motto, which could be summarised as one of “inhibiting inhibition”. The 
dancer’s conscious awareness of the vitalist body may allow him or her to foresee the 
mannerisms, awkwardnesses, and inhibitions gained in the early stages of dance 
training, and thereby to inhibit them. Alternately, the processes of dance pedagogy 
might be recast in more neutral terms, as ones by which the dancing body can 
circumvent undesirable side effects or parasitical aspects of a particular movement, by 
a re-programming (or actually a pre-programming) of the body through visualisation.
Totalising the Bodv: The Ghost-Body-as-Marionette as Metaphor
Just as the object that is the clock—its intricate parts, straight hands, and the 
geometry of its face—provides common metaphors in the dance class of the ghost- 
body-as-clockwork, so the object that is the marionette—and particularly its strings 
provides a central metaphor in the dance classroom of the ghost-body-as-manonette. 
The use of this metaphor is indeed helpful, in that it provides the dancer with a model 
by which he or she can measure both the global and the local efforts his or her body 
exerts in order to create a movement; both the positive and negative space that a 
movement creates in the body; both the parts of the body that act and those that resist
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the movement that is in the process of being created. Tlie strings of the marionette are 
imaged as suspending the body when the dancer is in a standing position. To the 
extent that the ascentional direction of that suspension is clear, posture is thereby 
stabilised, which allows the muscles which habitually ensure vertical stability to relax 
their efforts. The strings of the marionette offer a way of imaging the unity of the 
body, when they are imaged as traversing its entire length. This imaging is a simple 
and effective way of externalising the internal muscular chains which are at work 
when a movement is performed, and such externalisation allows efforts to be refined, 
once more in a modulation which enables many unrequired muscle groups to relax 
their efforts. On a more local level of movement, the strings of the marionette can 
furnish a means of making manifest the constant antagonism that inheres between the 
muscle groups on opposite sides of a segment of the body; and again the precise 
knowledge of that antagonism allows for a diminishing of muscular effort. The 
metaphor of the marionette yields a veritable method, by which the body may be 
trained in a selective passivity, so that the muscle actions the dance student produces 
are expressed in space, rather than remaining restrained in the body through the 
unthinking actions of yet other muscles.
The radical scope of this method may best be illustrated by personal 
testimony. In class at the Ecole Peter Goss, 1 am lying stretched out on my back in 
José Cazeneuve’s intennediate-level class, relaxing more and more into the floor as 
encouraged by the teacher’s voice, observing how each part of the body has a weight 
that now is grounded or now is suspended in a certain way. We the students are told 
to bend our knees, to orient them towards the ceiling, to place our feet flat on the 
floor, heels under our knees and slightly apart, in alignment with our sitting-bones. 
Now, Cazeneuve tells us, in this posture, the way that our back bodies touch the 
ground is very different from when our legs are relaxed on the ground. Cazeneuve 
directs our attention to the way our lumbar spines are now in closer contact with the 
floor, in comparison witli tlie position we have just left, where the lumbar spine was 
drawn up in the air and away from the floor through the traction exerted on it by the 
weight of the stretched legs. In order that we may feel this, we are asked to come into 
and out of this position several tunes, using the minimum effort possible, and while 
doing so to keep our attention focused on the relation between lumbar suspension and 
abdominal tension. At the end of this exercise, we are told to rest in the neutral lying
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position, to let our impressions collect, and to integrate them into our bodies. After 
resting for several seconds, we are told to repeat the exercise, but this time we are 
instructed to try not to lift it with our own force. Here, Cazeneuve does not mention 
the marionette, but the marionette metaphor is present in the construction of the class, 
which has placed us in a situation in which our bodies can develop a selective 
passivity, in which both lumbar suspension and abdominal tension are reduced, and 
time is given to allow the body to find the way in which the movement can emerge 
with the least possible effort.
Here, in this example, the use of the image of the marionette string permits the 
dancer to visualise the globality of his or her body engaging in the movement. 
Bending the knee causes the ham-string muscles (those situated on the back of the 
thigh) to receive a passive stretch, as the quadriceps muscle (on the front of the thigh) 
contracts to flex the thigh towards the torso. But the ham-string muscle is part of a 
muscular chain which runs the length of the back-body, from the top of the spine to 
the heels, and if this chain is tense, lifting the knee will be more difficult than if it is 
relaxed. In the exercise proposed in the class, the relaxation of the back body is 
encouraged: firstly, by having the dancers lie down outstretched, for in this position 
the postural muscles can relax their tension; and secondly, by the preparatory exercise 
in which students have been directed to visualise their back bodies, a visualisation 
once again aided by the unchanging, tactile reference of the floor’s surface. Here, the 
relative facility of the exercise allows the mere metaphor of the marionette to become 
performative, which is to say that it can effect the relaxation of the muscles which 
were possible restrainers of the wished-for movement.
Yet imagine if the next exercise were, after lifting the knee to the ceiling, to 
straighten the knee, bringing the foot to the ceiling. This exercise is a much more 
demanding one, for if the ham-strings are not stretched enough, the quadriceps must 
work doubly hard. For to their efforts to lift the weight of the leg against the force of 
gravity are added those of overcoming the resistance afforded by the foreshortened 
ham-strings. In this case, for the quadriceps to work with less effort, the ham-strings 
must absolutely be convinced to relax and lengthen. In order to effect this, further 
strategies are required, and ones I will explain through reference to the recurring 
figure of the double I analysed in Chapter 7 in my discussion of Gothic and Romantic
turns.
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Making Metaphor Matter
In Chapter 7, I suggested that the narrative strategy of doubling that recurred 
in the Gothic and Romantic novel and in its ballet, was at the service of an eradication 
of disturbing elements of the self. This strategy consisted in a series of operations 
which succeeded one another in time. First, the narrative divides the body into two 
bodies, creating clear distinctions between them. Then, it stages antagonism, contrast, 
or tension between the two bodies. And finally, it rids itself of that tension by putting 
one of the pair from the double to sleep. This process leaves the surviving double, at 
the end of the narrative, a tamed body.
Doubling appears as a kind of cathartic process by which narrative totalises 
the body. As in Aesop’s fable of the tortoise and the hare, doubling puts the faster- 
running voluntary body to sleep, allowing the slower and steadier involuntary body to 
overtake it, thereby bringing voluntary and involuntary selves into a simultaneity of 
coordination. A similar strategy of doubling, whose result is one of totalising the 
body, can be implemented in a pedagogical situation to totalise the interior muscle 
structure of a single body. This internal strategy works, similarly, through the three 
stages of: division, the staging of conflict, and resolution of tension. The body is 
divided into the agonists of a movement and its antagonists; a conflict is staged 
between the two kinds of muscle; the antagonists of the movement are disarmed, 
leaving the body access to the freer execution of the movement in question.
This pedagogical strategy, used to force the relaxation of fore-shortened 
muscles, can again best be illustrated by personal testimony. Again at the Ecole Peter 
Goss, this time taking Goss’s advanced class, the students, 1 amongst them, are lying 
outstretched on our backs during the Floor Work which begins the class. Around ten 
minutes into this section, Goss asks the class to extend one leg towards the ceiling. In 
this movement, as I described above, the agonists are the quadriceps muscle; the 
antagonists are the ham-string muscles. The tension of the ham-strings, (which 
constitutes the tightness of the muscle and its resistance to lengthening) may impede 
the work of the quadriceps, and keeps the leg from extending to the front. But here 
Goss stages a conflict between the two muscle groups, during which the muscles work
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actively against one another, until the slower-to-extend antagonist accepts to extend. 
Goss asks us to place our two hands, fingers interlaced, behind the thigh of the lifted 
leg, and to try to press the leg, away from the torso, and back down to the floor beside 
the other leg, as if trying, not to stretch the hamstring, but to shorten it. Yet at the 
same time that the antagonist in being intentionally solicited by exerting effort to 
bring the leg down, the agonist, the quadriceps are put in action by Goss’s command 
to stretch the heel to the ceiling, for the quadriceps muscle is that which brings the 
knee to straight. During the moments when the agonist and the antagonist are bought 
to work on against the other, the strength of the agonist, is that through which the 
rigidity of the antagonist is overcome, thereby making the body both stronger and 
more supple selectively. This means that afterwards, the effort the agonist exerts can 
be translated into an external movement—moving the leg through space—rather than 
being used up in an internal one—in the effort to overcome the resistance of the (now 
pacified) antagonist. Goss asks us to release the contest between the two muscles and 
relax back into a neutral position on the floor. After a few moments of rest, he directs 
us to repeat the leg lift to the ceiling and notice how the movement has changed.
In my illustration of my personal experience in José Cazeneuve and Peter 
Goss’s classes I have attempted to show how the same teaching method implies a 
different exerise according to the level of the students. In Cazeneuve’s intermediate 
class, she did not need to talk explicitly of the marionette as her students performed 
the exercise, because for intermediate students, her voice was already a sufficiently 
potent thread, one fully capable of suspending students’ minds and bodies, able to 
keep them channelled in the exercise and to guide them through it. Yet in my 
beginning level classes at the school, I think it helps less experienced students to have 
more guidance. And therefore I may make the marionette image explicit, by 
suggesting to students that someone has attached a string to each of their knees, and 
that these strings are held above them by someone whol first pulls on one string and 
then on another. Similarly, while Goss asks his advanced students to use their hands 
in the exercise I described above, when I give the same exercise to my intermediate 
classes I find students profit from the use of real props which help them to image the 
work of the muscles that is taking place in the body. This pedagogical turn involves 
making the metaphor of the marionette strings material again.
212
In order to illustrate this turn I will describe an exercise I learned in my 
practice of Iyengar yoga. With the practitioner already in a supine position, a yoga 
strap, or other long strand of non-extensible material, is placed on the heel of the 
lifted leg, its two ends held one in each hand. The strap and the arms keep the leg in a 
stationary position in which it extends vertically to the ceiling, so that the quadriceps 
muscle (and the ilio-psoas muscle) does not have to contract to keep the leg at that 
height. From this position, a conflict is staged between the muscle groups on the back 
of the leg and those of the front. The exercise consists in a combination of opposing 
muscle actions. While contracting the quadriceps muscle, as though to lift the knee­
cap towards the top of the thigh, the practitioner also contracts the ham-strings as 
though trying to move the leg away from the chest, back down to the floor, a 
movement which is impeded by an unchanging grasp of the hands on the strap. The 
actions going on in the body are the same as those I described in Goss’s advanced 
class. Yet in my intermediate class, the presence of the strap insists on the different 
parameters of the exercise, and ensures that the mind cannot forget these different 
parameters. The strap, as it is pulled strongly down into the top of the heel of the sole 
of the foot of the lifted leg stimulates the neuro-receptors in the soul of the foot, 
which are intimately liked with the body’s gravitational and tonic systems. The 
body’s reflex to this action is to push the strap away, and in order to do this two 
actions simultaneously occur. One of these is that the knee stretches, the other is that 
the top of the femur bone grounds itself more firmly in contact with the floor. Thus 
the student has the concrete sensation of the three directions the single movement of 
lifting the leg implies for three different parts of the body, and has these constantly 
made present by the tactile sensation of the strap. At the same time that the strap 
affords these informative tactile sensations, it, visually, suggests the global trajectory 
of the muscles that are attached to the thigh and lower leg, and how these together,
may form a single, long tissue.
While above I showed the benefits of working with real objects, I am not 
arguing for the systematic use of props. In the case Goss s advanced class, for 
example, the information that the prop offers body and mind is not new to them, and 
therefore using the strap cannot enliven the exercise for the professional dancers that 
attend this class in the same way that it can for intermediate students. Using the 
hands to hold the leg, is not just a shortcut: it is a way of addressing the body without
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insisting that the mind emphatically come to bear upon it, and this is part of the 
freedom that Goss is careful to allow his advanced students.
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Conclusion 
Why Ghost-Bodies Matter
In Ghost-Bodies: History, Performance and Practice in Contemporary Dance 
in France 1980-2000, I have argued that the Ghost-Body-as-Clockwork and the 
Ghost-Body-as-Marionette are total, self-sustaining programmes, programmes which 
involve particular ways of thinking and perceiving, as well as specific techniques that 
direct the body’s action. This presentation may have appeared to imply that one 
ghost-body could be sufficient unto itself; and, extrapolating from this, that 1 might be 
arguing that one of these ghost bodies could be adopted at the expense of the other. 
However, almost the opposite is the case. The Ghost-Body-as-Clockwork and the 
Ghost-Body-as-Marionette are greatly indebted to one another. Like the 
Enlightenment and Romantic movements that nourish them, respectively, they exist in 
dialectical relation. One is the condition for the other; for the excesses and oversights 
of one, are what create an urgent need for the other. At the level of dance technique, 
the Ghost-Body-as-Clockwork is founded on the possibility of articulation, of 
segmentation—a segmentation which cannot occur in the body until and unless the 
body is perceived globally. Similarly, the project of the Ghost-Body-as-Marionette, 
which involves considering the body as a global system, is one which presupposes a 
perception of the body as consisting of realms of differentiation.
Ghost-Bodies in the Plural
Hence, 1 do not argue that the dancing body should be a host for only one of 
the ghost-bodies that 1 have discussed, but rather, argue for the plurality of ghosts. 
Here, 1 am speaking to a context in dance writing which has recently engaged with the 
plurality of the dancing body, a plurality that has been called eclectic , 
“multitalented”, and “hybrid”. This context first struck me in Susan Foster’s 
“Dancing Bodies” (1992), an essay that 1 considered in my Introduction. After her 
analysis of five different dance techniques widely practised in the United States, 
Foster concludes the essay with a critique ot the body which has trained in several
such techniques. For Foster, this body is not “deeply involved” in any of the codes it 
knows: it is a body which “homogenizes all styles and vocabularies beneath a sleek 
impenetrable surface” (494). The measure of Foster’s distaste can be gauged by her 
styling this body as a “body for hire”, which thus likens it to the body of a prostitute. 
What structures Foster’s opposition between the body that trains in a unique technique 
and the body that trains in many techniques is a group of metaphors of surface and 
depth. For Foster, the dancer whose practice consists in a multiplicity of styles 
features a “rubbery flexibility coated with impervious glossiness”, while the dancer 
who is dedicated to the practice of a sole technique builds, through that technique, a 
deep and “irrevocable connection to a self’ (494).
Similarly, in “Hybrid Bodies” (1995), Laurence Louppe worries lest the 
mixing of cultural sources, and the borrowing of references should affect the 
production of the dancing body (62). In “Singular, Moving Geographies”, Louppe 
quotes Hubert Godard as saying that the dancing body which is marked by several 
aesthetics is less ready to join in the particular singular aesthetic project of any given 
choreographer, whose “only resource [then] consists of multiplying the metaphors” in 
order to transmit a sense of what he or she wants (18). Adding to this same 
discussion, though from the opposite side of the argument, is Dena Davida in 
“Dancing the Body Eclectic” (1992). Here Davida reveals the constructed, 
composite, and culturally specific nature of practices, which are taken as having 
sprung fully formed from the head of Zeus. As if responding directly Foster’s essay 
of the same year, and particularly, reacting to the abundant metaphors of surface and 
depth by which Foster distinguishes between seeming and being, Davida exposes that 
what is taken as depth of being, is, if attended to more closely, merely another level of 
seeming.
In my study 1 have wished to shift from the opposition between seeming and 
being, to an opposition between being and doing. What seems like accomplished fact 
or a state of being is in fact constructed by activity, the activity of bringing itself into 
being which Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela have called autopoeisis. 1 
have been concerned to show the constructed nature of dance culture, for 1 have 
wanted to stress that culture is not only something that subjects in a present moment 
inherit, but also, something that those subjects make. For such an awareness of the 
ongoingness of history, and the part that living dancing bodies can play now in
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writing the dance history of the future, may serve to authorise the creative projects of 
dance artists, thereby encouraging more cultural construction in the field of dance. 
Yet my review of the past, one which has been directed by a desire to encourage the 
present in its new aesthetic projects, is in tension with what is a widespread tendency 
in dance to privilege the conservation of the old at the expense of invention. My reply 
to Foster’s concerns in “Dancing Bodies” takes the form of analysing whether she has 
ground upon which to lay her concerns about the multitalented body, for I show the 
way in which the dancer’s desire is implicated in every step of the dancing body’s 
training, a desire which undermines the viewpoint from where the dancing body could 
be seen as a fundamentally disengaged “body for hire”. I have also attempted to 
overturn the ground on which Louppe’s fears are posed, rather than replying to those 
fears themselves. My examination of the findings of new cognitive science and 
neurology show that Louppe’s fears rest on assumptions about the integrity of 
subjects and how subjectivity is constructed, assumptions which are pervasive 
conceptual models in our culture, but also, this science now reveals, models which are 
flawed in important ways.
What allows Louppe to suspect that the dancer’s versatility in lending himself 
or herself to multiple aesthetics may actually hinder the invention of authoritative 
forms, is the distinction which she makes between knowledge that has already been 
incorporated in the body, and the disembodied knowledge of the metaphors which are 
spoken, now, to that same body. In the situation that Godard imagines and which 
catches Louppe’s writerly imagination, the choreographer, faced with dancers who 
have not been schooled in his or her aesthetic, is forced to speak to the dancers, 
“multiplying the metaphors”, rather than relying on what the dancers already know. 
Here, Louppe implies, like Foster, that the body has different levels, and that its 
surface level is less true and authentic than the body’s depths, through her posing of 
an opposition between “outer” metaphors and “inner” bodily knowledge. But her 
formulation also intimates a problematic which, I believe, is more crucial: the 
question of the body’s relation to time, timing, and duration. Louppe’s terms seem to 
imply that the depths of the body—its muscles and its sinews—are constructed over 
time; they intimate that the words the choreographer or teacher speaks, fall on a body 
which has never heard them before, and which then this body exerts itself to assume. 
In my study, I have been concerned to expose in detail, how the metaphors which
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matter to the body—which get it to arise and perform—are not new ones, but rather 
ones whose enunciation in a time past have been what have enabled the construction 
of the muscle and sinew by which that body, now, is moved. What I have intended to 
imply by means of my central concept of ghost-bodies—ghost-bodies which are 
capable of travelling through time and erupting unexpectedly in eras far removed 
from the moment of their initial appearance—is the curious way in which the body 
that is supremely bounded by time may also be seen to be outside or even untouched 
by time. For though the body usually is constructed slowly, through time, the rule of 
time is not the only directive that it obeys: the trump card in the body seems in fact to 
be played by homeostasis.
For a fundamental issue that Louppe’s fears raise, is also that implied by 
Alastair Macaulay’s review, which I discussed in Chapter 1, where the property of the 
body’s muscle memory was defined as the tendency to “linger”. In order to address 
the issue of the body’s relation to duration, I have examined, in Chapter 1, the 
research of V.S. Ramachandran and the personal history of Oliver Sacks. Their 
testimonies show that though muscles and sinews are usually constructed over an 
extended period of time, and show that body intelligence may remain as a structuring 
agent over long durations, the body also has the possibility to change itself with 
radical rapidity, to metamorphose by exponential leaps rather than by slow plodding. 
Ramachandran’s ingenious experiments enabled his patients to be quickly rid of 
phantom limbs that they had lived with for years, and in one case since birth; Sacks’s 
leg made instant recovery through the ruse of a specialist who was able to consider 
him as a person rather than as a case. In this study, I have taken first steps towards 
considering the underlying grammar of a homeostasis which both rejects such rapid 
change if the context outside the organism is such that none is necessary, and 
precipitates rapid change if the context in which the body is located requires such 
change. As part of such a consideration, my study has also begun to question the way 
in which the pedagogical situation and the situation of performance may become 
contexts which intervene within the grammar of the body’s homeostasis, an 
intervention which impels and supports the body’s transformation.
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The Imaginative Space of Ghost-Bodies
Though the present work has considered only two ghost-bodies, I do not 
pretend that these are the only ghost-bodies that exist in dance. Other ghost-bodies 
both currently exist and are now being elaborated, each involving distinctive ways of 
thinking, points of view, and physical practices which found, sustain, and promote 
them in turn. Yet there is a reason why the present study has focused its analysis 
exclusively on the Ghost-Body-as-Clockwork and the Ghost-Body-as-Marionette, and 
this is that these two ghost-bodies are now powerfully evoked by the contemporary 
context of dance culture in France, one which is marked by a fundamental divergence 
of attitude with respect to its own history. This divergence might be described, at the 
risk of over-simplifying, as one which distinguishes between codified and emerging 
techniques. Those who practise codified techniques seem to believe that the mere fact 
that a method, work, or code exists is sufficient reason that it should be inculcated; 
those who practice emerging techniques seem to hold the diametrically opposite view, 
that if a method, work, or code already exists, this is sufficient reason it should be 
avoided. Both of these attitudes limit the way in which practitioners may engage in 
creating dance, limitations which are reflected in the choreography that is seen 
onstage today. Simplifying again, I would suggest that the choreographic creation 
that emerges today from bodies which have been formed by codified dance techniques 
may seem empty and fossilised; while that which emerges from those bodies which 
have been formed by emerging dance tecliniques may seem pretentious or excessively 
occupied in justifying their legitimacy. These different aesthetic failings have a 
common source: their relation to dance history. The present choreographic creation 
which emerges from codified techniques is, first of all, scant; and the little that is 
choreographed seems thin and insufficiently driven.
Choreographers working within the academic traditions accept too much 
within those traditions as given, here they elaborate their work on aesthetic 
foundations which have not been challenged by new points of view. Yet this state of 
affairs—one which saps choreographic creation, and thus, ironically, undermines the 
continuance of the very tradition in which these choreographers hope to inscribe 
themselves—is prepared for at the outset. For the conservatory system which
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produces not only the dancers but also the choreographers of tomorrow, selects its 
students almost exclusively on the basis of ever more narrow physical criteria, 
students whom it proceeds to train in bodily patterns which also become patterns of 
mind.
By contrast, the choreographic creation that arises from emerging techniques 
is ample. Yet if more traditional choreography accords no time for reflection on its 
own foundations, the choreography that arises from emerging techniques is often 
characterised by the excessive amount of emphasis it places on the critique of 
aesthetic foundations, or, alternatively but relatedly, on inventing its aesthetic home. 
Many works end up being about the rejection of past forms, by which efforts 
choreographers hope to legitimise their own divergent aesthetic. The new 
choreography spends time and effort in constructing a second-order legitimacy, which 
it requires because it does not claim the heritage which it possesses and which could 
automatically confer legitimacy. This is time and effort that could be used more 
creatively, in the development of an aesthetic which might be autonomous and self- 
confident rather than caught up in the interminable search for legitimate and 
authoritative origins.
These two different kinds of aesthetic difficulty stem from a single source. 
Both those who practise codified techniques and those who practise emerging ones 
over-estimate the weight of history. This makes history enjoy indiscriminate 
acceptance from those connected to academies, and encounter wholesale dismissal 
from those who wish to sever all connections to them. But the weightiness of history 
is a valuation that may be changed through the careful analysis of the past, an analysis 
that allows it to become evident that the history which we receive with the force of 
inevitability, was not inevitable but contingent. History is not written in stone, but 
rather is made by bodies, the bodies of individuals in relation to other bodies, bodies 
which moved in certain ways in the context of particular situations and of specific 
times. If careful analysis can allow this to be perceived, the imperative to act or react 
for or against history may be removed. The removal of such an imperative may 
deliver the dancing body into a lighter and more inclusive imaginative space, one in 
which more creation may take place, with less extraneous effort.
It is such analysis, one which situates the dancing body in a continuity with its 
heritage, even as it seeks to liberate the dancing body from certain ostensible
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imperatives of that heritage, that I have provided in Ghost-Bodies: History, 
Performance and Practice in Contemporary Dance in France 1980-2000. For I have 
looked into the past, from the viewpoint of present-day dance practice in France, in 
order to show that the culture which we inherit is simultaneously one which we are 
making. In insisting that conceptualisation, perception, and action are indivisible 
partners, I have offered the dancer an analysis through which he or she may become 
conscious that his or her body practice implies a positioning of the self, both in terms 
of how he or she looks at and lives in the world, and of how he or she imagines the 
place of art within it. The dancer belonging to a larger culture than the culture that is 
proper to dance, and it has been my intention to enrich the dancer’s sense of 
connection with this larger culture, in order that this may open the dancer’s 
imaginative horizons. In becoming aware of how ghost-bodies are constructed in the 
self, the dancer may take a first step in the process of bringing new and different 
ghost-bodies into being. In creating these new ghost-bodies, the dancing body both 
may re-invent itself, and may offer to the public that watches dance new ways of 
entertaining being a body, and of being subjects.
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